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Abstract: This thesis explores the reasons behind barristers' advice to defendants in the 
Crown Court on plea, primarily through interviews with criminal law practitioners 
themselves. Beginning with a critical overview of the current research, the thesis argues 
that the views of criminal barristers are a neglected significant source of information in 
developing an understanding of why particular advice is given. The thesis, in the context 
of other research, analyses the data from interviews conducted with current practitioners 
on the London and the Midlands Circuits, and discusses the various drivers that act upon 
barristers in deciding what advice to give. Starting with the actual advice given and the 
advising styles adopted, the thesis explores why guilty pleas might be advised and plea 
bargains sought with prosecutors. The research goes on to examine the impact of various 
influences, including legal, ethical, cultural, regional and financial to produce an 
overview of what factors impact upon a barrister's advice. The thesis argues that the 
current view of the Bar sustained in much of the literature is insufficiently nuanced and 
outdated, and that the reasons behind the advice given to defendants on plea are 
extraordinarily varied, occasionally contradictory, and highly complex. The thesis 
concludes that the data from the interviews warrants a rethink of why particular advice is 
given and that discovering what drives barristers’ advice is critical to formulating law 
and government policy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the drivers behind the advice given by barristers to defendants on 
plea in the Crown Court in England and Wales. By drivers, this thesis means motivation, 
incentive, reason or influence. According to Bottomley, the plea is perhaps the most 
important decision in the criminal process.1 The plea is entirely conclusive of fact-
finding in a Crown Court case. In entering a plea of guilty, the matter of whether the 
defendant committed the offences charged is settled. The court, except in exceptional 
circumstances, will not reach behind the plea and explore the correctness of the facts that 
determine guilt.2 In deciding what plea is to be entered, the advice given by the defence 
barrister is of crucial significance. It is the defence barrister, with his or her knowledge 
of the law and experience of procedure, who meets with the defendant, evaluates the 
prosecution and defence cases and advises on the potential sentence. On the basis of this 
advice, and that of the solicitor, the defendant makes his or her decision on whether to 
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, and therefore whether the case proceeds to trial.  
 
However, why, and to a lesser extent how, barristers give advice as they do is not 
entirely clear. As will be explored in Chapter 2, some of the critical scholarship alleges 
that barristers subscribe to a guilty plea culture in which cases are generally approached 
by lawyers with an expectation that the defendant will plead guilty. With that 
expectation, defendants are pressurised by their own lawyers into pleading to offences to 
which they may have had a suitable defence. Alternatively, barristers are said to be part 
of a courtroom community which emphasises the expedition of cases through guilty 
pleas, or, that barristers attempt to maximise their fees through high case turn over and 
guilty pleas. According to this view, the barrister in conforming to the overwhelming 
culture of criminal defence, or the expectations of his or her colleagues, or to generate as 
                                                 
1
 A. K. Bottomley, Decisions in the Penal Process (Martin Robertson, London 1973) 105. 
2
 The defendant must have a free-choice of plea. The plea is a nullity if he or she is subject to such 
pressure that he or she does not have a free-choice: Inns (1974) 60 Cr App Rep 231. The court may hold a 
Newton (1982) 77 Cr App R 13 hearing if the prosecution and defence disagree on the factual basis of an 
offence. However, this is a hearing to determine the mitigating or aggravating features of the offence only. 
Questions regarding the defendant’s fitness to enter a plea are determined by the judge, who must decide 
on the basis of medical evidence whether, amongst other things, the defendant understands the difference 
between a plea of guilty and not guilty and the course of the proceedings so as to make a proper defence: 
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s 4(5) (as amended). Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303; Berry (1977) 
66 Cr App Rep 156, CA; Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557.  
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much money as possible, manipulates the defendant through a variety of psychological 
means and persuades them not to go to trial.  
 
This thesis argues that there are two main limitations with the current literature. Firstly, 
the majority of research on how and why plea advice is given pre-dates a huge amount 
of significant change and development in the criminal law. The research presented here 
provides a more up to date study of criminal barristers in the context of contemporary 
law and procedure. Secondly, the literature is missing a key aspect of the empirical 
evidence needed to create a fuller and more accurate picture of the advice-giving 
process, namely research with barristers themselves regarding the motivation behind 
their advice on plea. This thesis has sought to fill that lacuna through qualitative 
interviews with 24 criminal law practitioners, and the data from those interviews forms 
the basis of the five substantive chapters that are presented below.    
 
After a review of the current scholarship and law in Chapter 2 and a formal 
identification of the research question, the thesis briefly details the methods used in 
carrying out this research in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 to 8 constitute the main body of the 
study and attempt to explain the data from the qualitative research undertaken. In 
Chapter 4 the thesis explores a defence barrister’s advice on the micro, case-by-case 
level. Without intending to be all encompassing, this chapter details how barristers deal 
with the various factors that affect the case at hand and translate those factors into 
advice. This involves a series of complex decisions which take into account a multitude 
of factors including such matters as evidence and sentence, as well as bad character 
applications and sentencing indications. This chapter shows that barristers are 
thoroughly engaged in their cases and sets out the detailed practical, as well as 
sometimes ethical considerations that face a barrister in deciding what advice to give and 
how that advice should be delivered. 
 
Chapter 5 sets out a number of issues in relation to the practice of plea bargaining. This 
chapter presents the data gathered on why and how plea bargains are sought on behalf of 
the defendant, and attempts to answer some of the criticisms of the practice. Defendants 
are reframed as a barrister might see them; as those who face a prosecution case on a 
spectrum of evidence from very strong to very weak, rather than as the de facto innocent 
 11
or guilty. This chapter argues that bargained pleas are often sought because the barrister 
wishes to gain the optimal outcome for the defendant and are the result of a reasoned 
consideration by the defending barrister and defendant of risk and potential sentence. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the context for and manner in which barristers are paid. As well as 
presenting the interviewees’ views on whether the manipulation of fees for financial 
gain is possible or desirable, this chapter presents an alternative way of thinking about 
the role financial incentives play in professional decision-making. This chapter also 
models barrister pay according to the latest pay scheme and shows how financial 
incentives interrelate with other incentives to produce the advice given to defendants. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the barrister-solicitor relationship, and discusses how the influence of 
a solicitor might affect barrister decision-making. This chapter argues that barristers are 
subject to subsequent incentives- those incentives that primarily affect the solicitor are 
passed on to the barrister and affect how he or she might behave. This chapter looks at 
the financial incentives affecting solicitors, revealing that under current fee 
arrangements solicitors may now strongly favour trials. This chapter sets out the 
potential problems that this fee structure might cause the barrister-solicitor relationship 
and speculates as to what future difficulties solicitor pay rates may create for defendants 
and the criminal bar.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 examines the potential impact on advice-giving of the court 
community. It develops a potential, partial explanation for the significant differences 
observed in the judicial statistics for the guilty plea and cracked trial rates between 
London and the Midlands. Using a theoretical model of repeat players and court 
communities, this chapter argues that the size and contact rate of the Bar in the Midlands 
has allowed a court community to develop which has a tangible effect on the advice 
given to defendants. Within a court community made up of lawyers who are often repeat 
players, relationships of trust emerge that assist the flow of information between the 
prosecution and defence, allowing negotiations to conclude more successfully. 
Furthermore, within that community, the participants’ definitions of how defendants 
should be dealt with tend to converge, allowing cases to be resolved more regularly 
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without trials. This chapter will present data that supports this contention, including the 
interviewees’ perceptions on their own working practices.  
 
 
On the basis of the data gathered from barristers themselves, these chapters are intended 
to reveal the many and varied incentives that lie behind a barrister’s advice to the 
defendant. This thesis is an attempt to show that the current view of guilty plea culture, 
or court communities, or simple fee-result explanations do not realise the extremely 
complicated and nuanced reasons why defendants are advised by barristers to plead 
guilty, accept guilt to a reduced charge or go to trial.3  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 All website addresses referred to were current when last accessed on 14 November 2009. The law has 
changed in some areas since the interviews took place. Where relevant to the discussion this change is 
noted in the text.  
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Chapter 2: Pleading guilty: historical and comparative developments  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and critically evaluate the main strands of 
research and commentary on the role of barristers in the development and use of the 
guilty plea in the Crown Court of England and Wales. By discussing the literature and 
the law this chapter will identify the central research question (as well as ancillary 
questions), that this thesis has attempted to answer. Although the main discussion in this 
chapter will be on contemporary accounts and the law of plea bargaining or negotiated 
pleas, it will also briefly analyse historical studies in order to place the current 
developments in context. The literature in combination with the relevant law on plea is 
extensive, especially when the American research is taken into account. In an effort to 
manage the literature more effectively and concentrate on what is relevant to this 
research, this chapter focuses on research covering the Crown Court and the activities of 
barristers. Inevitably the literature explored includes the activities of the lower courts. 
Barristers regularly represent defendants in magistrates’ courts and the bridge provided 
by either-way offences has an important impact on the activities of the Crown Court.  
 
After a brief discussion of the origins of plea bargaining and the relatively new 
procedures of diversion from the criminal justice process, the main body of the chapter 
will be a critical examination of the research and approach of authors who have studied 
the guilty plea and plea bargaining in English courts in the last forty years. These 
authors have addressed the question of why, in a system based on the presumption of 
innocence, so many defendants decide to admit to criminal conduct without any kind of 
trial.  Much of this body of research has been critical of lawyers, including barristers, 
and their alleged complicity with the courts in producing guilty pleas. To provide 
context there will also be a discussion of the current law and the approach of Parliament 
and the courts to guilty pleas.  
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2. The origins of plea bargaining in Anglo-American law 
 
There remains a degree of dispute over the precise origins of plea bargaining in Anglo-
American law. While researchers agree that the historical data indicates that guilty pleas 
began to rise dramatically in both common law jurisdictions in the mid-19th Century4, 
the reasons for the escalation is not necessarily so clear. Dividing broadly in to three 
groups, authors have attributed the rise of guilty pleas, and by inference plea bargaining, 
to either the “lawyerization” of trials5, the increased work load on courts6, or to the 
demands of the wider political economy.7  
 
Malcolm Feeley and John Langbein have written widely on the development of the 
criminal courts of England in the 18th and 19th Centuries. The data produced by Feeley 
on the “lawyerization”, the development and domination of trials by lawyers, at the Old 
Bailey provides, however, a limited explanation for the rise of guilty pleas in England.8 
The explanation that lawyers over-complicated the system of trial through developing 
methods of excluding unfairly gained evidence and confessions, and cross examination, 
and turned the courts to plea bargaining to cope, lacks the contextual evidence of other 
studies. As George Fisher shows in his analysis of Massachusetts in the same period, 
documents that explain the motives of individuals in pursuing guilty plea agreements are 
vital in interpreting changes in pleading practice. Fisher’s account attributes plea 
                                                 
4
 For evidence of the rise of guilty pleas in the United States in the 19th Century: R. Moley, ‘The 
Vanishing Jury’ (1928) 2 S.Cal.L.Rev. 97; A. Alschuler, ‘Plea Bargaining and Its History’ (1979) 79 
Colum.L.Rev. 1, 19. For guilty plea rates at the Old Bailey to 1912: M. Feeley, ‘Legal Complexity and the 
Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining’ (1997) 31 Is.L.R. 18. 
5
 Feeley (n.4), M. Feeley, ‘Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process Journal of Justice 
Systems’ (1982) 73 Just.Sys.J. 338; J. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversarial Criminal Trial (OUP, 
Oxford 2003), ‘Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining’ (1979) 13 Law and Society Review 
261, ‘The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers’ (1978) 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 263. 
6
 G. Fisher, ‘Plea Bargaining’s Triumph’ (2000) 109 Yale L.J. 857; Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History 
of Plea Bargaining in America (Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 2003). 
7
 M. Vogel, Coercion to Compromise: Plea Bargaining, the Courts and the Making of Political Authority 
(OUP, Oxford 2007), ‘The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State 
Formation, 1830-1860’ (1999) 33 Law and Society Review 161; M. McConville and C. Mirsky, Jury 
Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005). 
8
 Feeley (n.4).  
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bargaining to an increased work load in the civil courts.9 These conclusions are enriched 
by a reliance on statistical measures, letters, newspapers and other contextual 
documents. Equally, McConville and Mirsky’s assessment that plea bargaining was a 
phenomenon of the political economy of New York court rooms, where elected officials 
wished to aggregate justice rather than spend time and money on individuals, is based on 
a detailed analysis of contemporary documents.10 When compared, the research of 
Feeley on English courts lacks important evidence on the motivation of those engaged in 
criminal practice.  
 
Unfortunately, neither the Fisher nor the McConville and Mirsky’s explanations can be 
readily transplanted to England. Undoubtedly, England went through a similar process 
of industrialisation and population change during the 19th Century, however, similar 
documentary evidence (as well as evidence of attrition of charges and changes in 
prosecutions) would be needed to confirm Fisher’s assertion that case load was the 
primary factor behind plea bargaining. McConville and Mirsky’s reasoning is even more 
difficult to apply to England given the relative lack of direct political influence on the 
treatment of criminal cases. Unlike most United States jurisdictions, judicial and 
prosecutorial positions are not occupied in England by elected officials. The relative 
non-politicisation of English court actors might explain the lower incidence of guilty 
pleas (and possibly a reduced incidence of plea bargaining) in English courts compared 
to their American counterparts, however, much further study would be required before 
any firm link between the political economy and guilty pleas could be established.  
 
3.  Pleading guilty and admitting to offences in contemporary English 
criminal justice 
 
It should be noted from the outset that the literature on guilty pleas and plea bargaining 
is set in the context of an overall governmental policy move in the past 20 years towards 
                                                 
9
 Fisher (n.6) (2000) 996-1001. 
10
 McConville and Mirsky (n.7) 334. 
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implementing laws and incentives to increase the number of defendants who plead 
guilty. As Ashworth and Redmayne commented in 2005, ‘the present Government has 
reaffirmed its objective of getting more defendants to plead guilty and to do so earlier.’11 
Successive governments, and particularly the current Labour government, have sought 
to curb defendant access to trials, increase incentives to plead guilty, and remove legal 
protections previously given to defendants. This includes the more recent expansion of 
policies that seek to divert defendants from the criminal justice process. 
 
a. Diversion 
 
Diversion removes defendants from the criminal justice system without a formal process 
of charge, trial and sentence, but requires an admission to an offence. This way of 
dealing with defendants has reached new prominence since the introduction of 
conditional cautioning under section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It is necessary 
to consider whether the pool of defendants who reach barristers in the Crown Court has 
changed. If a large number of defendants are now admitting to offences through a non-
judicial system, this has important implications for the continued relevance of previous 
research.  
 
i. Simple cautions 
 
Simple cautions are within the discretion of individual police officers and are not 
statutorily defined, although National Standards do exist to try and establish consistency 
in their application.12 Although not a criminal conviction, a caution is an admission to 
the offence. Once a caution is administered, a record of the caution is entered onto the 
Police National Database, and if the offence is listed under Schedule 3 to the Sexual 
                                                 
11
 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 286. 
12
 Home Office, ‘Cautioning of Adult Offenders’ Home Office Circular 30/2005 (2005) 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/publications/home-office-circulars/circulars-2005/030-2005>. 
Simple cautions are not available for offenders under the age of 18.  Offenders under the age of 18 are 
dealt with under a statutory scheme of reprimands and warnings under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
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Offences Act 2003 the offender’s name is entered onto the sexual offenders register. The 
caution can be used against the offender in court as part of evidence of bad character 
under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 101 in a future prosecution. If the offender 
works in a certain occupation (such as teaching, nursing, etc) their employer is informed.  
 
ii. Statutory cautions 
 
The new statutory scheme of conditional cautioning under section 23 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 allows prosecutors to ask a police officer to administer a caution with 
certain conditions attached. According to section 23(3) of the Act, the conditions 
attached must have the objective of either rehabilitating the offender, or making 
reparations to the victim of the offence, or both. Under the Code of Practice, a 
conditional caution should not be mentioned until the offender has made a clear and 
reliable admission and the offender should be given access to legal advice before 
accepting the caution and the proposed conditions.13  
 
For the purpose of this research it is not necessary to rehearse the arguments for and 
against the use of cautioning by the police.14 It is sufficient to say that cautioning 
removes from the criminal justice process many defendants who might previously have 
been prosecuted, and possibly pleaded to, or been found guilty of an offence. Although 
as some have argued, it would take a very strong person to reject a caution and risk 
prosecution15, an inevitable conclusion is that a significant number of those cautioned 
might have pleaded guilty to an offence in the courts. The Home Office produces 
statistics which examine the cautioning rate; that is the total number of those cautioned 
as a percentage of those either cautioned or convicted of an offence. In 2007 the 
                                                 
13
 Home Office, ‘Code of Practice on Conditional Cautioning’ (2004) paragraph 4.1 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cond-caution-cop> 
14
 For critical commentary on the use of police cautioning: Ashworth and Redmayne (n.11) chapter 6; A. 
Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2007) chapter 7; A. Sanders, ‘What 
policies underlie criminal justice policy in the 1990s?’ (1998) 18 OJLS 533; R. Evans, ‘Evaluating Young 
Adult Diversion Schemes in the Metropolitan Police District’ [1993] Crim LR 490; G. Dingwall and C. 
Harding, Diversion in the Criminal Process (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1998).  
15
 Ashworth and Redmayne (n.11) 156. 
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cautioning rate was 24% for summary offences (excluding motoring offences) or 
157,800 people, and 40% for indictable only offences (excluding motoring offences) or 
205,100 people.16 Although some might not have been prosecuted at all, this is a 
remarkable number of people who may have previously faced criminal prosecution in 
the Crown Court. 
 
iii. Penalty Notices for Disorder 
 
Another form of diversion brought into force by the Labour government has been 
Penalty Notices for Disorder (PND) issued by the police. Under the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 section 1, the police may issue a fine of between £50 and £80 for minor 
offences including retail theft (normally under £100), criminal damage (normally below 
£300) or other disorderly behaviour under section 5 of Public Order Act 1986.17 The 
issuance of a PND does not constitute a criminal conviction. Over 140,000 PNDs were 
issued between their introduction in late 2003 to November 2005.18 
 
The removal of defendants who might otherwise have been prosecuted for criminal 
offences is significant in understanding the changing pool of defendants who might 
previously have been prosecuted. Offences that might previously have been tried in the 
Crown Court, such as theft, may now be dealt with via a PND. Those defendants who 
have committed minor forms of the offence may now dealt with outside the judicial 
system and such cases may no longer be reaching the Crown Court in larger numbers. 
 
In combination with cautioning it can be theorised that the number of defendants 
entering the Crown Court and those who would otherwise have looked to resolve their 
                                                 
16
 Home Office, ‘Criminal Statistics: England and Wales 2007’ (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 2008), 
Table 3.3. 
17
Sentencing Policy and Penalties Unit, ‘Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (sections 1-11) Penalty 
Notice for Disorder Operational Guidance Retail Theft and Criminal Damage’ (Circular 2009/04, Ministry 
of Justice July 2009) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/criminal-justice-police-act-retail-pnd.htm>. 
18
 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, ‘Penalty Notices for Disorder: review of practice across police 
forces’ (Ministry of Justice, 2006) <http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/policing20.htm> 
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case via a plea of guilty has been reduced by both cautioning and PNDs. Therefore the 
pool of defendants encountered by barristers is almost certainly substantially different 
from those seen in court 20 years ago. Those who might previously have indicated a 
readiness to plead guilty to more minor versions of offences may now make admissions 
at a pre-judicial stage in order to avoid a court appearance. This has implications for the 
advice given by barristers on plea and the number of contested cases. 
 
b. Guilty plea rates in England and Wales 
 
Various historical figures exist for guilty plea rates in England and Wales, but the 
proportion of defendants pleading guilty between the 1950s and 1970s in the superior 
criminal court appears to have been 57-75% depending on the study.19 Gibson found a 
plea rate of 75.5% in 1956; the Association of Chief Police Officers 64% in 1965 (a 
countrywide sample); Rose a rate of 57% in 1967; Zander a rate of 63% in 1972 (a 
combined sample of defendant in the Inner London Crown Court and Old Bailey); and 
approximately 60% according to the Lord Chancellor’s Department in 1972.20 
  
The guilty plea in English courts is entirely determinative of the process of guilt finding. 
Once a defendant has pleaded to the charge addressed to him or her, the court turns to 
sentencing and does not investigate the factual basis for the offence unless it is pertinent 
to sentence itself.21  
 
The plea of guilty has become central to the English criminal justice process. The classic 
                                                 
19
 The Crown Court was established by the Courts Act 1971, and replaced the courts of Assize and 
Quarter Sessions.  
20
 E. Gibson, ‘Time Spent Awaiting Trial’ (Home Office Research Unit Report, HMSO, London 1960) 9; 
Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Trial by Jury’ (1966) 116 NLJ 928; G. Rose, ‘Royal Commission 
on Assizes and Quarter Sessions, 1966-69: Special Statistical Survey’ (1971) 34, Table 22; M. Zander, 
‘Are too many professional criminals escaping conviction?: A study of Britain’s two busiest courts’ 
(1974) 37 MLR 28, 30; Lord Chancellor’s Department, ‘Statistics on Judicial Administration’ (1973) 
Table 3.2 and 5.5. 
21
 A court may conduct a Newton ((1982) 77 Cr App R 13) hearing when the prosecution and defence do 
not agree on the factual basis of the offence. 
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image of a jury meticulously weighing the evidence after the testing of witnesses under 
cross examination does not reflect the reality of the English courts.23 Of the 96,027 
defendants dealt with in the Crown Court in 2008, 65,571 (68%) entered a guilty plea.24 
In the magistrates’ courts, where 95% of all criminal cases are heard, over 92% of 
defendants pleaded guilty.25 Therefore only 2% of defendants had their case heard in a 
jury trial and only 10% of defendants contested their case in some sort of trial hearing. 
Where the guilty plea deals with 90% of the cases in the system it is proper to give 
detailed consideration as to how those pleas are brought about. According to many 
commentators, guilty pleas are not merely a straight admission of the offence by the 
accused. Rather, pleading guilty is the result of a number of forms of plea bargaining. It 
is to those different forms within the English system to which this chapter now turns. 
  
4. The form of plea bargaining in English courts 
 
The form of plea bargaining in the English courts is perhaps not as obvious as that 
displayed in the United States where prosecutors can address the court on sentencing and 
make recommendations.26 Furthermore, it seems that until the 1970s plea bargaining was 
an unrecognised issue in the English literature.27 It was not until the studies of the courts 
by Dell28, McCabe and Purves29 and later those of Bottoms and McClean30 and 
McConville and Baldwin31, that plea negotiation was observed to be common place.  
                                                 
23
 P. Darbyshire, ‘The Mischief of Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Rewards’ [2000] Crim LR 895, 896. 
24
 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2008’ (Cm 7697, 2009) Table 6.6. This is a percentage 
of all defendants disposed of, some of whom do not enter a plea. It should be noted that these figures hide 
wide disparities between types of offence and judicial circuit: Table 6.2.1. 
25
 This statistic is calculated by the researcher based on the CPS Annual Report 2008 Annex B 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2008/annex_b.html>. The government does not publish a 
plea rate for the magistrates’ court in the Judicial Statistics. 
26
 English prosecutors cannot make recommendations to the court on length of sentence: Atkinson [1978] 
2 All ER 460. 
27
 For comments on a lack of literature on plea bargaining in English courts: P. Thomas, ‘An Exploration 
of Plea Bargaining’ [1969] Crim LR 68; and, A. Davis, ‘Sentences for sale: A new look at plea bargaining 
in England and America’ [1971] Crim LR 150. 
28
 Silent in Court (Bell, London 1971). 
29
 By Passing the Jury (Blackwell, Oxford 1972). 
30
 Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge & K. Paul, London 1976). 
31
 Negotiated Justice: Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty (Martin Robertson, London 1977). 
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The current literature identifies four types of plea bargaining: discounting (where a 
defendant pleads guilty in return for a reduced sentence, commonly in the form of a 
reduction of the final sentence imposed); judicial indications (where the judge indicates 
to the defendant that a reduced sentence can be expected on a guilty plea); charge 
bargaining (where a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offence in return for a reduced 
sentence); and fact bargains (where the prosecution bargains with the defendant over the 
what version of the circumstances of the offence is presented to the court on sentencing). 
This chapter will now consider the literature on each type of bargaining, together with 
the development of the law and the courts’ regulation of plea bargaining practice.  
 
a. Bargaining through the discount  
 
It has long been held to be appropriate to give a defendant credit for his guilty plea by 
reducing the final sentence passed by the court.32 The discount is now a matter of 
statutory law and is subject to definitive guidelines released by the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council in their statutory role.33 According to guidelines released by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council it is: 
 
 …in everyone’s interest that those who are guilty of an offence indicate 
willingness to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. This avoids the guilty 
being acquitted. It also benefits those most closely affected by the crime by 
sparing them the tension of a trial and the requirement to give evidence. It 
reduces the time spent in bringing the case to a conclusion (with all the 
consequential savings in public money) and shortens the time that elapses 
between an offence being committed and sentence being passed.34 
 
The rationale behind the discount seems to be one primarily of cost. According to Home 
                                                 
32
 See Buffrey (1993) 14 Cr App R(S) 511. 
33
 The Council issues guidelines under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 170(9). All courts must 
sentence with regard to the guidelines released under s. 172 of the same Act. 
34
 Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Reduction in Sentence for A Guilty Plea Guideline’ (Sentencing 
Guidelines Secretariat, 2005) Foreword. 
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Office statistics, the average cost of a contested case in the Crown Court in 1997- 98 was 
£17,750, compared with £2,600 for a case resolved via a guilty plea.35 
 
i. Statutory regulation 
 
The statutory law that governs the discount is, in its current form, found under the 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sections 144 and 174 (2)(d). Section 144 
provides that a court ‘in determining what sentence to pass on an offender who has 
pleaded guilty…must take into account- a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at 
which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty, and b) the circumstances in 
which this indication was given.’ Section 174(2) provides further that ‘in complying 
with [s.144] subsection (1)(a), the court must-….(d) where as a result of taking into 
account any matter referred to in section 144(1), the court imposes a punishment on the 
offender which is less severe than the punishment it would have imposed, state that fact, 
and (e) in any case, mention any aggravating or mitigating factors which the court has 
regarded as being of particular importance.’ These sections replaced section 152 Powers 
of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCC(S)A) on 4th April 2005 and are a 
modifications of the original legislation that required the court take guilty pleas into 
account on sentence under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1991, section 48.  
 
The wording of section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has not changed from 
section 152 of PCC(S)A, with the exception of the word ‘shall’ being supplanted by the 
word ‘must’. Section 174 provides for a more thorough explanation of the factors taken 
into account by the court on sentencing, including those specified in section 144(1)(a). 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 R. Harries, ‘The Cost of Criminal Justice’ (No. 103, Home Office Research, Development, and 
Statistics Directorate 1999) Table 2.  
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ii. The Sentencing Guidelines Council  
 
The government has attempted to improve the consistency of sentencing law through the 
formation of the Sentencing Guidelines Council. The Council is advised by the 
Sentencing Advisory Panel and consults with Parliamentary bodies when drawing up 
guidance. The Council produces definitive, though non-binding, guidelines in 
accordance with section 170(9) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The current guidelines 
on the ‘Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea’ are published on the Council’s 
website.36 
  
Paragraph B 2.2 of the guidelines suggest that a reduction in sentence on a plea of guilty 
is appropriate because ‘a guilty plea avoids the need for a trial, shortens the gap between 
charge and sentence, saves considerable cost, and, in the case of an early plea, saves 
victims and witnesses from the concern about having to give evidence.’  The discount on 
guilty plea is a separate issue from aggravation and mitigation. Paragraph B 2.4 indicates 
that mitigating factors, such as admissions to the police in interview, should be 
considered separately before calculating the reduction for the guilty plea. The court 
should also take into account other offences asked to be taken into consideration before 
applying the discount.37 A discount is applicable only to the punitive elements of a 
penalty and does not apply to ancillary orders.38 Where the sentence is lowered from a 
custodial sentence to a community sentence or a community sentence to a fine, the 
actual sentence imposed incorporates the reduction.39  
 
The level of discount is on a sliding scale ranging from a maximum of one third (where 
a guilty plea was entered at the first reasonable opportunity), reducing to a maximum of 
one quarter where trial date has been set, to a maximum of one tenth at ‘the doors of the 
                                                 
36
 <http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/docs/Reduction%20in%20Sentence-final.pdf> 
37
 Ibid. Part B, para. 2.5. 
38
 Ibid. Part B, para. 2.6. 
39
 Ibid. Part B, para. 2.3. 
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court’ or after trial has begun.40 The discount reflects ‘a willingness to admit guilt to the 
offence’ and the maximum of one third only applies when the defendant indicated a 
willingness to admit guilt at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’.41 Annex 1 of the 
guidelines illustrates the types of occasion that may be considered the first reasonable 
opportunity. A first appearance at court may be such an occasion; however, the court 
may consider it was reasonable for the defendant to indicate a willingness to admit to the 
offence during interview at the police station.42 
 
Discounts may not generally be withheld. Discounts still apply to the minimum 
sentences on dangerous offenders43; and where the sentencer feels that maximum 
penalty is too low because of under charging.44 It is worthy of note that a sentencing 
judge may depart from the Sentencing Guidelines as long as the court gives reasons for 
doing so.45 Therefore a discount is not automatically given regardless of other factors 
that might affect a sentencer’s discretion.  
 
iii. Discounting outside the guidelines 
 
Although the Sentencing Guidelines should now been considered definitive there may 
remain scope for the court to give extra discounts to defendants. In A and B46 the Court 
of Appeal gave several examples in which defendants could receive discounts on top of 
the “normal” one third. Those who agreed to testify against their co-accused, helped in 
the suppression of crime, or those who provided information that put themselves or their 
family in danger were to be provided with further credit. Further credit may also be 
available under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, section 73 for 
defendants who offer assistance to the investigator or prosecutor, although the Act does 
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 Ibid. Part D. 
41
 Ibid. Part D, para. 4.3. 
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 Ibid. Annex 1, para. 3. 
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 Ibid. Part G. 
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 Dalby and Berry [2005] EWCA Crim 1292. 
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 Last [2005] EWCA Crim 106. 
46
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not specify to what extent a sentence may be reduced. According to recent cases the 
discount received for co-operation may be substantial. In P and Blackburn47, the Court 
of Appeal held that the reduction given to the defendant under this section would 
normally be somewhere between one half and two thirds of the expected sentence, but 
no more than three-quarters. In Jackson48 the defendant was given a two thirds discount. 
It would appear that enactments that provide minimum sentences or sentences fixed by 
law do not affect the sentence given under the section.   
 
b. The judicial indication: the development of the law from Turner to 
Goodyear  
 
The English courts have traditionally disapproved of any plea bargaining whatsoever. 
The Court of Appeal had previously overturned convictions where indications from the 
bench had been given as to the expected sentence on a guilty plea. In 1977, in Turner49, 
the Court of Appeal attempted to regulate communications between the judge and 
counsel to prevent undue pressure being placed on the defendant in what are now known 
as the Turner Rules. In Turner the court felt that it was occasionally appropriate for 
defending counsel to speak with both the judge and prosecuting counsel to discuss 
matters which could not be discussed in open court. However, the Turner court 
emphatically rejected the idea that a judge could indicate a sentence that he or she might 
be minded to give on a plea of guilty. That would place ‘undue pressure on the accused, 
thus depriving him of that complete freedom of choice which is essential.’50 Only the 
likely form that the sentence was likely to take, regardless of plea, could be discussed 
with counsel.  
 
Throughout the late 1970s, the Court of Appeal issued several opinions forthrightly 
rejecting the availability of plea bargaining in English law- opinions which seemed to be 
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  [2009] EWCA Crim 1695. 
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being ignored or misunderstood in the lower courts.51 Several studies from the 1970s 
and early 1990s reported an open disregard for Turner by counsel and judges.52 As 
recently as the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction53 issued in 2002, and cases 
such as Bargery54, Attorney General’s Reference No 44 of 2000 (Peverett)55, and 
Attorney General’s Reference No 88 of 200256, the Court of Appeal has consistently 
upheld and attempted to disseminate the principles of Turner, despite the apparent 
disregard of the rules by both barristers and judges.  
 
In what appears to be recognition of the futility of continuing to insist on the Turner 
Rules, and the general changing climate of attitude towards defendants, the Court of 
Appeal has changed its guidance.57 In the 2005 judgment of Goodyear58, a five judge 
court declined to follow Lord Chief Justice Parker’s dictum in Turner and outlined a 
modified procedure to be followed in the event that a defendant wished to seek a trial 
judge’s thoughts on sentence. Under Goodyear, a judge may, if asked by the defence, 
indicate the maximum sentence he or she would be minded to impose if the defendant 
were to plead guilty at that stage of proceedings. Such an indication is binding on the 
judge and remains binding on any judge who takes control of the case until a reasonable 
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time for acceptance has passed. The prosecution may not initiate the process although 
the judge may remind a represented defendant that an indication may be sought. While it 
should be normal for a basis of plea to be agreed, the court will hold a Newton hearing59 
if there is disagreement between the defence and prosecution. Although the court 
expressly disowns the idea of plea bargaining in Goodyear60, the implications of the 
judgment are clear. Defendants in combination with their defence counsel and the 
Sentencing Guidelines now have a calculable and accurate estimate of the difference 
between sentence at trial, and sentence at first appearance.61  
 
c. The discount in operation 
 
The availability of the discount, despite being reported as inconsistently applied62, is 
now universally available to all offences.63 Ashworth and Redmayne’s research on the 
Criminal Justice Statistics 2002 revealed that there was a significant discount for 
pleading guilty.64 Some 76% of those convicted after pleading not guilty to indictable 
offences were given custodial sentences compared with 62% of those pleading guilty.65 
As Ashworth and Redmayne note, the plea can be crucial on whether the custody 
threshold is crossed.66 Of those given terms of imprisonment, an average of 44 months 
was given to those who contested their trial, whereas guilty pleaders were given an 
average 27 months.67 Research by Roger Hood on Crown Court sentencing and race 
discovered that guilty pleaders were being given reduced sentences and often that meant 
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that the custody threshold was not crossed.68 This important practice was also examined 
by McConville and Baldwin and David Moxon in their respective studies.69 However, 
these findings might no longer reflect court practice which has become much more 
regulated since the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
With the new law in effect, the discount should now be applied consistently and there 
should be similar rates of discount applied to all offences.70 A bare analysis of the 
figures provides a rough guide to the application of the discount from 1996-2006. Table 
2-1 provides statistics relating to guilty plea rates; the custody rate (the percentage of 
those placed in immediate custody) by plea; the difference in the custody rate between 
guilty and not guilty pleas; the average sentence given in months depending on plea; 
and, the percentage size of the average discount given per defendant. Table 2-2 provides 
a more detailed break down by category of offence for 2006 of plea rates; custody rates 
by plea; the difference in the custody rate between guilty and not guilty pleas; the 
average sentence given in months depending on plea; and, the percentage size of the 
average discount given for each category of offence. The data in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 is 
taken from the Sentencing Statistics 2006.71 Calculations in both tables relating to the 
difference in custody rate and the percentage size of the average discount have been 
made by the researcher. 
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Table 2-1 Persons sentenced for indictable offences at the Crown Court: Plea rate, custody rate, 
average sentence length, and average discount applied to a sentence of imprisonment per defendant, 
2006 
 
Pleaded 
guilty 
(%) 
Custody 
rate (%) 
 
Difference in 
custody rate 
for guilty plea 
Average 
sentence 
(mths) 
 
% size of 
average 
custody 
discount 
Year  Guilty 
Not 
guilty 
 Guilty 
Not 
guilty 
 
1996 82.2 59.3 68.8 -9.5 20.6 34.1 39.6 
1997 83.6 58.7 70.4 -11.7 21.1 36.6 42.3 
1998 81.8 57.2 70.1 -12.9 21.6 36.8 41.3 
1999 81.3 59.3 71.0 -11.7 22.5 38.1 40.9 
2000 81.7 60.3 73.2 -12.9 22.9 37.1 38.3 
2001 81.8 60.1 72.0 -11.9 24.4 38.9 37.3 
2002 82.5 59.4 72.8 -13.4 25.9 41.6 37.7 
2003 83.7 56.7 70.5 -13.8 26.2 44.4 41.0 
2004 83.8 57.5 72.7 -15.2 26.3 44.9 41.4 
2005 84.3 56.7 71.0 -14.3 26.0 43.3 40.0 
2006 84.4 54.5 69.5 -15.0 25.4 42.7 40.5 
Mean 
Average 82.8 58.2 71.1 -12.9 23.9 39.9 40.0 
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Table 2-2 Persons sentenced for indictable offences at the Crown Court: Plea rate, immediate 
custody rate, average sentence length, and average discount applied to categories of offences, 2006 
2006        
Offence 
Pleaded 
guilty 
(%) 
Custody 
rate  
Difference  in 
custody rate 
for guilty plea 
Average 
sentence 
(mths)  
% size of 
average 
custody 
discount 
  Guilty 
Not 
guilty  Guilty 
Not 
guilty  
Violence 
against the 
person 79.8 47.4 68.0 -20.6 22.8 35.5 35.8 
Sexual 
Offences 63.2 67.7 84.4 -16.7 37.4 57.4 34.8 
Burglary  91.4 69.1 70.9 -1.8 26.7 33.9 21.2 
Robbery 84.2 81.4 85.5 -4.1 34.2 45.6 25.0 
Theft and 
handling 87.9 42.0 40.0 2.0 14.4 20.6 30.1 
Fraud and 
forgery 87.9 52.7 54.3 -1.6 14.6 24.6 40.7 
Criminal 
Damage 90.0 39.0 54.1 -15.1 27.3 38.4 28.9 
Drug 
Offences 86.4 61.6 82.7 -21.1 36.1 64.6 44.1 
Other 
(excluding 
motor 
offences) 89.1 42.8 61.9 -19.1 15.7 28.3 44.5 
Motor 
offences 85.6 46.9 35.8 11.1 10.4 12.3 15.4 
Average 
discount 
among 
offences 84.6 55.1 63.8 -8.7 24.0 36.1 33.7 
 
 
 
 31
Several caveats must be born in mind before concluding that the discount is applied 
uniformly to early pleaders. Firstly, the yearly figures hide discrepancies between 
offences as to what extent and whether the discount is given at all. In some years a small 
number of offences have borne a higher penalty for a guilty plea than a conviction after 
a not guilty plea. As can be seen in Table 2-2, in 2006, 2% more guilty pleaders were 
given custodial sentences for theft and handling offences compared with not guilty 
pleaders. The consistency of how the discount is applied was indirectly considered by 
Ralph Henham.72 In his study of 310 guilty pleas from six Crown Court Centres, 
Henham explored the effect of section 48 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 (the pre-cursor of Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 144) which required the court 
to take into account the stage in the proceedings at which the defendant indicated his 
intention to plead guilty, and state in open court if it had done so. Henham found a 
widespread failure, identifying 145 cases or 46.8% of his sample where judges had not 
explained their sentencing decision under the Act and whether a discount had been 
given.73 Henham interpreted that this failure only translated into six cases of the discount 
being withheld.74 In those six cases the judge explicitly said that no discount had been 
given. Sanders and Young correctly point out a failure to mention whether discount had 
been given might mean no discount had been given at all, increasing the potential 
number of defendants in the sample who did not receive a discount. However, their 
extrapolation that the system is ‘playing dirty’ with the defendant’s right to a discount is 
not fully supportable on this evidence.75 What is uncontroversial is that, with some 
discrepancies, the sentencing discount is regularly being given for guilty pleas. Subject 
to the limitations described below the statistics show a reduction in sentence on guilty 
plea, both in the rate at which custody is imposed and in the average length of time for 
which defendants are imprisoned. Sanders and Young’s second conclusion that even 
when discounts are announced by the judge they may be being secretly withheld is again 
not necessarily supportable on this evidence.76 While conceivable, one would expect to 
find large numbers of defendants who complained that the sentence they had received 
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was much higher than they had been lead to expect by their barrister, who should be able 
to make an estimate well within a one third margin of error.77 Without such data it is not 
possible to confirm the Sanders and Young thesis. 
 
Secondly, the yearly figures in Table 2-1 are for all defendants. Because the court deals 
with many more defendants involved in violent offences, the discount given to those 
defendants is disproportionately represented, as compared to, for example, the discount 
for fraud. If offences are compared equally weighted (ignoring the number of defendants 
convicted) as in Table 2-2, the average discount is much lower: 33.7% compared with 
40.5% in 2006.  
 
Thirdly, as Ashworth and Redmayne point out in relation to their analysis of the 2002 
statistics, the figures hide the seriousness within offences, and the mitigation that may be 
presented on behalf of each individual defendant.78 Some research has suggested that 
those charged with more serious offences with highly aggravating features, such as 
violent rape, are much less likely to plead guilty.79 This inevitably distorts the average 
sentence length and the size of the discount between those pleading guilty and not guilty, 
as those not guilty pleaders are likely to receive much longer sentences because of the 
gravity of their offence. If defendants pleading not guilty are in cases with greater 
aggravating features, this might partially explain why no discount seems to be given for 
some offences in some years.  Other factors may also influence sentencing such as race 
and possibly gender. Roger Hood, found in his 1989 sample that the discount for guilty 
plea was diminished when all other factors (mitigation, previous convictions, etc) had 
been taken into account.80   
 
Fourthly, this data does not reveal when the plea was entered and the extent of the 
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discount given. It is not possible to tell whether the new law has affected the extent of 
greater discounts being given for earlier guilty pleas as found by Flood-Page and 
Mackie81, or whether judges are preserving greater credit for late pleaders as found by 
Baldwin and McConville, and to a lesser extent by Moxon in the 1970s and 1980s.82 
Although the Sentencing Guidelines and sections 144 and 177 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 appear, on the face of these statistics, to have had little effect on the average 
pattern of discounting, to say definitively whether the discount is being applied more 
precisely according to the new law would require further quantitative study.  
 
d. Commentary and research on the effect of the discount on defendants 
 
In Dell’s study of the legal representation of women sent to Holloway prison in the early 
1970s, she recorded that of the 527 women tried at the magistrates’ court that she 
interviewed, 106 denied having committed any offence.83 Of those 106, 56 (53%) 
pleaded guilty. Dell labelled these women as ‘inconsistent pleaders’. Investigating the 
reasons for their inconsistent pleas, Dell discovered that ten of the women who had 
pleaded guilty had done so to try and avoid a remand or out of a fear that to plead not 
guilty would result in a harsher sentence.84 Dell’s observations are clearly indicative of 
the discount system at work. Dell did not believe inconsistent pleading was a problem in 
the higher courts and attributed this to independent legal representation.85  
 
In McCabe and Purves’ study of a small number of Assize and Quarter Session courts, 
again in the early 1970s, they specifically looked at defendants who pleaded guilty at 
‘the doors to the court’ or were saved from jury trial following a directed acquittal from 
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the judge, but had been expected to go to trial.86 McCabe and Purves identified 112 
(24%) defendants who changed their plea at a late stage and pleaded guilty to all, some 
or alternative charges. During their research McCabe and Purves were able to attribute 
these changes in plea to the defendants’ legal representatives, who conducted 
negotiations with the defendant and prosecution in final consultation with the judge. 
However, after the recent approval of the Turner Rules in the Court of Appeal, McCabe 
and Purves did not feel that plea bargaining was conducted by judicial pressure on the 
accused. While observing that the defendant is advised as to credit on a guilty plea by 
their representative, they felt that in England ‘there seems little justification for unease at 
the nature of judicial involvement and the issues associated with it.’87 The discount, 
according to McCabe and Purves, ‘is a well known and respectable sentencing practice, 
hallowed by precedents, and justified by reference to the propriety of giving credit to a 
defendant who pleads guilty on the grounds that allowance must be made for contrition, 
repentance and co-operation with the authorities.’88 McCabe and Purves did not 
therefore see any danger in offering the defendant some benefit from pleading guilty.   
 
Bottoms and McClean’s 1976 study of the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts of 
Sheffield, was a far more comprehensive effort to follow a defendant through the 
criminal justice system.89 Whereas McCabe and Purves concentrated only on defendants 
who were removed from trial in the latter stages, Bottoms and McClean began with 
defendants’ first contact with the courts and considered plea from the defendants’ 
perspective. This was the first attempt in the English literature to evaluate defendant 
decision-making overall, viewing the system as a whole rather than in constituent parts.  
 
Bottoms and McClean’s research revealed high guilty plea rates of 95% in all courts.90 
Around two-thirds of those pleading guilty said that they had done so because they were 
guilty of the offence charged. In respect of plea bargaining, Bottoms and McClean 
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sought to identify defendants who changed plea because of an intimation of sentence 
from the judge (a possibility thought to be of extremely limited effect since Turner); or 
defendants who altered their plea because of a deal struck with the prosecutor by their 
representative (plea bargaining); or those who changed their plea on legal advice from 
their representative (plea changing).91 In their sample Bottoms and McClean identified 
only three cases of possible ‘real plea bargaining’, where a defendant’s plea of guilty 
was in response to an offer from the prosecutor.92 Bottoms and McClean also identified 
‘plea changers’- those who changed plea late in the day before trial. High proportions of 
those pleading guilty in the Crown Court did so at a late hour (37%) and on the advice of 
the legal representative (82% of plea changers).93  
 
Bottoms and McClean sought to draw out from their entire interview sample defendants 
who pleaded guilty, but in their interview with the researchers raised a credible 
possibility of a not guilty plea. On this analysis they discovered that 18% of guilty plea 
defendants were ‘possibly innocent.’94 Of those possible innocent defendants, 34% 
pleaded guilty on their lawyer’s advice.95  
 
McConville and Baldwin’s study of the Birmingham Crown Court in a 15 month period 
between 1975 and 1976 is perhaps the most controversial of the studies conducted.96 In 
their research of 121 defendants who originally intended to plead not guilty but changed 
their plea, McConville and Baldwin found four types of defendants: those who pleaded 
guilty because they were factually guilty of the offence charged; those who claimed to 
have been subject to a bargained plea; those who were not aware of a plea bargain, but 
felt that something was going on behind the scenes; and those who were not aware of 
any bargaining, but acquiesced to pressure or advice from their barrister.  
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Of the 121 defendants sampled, 18.2% reported being subject to an explicit bargain. 
McConville and Baldwin found that, subject to the defendant giving an accurate 
account, nearly half of those involved in explicit bargains were offered precise 
indications of sentence or came under pressure to plead guilty from the judge contrary to 
the Turner Rules.97 The other half were offered explicit bargains within the rules of 
Turner. These defendants were told by their barrister the form of sentence on a guilty 
plea (i.e. whether the sentence would be custodial or non-custodial) as indicated by the 
judge, although often not that they would receive the same form of sentence on a not 
guilty plea.98 Of the 121 defendants a further 13% were subject to tacit bargaining where 
the defence barrister indicated that some kind of deal was being agreed behind the 
scenes without being definite as to its form.99  
 
McConville and Baldwin draw on this data to argue that whether defendants’ pleas are 
voluntary when subject to such pressure is open to question.100 Although McConville 
and Baldwin agreed that there was a lower incidence of plea bargaining in English 
justice than in the United States, they found little to support the statement that plea 
bargaining does not exist in England to any significant degree.101 McConville and 
Baldwin found clear evidence of bargains (implicit or explicit) being struck in over 30% 
of their sample. The researchers comment that when defendants believe that the judge is 
involved in an indication of sentence, it is difficult to maintain that defendants’ pleas are 
entered voluntarily.102 
 
McConville and Baldwin conclude by pointing out that English criminal justice has 
selected administrative efficiency over accuracy- a process brought about with the 
collusion of defence counsel. In their view the operation of the discount system has little 
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to do with justice, rather, ‘it exists primarily because of administrative expediency.’103 
The combination of plea bargaining, sentence discount, and pressure from counsel result 
in defendants having little real choice over plea with the accompanying possibility of 
miscarriages of justice in significant numbers of cases. The research indicates such 
problems are symptomatic of a guilty plea system and argues for the abolition of the 
discount as the only way to eliminate the pressures brought to bear on defendants.104 
That the discount continued to be instrumental in defendants’ choice of plea was 
revealed by further research in the courts in the 1990s. Hedderman and Moxon found 
that 65% of defendants who pleaded guilty to either-way offences cited a lighter 
sentence as a reason for doing so.105  
 
The system incentives provided by the criminal justice process are therefore framed by 
some commentators as undermining the principle of defendant autonomy- the ability of 
defendants to make free choices about plea. Ashworth and Blake believe that the 
discount ‘militates against the “free choice” of the defendant’ and that committed 
defence lawyers should strive to maximise client choice.106 In providing large discounts 
to guilty pleaders, the criminal justice system, it is argued, runs contrary to fundamental 
rights of the accused under the European Human Convention on Human Rights.107  
Ashworth and Redmayne believe that the magnitude of the discount in English courts 
induces ‘those who are not guilty to change their plea.’108 In providing a third or more 
reduction on a sentence after trial, and thus providing a large inducement to defendants 
to plead guilty, they argue that the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right not to be discriminated against in exercising article 6 rights, and 
the right to a fair and public hearing are sacrificed to expediency.109   
                                                 
103
 Ibid. 109 
104
 Ibid. 115 
105
 C. Hedderman and D. Moxon, ‘Magistrates’ Court or Crown Court? Mode of Trial Decisions and 
Sentencing’ (Home Office Research Study 125, HMSO, London 1992) 24. 
106
 A. Ashworth and M. Blake, ‘Some ethical issues in prosecuting and defending criminal cases’ [1998] 
Crim LR 16, 26. See also: L. Bridges, ‘The Ethics of Representation on Guilty Pleas’ (2006) 9 Legal 
Ethics 80, 94. 
107
 Ashworth and Redmayne (n.11) 287-92. 
108
 Ibid. 288. 
109
 These rights are either explicitly given to defendants or have been found to be implied by Article 6 and 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issue arising from Article 14 is based on 
 38
 
e. Charge bargaining 
 
Charge bargaining is the practice whereby, on negotiation initiated by either side, the 
parties agree to a reduction in the charge facing the defendant in return for a guilty plea. 
Charge bargaining has been criticised as placing enormous pressure on the defendant 
who by pleading guilty to the lesser charge can avoid custody or reduce the available 
sentence. The availability of charge bargaining has been confirmed by the courts and 
such agreements have long been negotiated between the prosecution and defence. 
Although in Grafton110, in 1993, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a prosecutor was 
free to drop or reduce charges without the need to refer the matter to the trial judge, the 
judge may now adjourn proceedings until the prosecutor has consulted with the Chief 
Crown Prosecutor, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or, in unusual circumstances, the 
Attorney-General regarding the change in charge.111 The focus here is on charge 
bargaining as a practice in itself, rather than as a device used by unscrupulous lawyers to 
extract a guilty plea. The literature that examines lawyers and their attitudes to 
defendants is dealt with below. 
 
i. The magistrates’ court 
 
Although this research is primarily focused on the practices of the Crown Court, the 
lower courts’ activities do have a significant impact on what occurs in Crown Court 
proceedings via the committal of either-way offences for trial or sentencing. Therefore, 
it is important to review the practices of the magistrates’ courts, particularly with 
reference to either-way offences and mode of trial hearings. 
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The magistrates’ courts are peculiarly neglected in the literature given that an 
overwhelming majority of defendants in the criminal justice system are dealt with by 
summary procedure.112 Until recently, there were a number of differences in the 
approach of the two tiers of courts, particularly to the sentence discount on guilty 
plea.113 Despite the tendency of researchers to concentrate on the Crown Courts, several 
commentators have identified a practice of plea bargaining in the magistrates’ courts 
which has a vital impact on Crown Court proceedings. 
 
The magistrates’ courts are limited in sentencing powers to either 6 months 
imprisonment for one offence114 and/or a fine of £5,000.115 On aggregate of two or more 
offences, where one of the offences is triable either-way, the court is limited to imposing 
a sentence of 12 months imprisonment.116 Magistrates’ courts also have the power to 
commit triable either-way cases for trial117, or commit the case to the Crown Court for 
sentence when the court feels that its powers are inappropriate.118 After committal the 
Crown Court is not restricted to the powers of the magistrates.119 Comparatively, the 
sentencing powers of the Crown Court for the same either-way offences are radically 
different. According to Hedderman and Moxon’s study of either-way offences and mode 
of trial hearings, they found that custody was used almost three times as often and 
around two and half times longer sentences of custody were imposed than in comparable 
cases in the magistrates’ court.120  
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According to the literature, the high proportion of defendants pleading guilty in the 
magistrates’ court is produced by two factors: the dramatic discount between Crown 
Court and magistrates’ courts; and, the discretion available to Crown Prosecutors 
brought about by overcharging defendants at the police station. Although a Crown 
Prosecutor must ‘never accept a guilty plea just because it is convenient’121, Crown 
Prosecutors under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 have little constraints placed 
upon them in making additions, deletions or alterations to the information laid against 
the defendant.122 In McConville, Sanders and Leng’s study of the effect of the creation 
of the CPS in 1985, evidence was found of overcharging by both police and prosecutors 
who were unwilling to reduce charges to allow bargaining to take place at court.123 Even 
though prosecutors knew cases to be weak on any charge, maintaining charges until pre-
trial hearings meant that defence lawyers could be brought into negotiations.124  
 
Prosecutors are, according to Sanders and Young, willing and able to offer defendants 
charges to plead to which will not lead to a committal to the Crown Court.125 By 
dropping either-way offences, demoting them to lesser, summary only charges, or by 
making recommendations to the magistrates on the suitable mode of trial, prosecutors 
wield an enormous bargaining power. In Riley and Vennard’s study of triable either-way 
offences, the preference of the Crown was matched by the magistrates’ decision in 96% 
of cases.126  
 
Since the plea before venue hearing was introduced in 1997, the number of defendants 
committed to the Crown Court for trial has steadily fallen.127 In 1997 some 64,000 
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defendants were committed for trial.128 By 2007, approximately 53,100 were committed 
for trial129, while committals for sentence had increased from 5,000 to 17,800 a year.130 
Ashworth and Redmayne believe this is attributable to the discount created by the 
differential between the sentencing powers of the two tiers of the court.131 Defendants 
placed under pressure by the sentencing rates observed by Hedderman and Moxon 
reduce their risk of a heavy sentence by either choosing summary trial, or by indicating a 
plea of guilty at the mode of trial hearing in an attempt to avoid the Crown Court.132 
Therefore, the process in the magistrates’ court of plea before venue, selection of 
charges and sentencing strongly encourages the entry of a guilty plea by the defendant. 
As with diversion, it is likely that the plea before venue for either way offences has 
removed from the pool of defendants in the Crown Court those who would accept advice 
to plead guilty at an early stage. Those reaching the Crown Court have already indicated 
a plea of not guilty, are potentially more determined to go to trial, and may have a better 
defence on the basis of the legal advice already received.  
 
ii. The Crown Court 
 
Research on charge bargaining in the Crown Court has produced similar results to that in 
the magistrates’ court. Although committal to a higher court no longer presents a risk to 
the defendant, prosecutors can similarly vary the charges faced by the defendant. As 
with the magistrates’ court, the critics of the incentives created by the system contend 
that defendants are placed under pressure by charge bargains. 
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In the earliest research from the 1970s, McCabe and Purves found no support to suggest 
overcharging by the police. Essentially relabelling the term as ‘full charging’, they 
argued current practices allowed plea bargaining by the prosecutor to take place.133 
Commenting on prosecutorial tactics, McCabe and Purves felt that an experienced 
prosecutor was generally inclined to avoid the hazards of trial, however strong the 
case.134 This bargaining was to give effect to the ‘advantages attendant upon the rapid 
disposal of cases in the administration of justice.’135 Accordingly, McCabe and Purves 
found that ‘it is difficult to see how the practice of plea bargaining as it exists in England 
operates to deny the defendant his ‘right to put the prosecution to its proof.’136 In fact, 
the defendant was placed in a position to exploit the obstacles inherent in the discharge 
of the burden of proof by the prosecution, giving him or her a powerful bargaining 
position.137 McCabe and Purves felt that plea bargaining, at least in its English form, was 
a realistic and pragmatic way of dealing with defendants, avoiding the ‘rhetoric, 
innuendo, suggestion, intimidation, and manipulation of the rules of evidence’138 that a 
jury trial presented as an alternative. Concluding, McCabe and Purves wonder at the 
scale of ‘wastage of time, effort and money’ last minute pleaders cost the public purse as 
well as those involved in the trial.139 McConville and Baldwin found no evidence of 
overcharging in Birmingham Crown Court in their study.140 
 
Whether caused by overcharging or not, the use of charge bargaining in the Crown Court 
appears to be extensive. In Hedderman and Moxon’s 1992 study, 82% of defendants 
who elected jury trial subsequently pleaded guilty.141 Of those who changed their plea, 
51% reported that they expected some charges would be dropped or reduced, resulting in 
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a lighter sentence.142 Hedderman and Moxon found that 29% of the defendants in their 
sample had pleaded guilty in accordance with charge bargains.143  The so-called charge 
attrition rate (where a defendant pleads to a lesser offence than the original indictment) 
appears to be high in contemporary courts. According to Henham’s 2002 sample of six 
Crown Court centres, 61.7% of defendants originally indicted for causing grievous 
bodily harm with intent pleaded guilty to a lesser offence.144  
 
As with the magistrates’ court, the critics of charge bargaining maintain that prosecutors 
keep charges artificially high in order to convince the defendant to plead guilty to a 
lesser offence. Baldwin found evidence that:  
 
[M]ost barristers see it as their primary responsibility to prosecute the case in the 
Crown Court in accordance with the instructions they are given by the CPS. 
While almost all the barristers interviewed said that they would point out 
manifest weaknesses in the case to the CPS at an early stage, this is not 
something that many would do on a regular or a frequent basis.145 
 
Baldwin’s research suggests that prosecuting counsel are unwilling to drop weak cases, 
or change the indictment to a lesser offence until they are later discovered by the judge.  
Prosecutors, according to Baldwin, continued with weak cases because they shared the 
same view of cases as the police, particularly in respect to more serious offences. 
Baldwin found prosecutors and police believed that the defendant deserved to be 
prosecuted, despite a lack of evidence, because of the nature of the offence.146 
According to Sanders and Young’s interpretation of Baldwin’s research, prosecuting 
counsel are potentially placed in a bargaining position by virtue of an inaccurate 
indictment that they are unwilling to correct.147 Baldwin’s research, however, only 
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looked at cases where the judge ordered or directed an acquittal. Sanders and Young 
believe that ‘if one took a sample of all weak cases one would no doubt find that 
prosecuting counsel prefer a last minute charge bargain to a discontinuance…’148 
However, there is no evidence that prosecution counsel press ahead with weak cases as 
charge bargains if they are not discovered by the judge. It does not necessarily follow 
that large numbers of weak cases are not spotted and left to be bargained over by an 
unscrupulous prosecutor and defence barrister. Another view is put forward by Jeremy 
who argues that charge is often determined ‘at a time when emotions are high, the 
investigation is in its infancy, and when every instinct channels him towards charging 
“high” rather than “low.”’149 As he points out, prosecutors are placed in a difficult 
position where they must strive to ‘resist pressures from victims and from the police, to 
show respect for due process, to be fair and act as a “minister of justice.”’150 
Overcharging is not necessarily a product of looking ahead to a charge bargain at court. 
Indeed there may be a number of complex reasons as to why charges are reduced later, 
caused by a range of factors including societal or institutional attitudes towards different 
types of offences. Lea, Lanvers and Shaw found high attrition rates in contemporary 
rape cases151, but these reductions in charge were highly specific to sexual offences 
where lack of evidence, attitudes of police officers to rape complainants and the 
vulnerability of the complainant were found to be extremely important.152  
 
This conclusion is reinforced by Elaine Genders’ research on the downgrading of assault 
charges.153 She argues that the overcharging observed is the result of an imperfect 
system of available charges, which do not match the real life offending faced by the 
police and prosecutors. Genders believed that defendants charged under the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 are often charged according to normative standards of 
intent rather than those strictly laid out in the statute. Genders’ research provides strong 
evidence that section 18 offences ‘relabelled” section 20 were frequently mid-way 
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offences that had aggravating features that ‘original’ s.20 charges did not. This suggests 
an alternative explanation as to why some defendants appear to have been overcharged 
and why defendants are willing to accept demoted charges. It also suggests that 
prosecutors and defence lawyers do not necessarily conspire to produce a plea, but rather 
find a charge more suitable to the statute and evidence. If Genders’ analysis of charging 
according to normative standards is correct, the determination of charge by Crown 
Prosecutors at the police station, who are legally trained (as opposed to the police), 
should provide a more accurate charge or rather more importantly, help prevent charges 
from being relabelled. On the basis of Genders’ research, it would appear that the 
process of charge, bargain and subsequent downgrading is highly complex and not 
necessarily the result of purposeful action by police, prosecutor and defence lawyer to 
produce a guilty plea.  
 
Sanders and Young argued in their 2007 textbook that recent changes to the law under 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 have not assisted defendants, who remain faced with 
inflated charges which are used to place pressure upon them.154 Since the introduction of 
section 28 of the Act (amending the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 37), 
the CPS is:  
 
…responsible for the decision to charge and the specifying or drafting of the 
charges in all indictable only, either-way or summary offences…except for those 
offences specified in this Guidance which may be charged or cautioned by the 
police without reference to a Crown Prosecutor.155 
 
In choosing the charges the CPS should select the right charges from the outset and stick 
to them.156 Giving the CPS control over charge was intended to remove any bias that 
might attach itself to a police decision and allow an independent, legally trained eye to 
scrutinise the prosecution case. Sanders and Young note, however, that the CPS is 
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subject to managerial targets to reduce unsuccessful outcomes in the courts, increase the 
guilty plea rate and increase the number crimes for which an offender is convicted.157 
The pressure of convicting defendants and increasing guilty pleas, they maintain, looks 
like ‘a recipe for disaster.’158 According to the Code for Crown Prosecutors, prosecutors 
should also ‘ensure that the interests of the victim and, where possible, any views 
expressed by the victim or victim’s family, are taken into account when deciding 
whether it is in the public interest to accept the plea.’159 Rather than demote charges, the 
Code clearly gives a strong indication that Crown Prosecutors should follow through on 
charges, particularly when the victim has a good reason to want a prosecution of the 
original charge.160 
 
The involvement of prosecutors at the charging stage seems to answer some of the 
criticisms previously made of the pre-court stage. Crown Prosecutors are not as involved 
in criminal cases as the police who have investigated the offence, and therefore can be 
more objective about the appropriate charge. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 were enacted because it was perceived that Crown Prosecutors would reduce the 
incidence of overcharging.161 The provisions should help ameliorate the tendency, as 
observed by McConville et al and Baldwin, of Crown Prosecutors failing to review 
charges properly or support weak cases. It would be logical to expect that the rate of 
early guilty pleas would increase as a result of more accurate charging. A more accurate 
charge would also remove much of the leverage available to the prosecutor who cannot 
bargain with the defendant if he or she has nothing to give. Research produced by the 
CPS suggests that the conviction rate has increased and that the changes have ensured 
that ‘the right person is charged with the right offence at the right time.’162 
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f. Fact bargaining 
 
Since the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Beswick163 an agreement between the Crown and 
defence on the factual basis of plea is partially regulated. The Crown must not accept a 
basis which is an unreal or untrue set of facts. Since the decision of Goodyear164, such 
fact bargains may become much more important as, according to the court in that case, 
the prosecution and defence should normally agree a factual basis for the offence before 
seeking the judge’s indication on sentence. There is therefore a clear opportunity for 
mitigating or aggravating features to be bargained over by the prosecution and defence 
in return for a guilty plea. The extent to which fact bargaining occurs is yet to be the 
subject of extensive research. 
 
5. Pressure from defence barristers 
 
In addition to the system of sentencing and charging, some commentators have 
scrutinised the role of defence lawyers in the production of guilty pleas. 
Overwhelmingly this research has placed responsibility for the high guilty plea rate on 
the defence lawyer. This criticism is supported by a number of studies that have found 
defendants to be passive in the conduct of their case and unwilling to question their 
lawyer’s advice. Defendants are described as ‘dummy players’, unable to take control 
their own case.165 Ericson and Baranek describe defendants as ‘dependants’ in the 
criminal process.166 Most criminal defendants because of socio-economic factors, 
combined with the stress of the proceedings, and lack of legal knowledge are in a 
particularly poor position to take control of their own defence.167 Goriely et al found that 
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defendants accepted that they were not able to assess the quality of the legal advice they 
received or the command of the law demonstrated by their solicitor.168 The majority of 
criminal defendants are therefore unable to critically assess their lawyer’s performance 
and often follow their advice directly. This makes them susceptible to accept poor 
advice given by an unscrupulous or incompetent lawyer.  
 
The potential for defendants to be overwhelmed by the advice of their defence barrister 
is exacerbated by the manner in which advice on plea may be given. According to the 
Code of Conduct, barristers may advise defendants on plea ‘in strong terms’ if 
necessary.169 However, as Peter Tague has noted, how ‘strong’ advice may be is left 
undefined.170 This allows barristers to adopt various approaches that may, in some cases, 
place considerable pressure on the defendant to plead. 
 
Three main strands of criticism have been directed at the criminal bar. Firstly, barristers 
have been described as being part of a guilty plea culture. This phrase describes the 
general presumption of guilt displayed by criminal lawyers in their attitudes towards 
defendants. Secondly, some commentators believe that the court community of the Bar 
demands great loyalty from its members than does a fidelity to the ideals of due process 
and the fearless defence of the accused. Thirdly, some critics argue that barristers 
manipulate defendants to maximise their fees through guilty pleas and late resolution of 
cases before trial. This chapter will now consider those criticisms in detail. 
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a. Guilty plea culture 
 
In the late 1970s, Baldwin and McConville’s research found intense pressure being 
exerted by defence counsel on defendants to plead guilty.171 Arguing that Turner 
provided no protection to the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea, they concluded that the 
combination of ‘giving advice in strong terms if necessary’ and the sentence discount 
given on guilty plea, caused defendants eventually to enter a guilty plea.172 The research 
found that significant numbers of defendants pleaded guilty under pressure and were 
either entirely unhappy with the process or claimed innocence after sentencing.173 
Describing the public image of the barrister fearlessly upholding the interests of his 
client as a ‘considerable distortion of the truth’174, Baldwin and McConville argued that 
the combination of defence counsel pressure and the sentence discount on guilty plea 
was overwhelming to defendants, including those who may be factually innocent. A 
detailed analysis of why some defence counsel conspired with the criminal system to 
produce guilty pleas was not provided in Negotiated Justice. Baldwin and McConville 
speculated that barristers were overworked and that ‘counsel’s primary interests lie with 
the court system and not the defendant.’175  
 
McConville engaged in further criticism of barristers in Standing Accused.176 For the 
purposes of the current research here it is necessary to concentrate on what is said about 
barristers and their advice in the Crown Court, rather than the majority of the research 
which concentrated on solicitors’ practices.177 According to McConville et al’s research, 
the defending barristers observed presumed the guilt of those they represented and were 
closed to alternative explanations given by the defendant.178 In many cases barristers 
showed an over eagerness to accept a guilty plea and made no attempt to test the 
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foundations of the defendant’s willingness to capitulate. The explanation, according to 
the authors is that barristers ‘begin with a presumption of guilt and assume that a guilty 
plea is both appropriate and normal.’179 Barristers, they claim, are involved in 
manipulating the defendant through subtle psychological pressures applied to force 
defendants into entering pleas which counsel have decided are appropriate. Counsel 
‘evinces little interest in scrutinising the evidence or in attempting to convince the 
defendant of its weight and probative value. Rather, conferences are treated as 
“disclosure interviews”, the purpose of which is to extract a plea of guilty from the 
client.’180 In a ‘guilty plea culture’: 
Defence lawyers approach their work on the basis of standardised case theories 
and stereotypes of the kind of people who become involved in criminal events; 
images of clients as feckless or dishonest are allowed to structure the way their 
cases are handled from the outset; the views of clients are given little weight and 
their accounts not investigated; and the case proceeds on the basis that the lawyer 
knows best in a context in which all the incentives point towards a guilty plea.181 
 
According to McConville et al, for most advisors the presumption of guilt assumes ‘a 
universalistic character and is unthinkingly applied to the client population at large.’182 
In doing so, barristers are part of an overall culture of criminal defence that, along with 
solicitors, presumes the defendant’s culpability. As Mulcahy comments on the practices 
of solicitors in the magistrates’ court, ‘the object of negotiations appears to be the 
determination not of guilt or innocence, but of the “appropriate” level of guilt.’183    
 
b. Court communities 
 
Sanders and Young, referring to the evidence presented in Negotiated Justice, believe 
there to be ‘a powerful culture [at the Bar] in which priority given to settling cases rather 
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than fighting cases is particularly marked.’184 Unlike McConville et al who reject a court 
community model of criminal justice185, Sanders and Young transplant an American 
model of loyalty and co-operation amongst criminal lawyers into English courts.186 
Their research presents a community of barristers whose fidelity to due process and 
testing the evidence has been co-opted to the needs of the system. That system expects 
and requires guilty pleas in significant numbers and barristers manipulate and distort the 
strength of the evidence in order to convince the defendant to plead. Sanders and Young 
argue that the relationship between members of the Bar is based on trust and that this 
often overrides the duty owed to the defendant: 
 
The interest in maintaining good relations with other barristers (and with judges 
seeking to manage a heavy caseload) may become more important than the 
interests of an individual defendant.187  
 
According to Sanders and Young, the courtroom culture creates strong incentives for 
barristers of both sides to cause the case to “crack.”188 Judges are a cooperative part of 
this culture and ‘prosecution and defence lawyers have little to fear in seeking the 
approval of the judge for a charge bargain because all the parties involved share a 
common outlook…’189 
  
c. Financial incentives 
 
Sanders and Young seek to explain defence barristers’ willingness to settle cases as 
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driven, in part, by financial incentives.190 Pointing to the research carried out by Morison 
and Leith and Bredar, they argue that barristers put off placing pressure on the defendant 
or advising a plea of guilty until the day of trial causing it to “crack”.191 Defence 
barristers achieve a cracked trial through emphasising the discount available, or 
commonly, through a charge bargain.  In this way counsel maximises the ratio of work 
to reward.192 The barrister is then free to conduct another case the next day with the 
same result. Furthermore, barristers earning case-by-case take on more work than they 
can handle relying on the probability that a case can be disposed of via a guilty plea. In 
doing so, barristers keep hold of briefs until the last minute when it becomes clear that 
they cannot appear.193 Barristers are assisted in this process by their clerks who try to 
keep a case “in chambers” and avoid telling the instructing solicitor that their chosen 
counsel is unavailable. The instructing solicitor is then forced to keep the brief with that 
set of chambers as free counsel elsewhere cannot be found.194 Accordingly, many 
counsel are instructed at the last minute in cases for which they cannot prepare properly.  
 
Zander and Henderson’s Crown Court Survey195 could support Sanders and Young’s 
argument that defence barristers purposefully crack cases because of pay. The survey 
details the high number of cases that cracked and the late briefing in many cases in the 
early 1990s.196 Furthermore, Sanders and Young believe that able young barristers will 
tend to gravitate towards privately funded work, leaving the criminal bar to their less 
talented contemporaries to ‘eke out a living by settling cases wherever possible.’197 This 
view is reinforced by Belloni and Hodgson who have tentatively suggested that 
barristers crack trials to avoid the potential embarrassment of being unprepared.198  
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Sanders and Young also say that prosecuting counsel have the same reasons to charge 
bargain over plea as defence barristers. Referring to Temkin’s study of rape cases, 
Sanders and Young believe that prosecutions of overly complex cases that are not 
matched by correspondingly high pay rates are sometimes passed at a late stage to 
younger, more inexperienced members of chambers who are more likely to settle by 
charge bargaining with the defence.199 Negotiations over charge are conducted at a late 
stage because prosecutors are unwilling to suggest to the CPS that cases should be 
discontinued.200 With a charge bargain the defendant receives a substantial drop in 
sentence and also full credit for a guilty plea. The prosecutor, they argue, has the same 
incentive in settling cases as they will receive a higher payment over several cases than 
he or she would do for one trial.201  
 
d. Rethinking barrister incentives and culture 
 
Peter Tague, in considering the criticism of McConville et al, argues that some evidence 
strongly points to a more complex interpretation of barrister behaviour than that 
presented in Standing Accused and Negotiated Justice. As Tague argues, if barristers 
were to act entirely selfishly and to their own financial gain, it would not be in their 
interests to systematically remove defendants from trial.202 The manipulation of the 
defendant and the determination to secure a plea of guilty does not meet what Tague 
calls a barrister’s three main ‘selfish’ incentives: to attract briefs, avoid sanction and 
maximise remuneration. According to Tague, under the previous fixed fee scheme by 
which barristers were remunerated it was in their financial interest to run trials.203 It is 
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also, Tague argues, in a barrister’s interest to be known as a good advocate rather as a 
negotiator.204 Finally, the observed habit of counsel meeting the defendant just prior to 
trial and attempting to manipulate and pressurise defendants to plead guilty would be 
ruinous to their reputation with solicitors, a reputation counsel should be keen to 
protect.205 Tague hypothesises that the high guilty plea rate may be the result of 
barristers acting in what they believe to be the defendant’s best interests. According to 
Tague, adopting either model of the selfish lawyer or the altruistic barrister would result 
in more trials.206  
 
Tague’s research is highly unusual in that he spoke with barristers rather than 
defendants, unlike Negotiated Justice and Standing Accused, where no barristers were 
interviewed about the advice they gave. Tague notes that while ‘vociferously critical of 
the barristers' motives in those conferences, the authors of those studies apparently did 
not attempt to speak with the barristers, to learn what the barristers thought they were 
doing.’207 Tague’s work draws three conclusions about the current literature. Firstly, the 
analysis put forward by McConville et al may be empirically incorrect as it is often 
demonstrably in defendant’s best interests to plead guilty rather than contest a trial. 
Shifting “blame” to barristers incorrectly focuses attention on how guilty pleas are 
produced. Secondly, barristers’ thought processes in relation to plea require greater 
scrutiny and research, and that drawing conclusions from observed behaviour is an, as 
yet, under-explored source of empirical research. Finally, the financial incentives 
provided to the Bar should be carefully analysed to see how barristers’ advising 
behaviour may be affected. 
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6. Gaps in the current literature 
 
The main body of the present literature and research appears to attribute the high 
incidence of guilty pleas in English courts to a combination of system incentives and 
manipulation by legal professionals. While it is undoubtedly true that bargaining in some 
form or another has been a consistent feature of English courts for more than 100 years, 
there is insufficient empirical research to support the view that lawyers in contemporary 
criminal justice subscribe to a ‘guilty plea culture’, are part of courtroom communities 
that encourage guilty pleas, or actively manipulate defendants for financial gain. The 
explanation that lawyers, and specifically barristers see defendants as ‘unworthy and 
undeserving’208 is problematic given the wider context of the possible complex and 
intersecting variables which might affect barristers’ behaviour.  
 
An important limitation of the current literature in this field is the relative lack of 
evidence regarding barristers’ perspectives of how the matter of plea is dealt with. As 
Tague’s work indicates, there is a clear need for more empirical research into the 
practices of the criminal bar. Moreover, the current literature is based on empirical data 
which is now considerably out of date, having been gathered in a very different legal and 
political context.  In particular, the following four main areas are under-researched and 
require further attention.  
 
Firstly, work by McConville et al being based primarily on interviews with defendants 
leaves a gap in the data which might identify how barristers themselves think about their 
own work and how they come to decisions on plea or why they enter into bargained 
pleas. Although drawing inferences from observed behaviour is a valuable and 
recognised research method, it is necessary to analyse data based on interviews with 
barristers in order to construct a more detailed, nuanced and up to date account of their 
motivations and behaviour. While it is true that data drawn from interview data will 
inevitably exhibit a favourable self-bias or suffer from a false consciousness about the 
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motivation for the content of their advice, practitioners can contribute valuable data and 
new perspectives that should not be ignored. Previous research by Mulcahy has 
criticised the value of lawyers’ accounts of their own behaviour, arguing that such 
accounts are ‘ideological’ as lawyers seek to justify plea negotiations in the face of 
criticism.209 However, this argument is predicated upon the questionable idea that plea 
bargaining is always unfair and coercive, and that any explanation given in the face of 
criticism is a ‘justification’ and therefore necessarily ideological. Rather, any 
explanation should be assessed on its own merit, and lawyers’ accounts should be 
carefully scutinised against other evidence as a potential explanation of why guilty pleas 
are advised. As Tague’s study suggests, previously unaccounted for incentives should be 
investigated and a more nuanced approach to the question of plea is necessary. The 
views of barristers may be extremely significant in understanding why and how pleas are 
produced and this source of information is currently under-explored.  
 
The second area which requires further research concerns the nature and extent of the 
court community model advanced by Sanders and Young. Difficulties arise in 
demonstrating the existence of such a model. While the Bar is certainly small enough to 
ensure barristers on the same circuit come into contact reasonably often and many 
judges are drawn from the Bar’s ranks, there is little empirical evidence in the literature 
to suggest that a community of co-operation similar to that observed by some in 
American courts is active amongst the Bar. Sanders and Young rely on James Bredar’s 
work describing plea negotiations during his time as a director of a pilot scheme in a 
Crown Court centre in the north-west, however, the conclusions presented there could be 
limited to one court centre.210 The risk of drawing national conclusions from this study is 
that regional variations on how barristers interact may be hidden.211  
  
Research with barristers might indicate, in line with Tague’s research, that defence 
lawyers believe that negotiated pleas are the best outcome for their client because of the 
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weight of evidence, or because of a realistic evaluation of the defendant’s chances at 
trial. Furthermore, other studies suggest that more complex processes may be at work. In 
Morison and Leith’s research, counsel interviewed put forward many reasons for 
advising on plea, occasionally forcefully.212 Their research revealed that the ‘barrister’s 
job is to take all the disparate information that is of relevance and make an 
evaluation.’213 These matters include not just legal proof but also the character and 
personality of the accused, witnesses or experts, the strength of the prosecution’s case 
and counsel, the logistics of the legal process and the judge. This view seems more 
consistent with advice being based on a number of complex reasons, rather than the 
manipulation of defendants according to a guilty plea culture or to satisfy the 
expectations of fellow counsel and judges. 
 
The third limitation in the current literature relates to the issue of fee incentives. 
Although work to date has indicated that fee incentives are an important driver of 
barrister behaviour, it is not clear how exactly this works in practice. Without knowing 
how different case outcomes are remunerated, and how this might be related to other 
contextual factors such as the volume of work available to barristers, it is difficult to 
draw the conclusion that the fee structure has created an incentive in favour of cracked 
trials and guilty pleas. Lawyers are thought to be susceptible to fee incentives214, 
however, no thorough research has been conducted on the incentives of the English 
criminal bar. Although it is argued that there is little financial incentive to barristers to 
fight cases215, the reverse may actually be true. In England and Wales barristers are paid 
according to the Advocates’ Graduated Fee Scheme (AGFS), a fixed fee scheme. The 
Graduated Fee Scheme has been altered recently following the recommendations given 
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by the Carter Review216 in the Criminal Defence (Funding) Order 2007. Furthermore, 
defence barristers and prosecution barristers are not paid according to the same 
scheme.217 Without the same pay incentives, prosecution and defence barrister might 
disagree about when is the most lucrative time for the case to crack, and prevent the type 
of collusion Sanders and Young suggest. Further research is therefore needed which 
precisely calculates the fees produced by different outcomes. That pay rates have varied 
over the years may mean that any previous studies are no longer an accurate reflection of 
barristers’ fee incentives. 
 
The last limitation of the current literature concerns the effect of the significant 
acceleration of changes to the criminal justice process generally, and the funding and 
provision of legal advice specifically. Much of the literature predates these changes. 
McConville and Baldwin’s description of court practices from 20-30 years ago sets the 
historical context for developments only. The last major study that included research on 
the Bar was McConville et al’s Standing Accused published in 1994. Since that time 
changes that may have had a significant impact on court practice include: the number of 
defendants being diverted from the criminal justice system through cautioning and PNDs 
and thus the type of defendants encountered; the CPS becoming more involved in early 
charging decisions; the changes to the pay structure for defence work (for example the 
recent Carter reforms); significant changes to the rules of evidence at trial (the use of 
bad character evidence; the in-roads into the right to silence; the introduction of hearsay 
evidence); minimum sentences for certain offences; alterations to the law on disclosure; 
the enshrining of the one third discount by the Sentencing Guidelines Council; the 
indication of sentence in Goodyear; and, from an evidential point-of-view, the 
availability of CCTV evidence and improved scientific evidence, such as the widespread 
use of DNA matching. If those changes are considered together with possible alterations 
in attitude by members of the Bar, further socio-legal research is required to draw firm 
conclusions about how barristers approach the question of plea. 
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7. Identifying the research question 
 
The central focus of this research is to examine the factors which determine a barrister’s 
advice on plea and to answer the question: ‘what is it that determines a barrister’s advice 
on plea?’ Given the relative passivity and lack of legal knowledge of defendants in 
entering a plea and their inevitable reliance on legal advice, this question is vital to any 
analysis of criminal justice. The plea is entirely determinative of whether a trial on the 
facts is held, therefore the advice upon which the plea is determined and entered is of 
central importance. Although work to date has examined this question, limitations in 
earlier methodologies and analytical models are such that important questions remain 
unanswered. Moreover, the very different context in which barristers now operate means 
that new research is needed in order to shed light on the current decision-making of legal 
advisors. Gaps in the existing literature are such that a more nuanced, detailed 
understanding of barrister incentives or “drivers” is required. In particular, there is a 
need to include the attitudes of barristers themselves as a source of data. 
 
In order to address the primary research question, five areas need to be examined in 
detail. Firstly, the process of advice-giving itself will be examined at a micro level. This 
will require an analysis of how defendants are advised on a case-by-case basis and the 
factors considered relevant by a barrister in determining what advice to give. Secondly, 
in the light of the central role ascribed in the current literature to the construction of 
guilty pleas, the thesis will examine why plea bargains are entered into and how 
bargained pleas might act upon defendants’ decision-making. Thirdly, the thesis will 
attempt to explore the financial incentives which affect barristers and discuss what case 
outcomes barristers may prefer. Fourthly, given the importance placed in Tague’s work 
on the role of the instructing solicitor in sanctioning barristers who do not live up to their 
expectations, the thesis will discuss the barrister’s relationship with his or her instructing 
solicitor. Finally, this research will look for evidence of court community and attempt to 
identify whether or not barristers’ values and decision-making are co-opted by 
organisational drivers.  
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Chapter 3: The empirical basis for the research 
 
The empirical basis for this research consists of 24 interviews conducted with 22 
practising barristers and two solicitors. To ensure the reliability and validity of the data 
collected this research was designed with close reference to accepted methods of 
qualitative data collection and analysis. However, to retain the readability and flow of 
the thesis, the detailed account of the methods used in this research is set out in 
Appendix A. This chapter briefly discusses the main issues relating to what the research 
sought to achieve and the reasons why qualitative interviews with practising criminal 
lawyers were used. 
 
1. Method summary 
 
The aim of the research was to identify the factors or drivers which may determine a 
barrister’s advice on plea. As the previous chapter detailed, no recent published research, 
with the exception of that conducted by Peter Tague, has spoken to barristers about how 
and why they advise defendants to plead.218 What determines a barrister’s advice on plea 
is almost certainly brought about by complex social processes and cannot be measured 
through the analysis of quantitative, causal relationships between variables.219 On the 
other hand qualitative research, and more specifically interviewing, allows the 
exploration of how and why people behave the way they do. Using interviews as the 
primary research tool is therefore a well suited, valid method to tackle the research 
question. Although observation of social phenomena provides an understanding of how 
people behave, it does not allow for the understanding of motivation or experience. The 
research objective of discovering the motivation of barristers would be partly hidden to 
someone who merely observed behaviour. Interviews give a chance for participants to 
think about their own behaviour and to explain it. As the focus of the research was to 
find out why barristers advise as they do rather than how, the best way of finding that 
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data was to ask the barristers themselves. Interviewing is a well-established research 
tool, and has been used extensively in researching the working practices of lawyers.220  
 
The methodology used can be described as a grounded theory approach.221 The research 
questions were designed with reference to pre-established variables that were identified 
as relevant in the literature. These variables were supplemented by questions relating to 
areas of law that might have some impact on the advice given.  Because the current 
literature has not given a detailed account of how barristers think about their work 
according to their own perspective, the research adopted an emerging theory method 
whereby the questions posed during the course of the research could change to address 
new, interesting or previously under developed areas relating to advice on plea.223 Using 
the research data already collected, the questions partially evolved in an inductive 
fashion. This allowed an emerging theory about the data to be produced that could be 
tested against participants’ responses as further interviews were conducted. The core 
questions asked remained the same throughout the interviews, however, additional 
questions relating to regional factors and pay were added as the research continued. 
 
The questions were arranged in a semi-structured interview format. There was therefore 
flexibility in the structure of each interview, allowing participants to talk at greater 
length about areas they felt were of relevance or importance. That is not to say that the 
question format changed radically or that the structure of any of the interviews varied 
widely from the question schedule presented in Appendix B. Rather, while most of the 
interviews were similar in form and content, issues thought important by different 
interviewees could be explored through follow-up questions and so examined in detail.  
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The interviewees were also selected according to an emerging theory sampling 
technique. The initial sample was chosen to take in a number of what were thought to be 
significant, controllable variables, such as year of call (and therefore experience and 
type of work undertaken); size of chambers; gender; proportion of work in prosecution 
and defence; and practice profile of chambers. However, as the study progressed the 
sample varied according to the needs of the emerging theory.224 The sample was 
therefore changed when it was discovered in the initial sample that some regional 
variation existed between the judicial circuits. This expanded the scope of the study to 
take in five barristers and one solicitor from the Midlands Circuit. While not a 
quantitative study, the sample was continually monitored to ensure that the range of 
relevant variables was represented in the data. Appendix A, Tables A-1 to A-5 show the 
profiles of the barristers interviewed by each of the variables controlled. 
 
Barristers were selected using the Bar Directory published by Sweet and Maxwell and 
chambers’ own websites.225 After each interview was conducted, what was discussed 
was reflected upon and the data transcribed by the researcher. Although the core 
questions and areas of interests remained the same with each interviewee, there was a 
process of continual theory development as data was revealed and gaps and weaknesses 
were discovered.  
 
Although it was recognised that the data would inevitably contain some favourable 
biases in interviewees’ views of themselves, the descriptions given by the participants 
were treated as potentially accurate depictions of their thought processes in determining 
what advice to give on plea.226 The reliability of the data was improved by several other 
methods. Firstly, the data presented in Chapters 4-8 is set in the context of other studies 
and statistical measures. This allowed the data to be compared and checked for veracity. 
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Secondly, the researcher has practical legal training and some experience in criminal law 
and procedure and could approach the topic with an informed view as to how advice is 
constructed. This awareness enabled a penetration beyond a potential “standard 
response” that might be given by a participant. The “insider-outsider” status of the 
researcher also produced a rapport between the researcher and the participants who felt 
comfortable to speak freely about their work. Thirdly, the data was triangulated with 
interviews with two solicitors. The solicitors’ accounts about their relationship with 
barristers and the effect that the relationship has on advice are presented in Chapter 7.  
 
The interviewee extracts are labelled in the thesis according to an alphanumeric system. 
The letter indicates the chambers of the interviewees, and the number the individual 
barrister from that chambers. Therefore ‘A1’ is the first barrister to be interviewed from 
chambers ‘A’. Participants labelled ‘L’ or ‘N’ were interviewed in Leicester Crown 
Court and Nottingham Crown Court respectively. S1 and S2 are the two solicitors 
interviewed. Where important, background information about the participant, such as 
experience or type of practice, is described in the text. The initials ‘JB’ represent the 
researcher. 
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Chapter 4: The advice process 
 
This chapter examines the advice process at the case-by-case, micro level. In answering 
the question what determines a barrister’s advice on plea? it is important to first 
understand how barristers interact and advise defendants about the plea-making 
decision. This first substantive chapter seeks to understand how the decision itself is 
reached on the basis of law or facts that affect the case at hand. Later chapters will 
explore pressures that are brought to bear on the advice process, but only as external 
matters that are not to do with the case itself or the particular circumstances of a 
defendant. Understanding the plea-making decision in this way appreciates the 
complexity of what drives advice and how it is given, and reflects the layers of 
incentives and motives that impact upon barristers as professionals.     
 
In this chapter the nature of advising defendants on plea, most commonly in conference, 
will be explored. Based primarily on the data gained from interviewees, this chapter will 
set out how the interviewees explained the process they used to come to decisions about 
individual cases and how advice is conveyed to defendants. As will be seen, there are a 
multitude of factors for the barrister to assess which cannot be explored in complete 
detail here. The advice process and the various matters which may affect a barrister’s 
approach to a case involve a significant number of factors which could not all be 
explained sufficiently in a thesis of this length. This research has chosen to focus on 
general matters or more specific examples of burgeoning importance.  The data 
presented here is therefore illustrative and indicative, rather than definitive, of barristers’ 
approaches to advice. 
 
1. Current conceptions of the advice process 
 
Prior analysis of barristers advising defendants is found in two main studies. The first, in 
the mid-1970s, found a significant number of barristers behaving in an overtly 
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manipulative manner to extract guilty pleas from defendants who later protested that the 
way in which they were advised left them with little or no choice.227 Defendants 
described being ‘instructed’, ‘ordered’, ‘forced’, or even ‘terrorised’ into pleading guilty 
by their barrister.228 These barristers used a number of techniques to get defendants to 
plead, including ‘throwing a fit’ of anger, paying little or no attention to the defendant’s 
alternative account, or emphasising the large difference in sentence between that on a 
guilty plea and that on conviction to frighten the defendant.229 The second study two 
decades later which mainly concerned the practice of defence solicitors, but which 
observed counsel in conference with defendants at the Crown Court, argued that 
barristers were more subtly manipulating defendants than that found previously.230 
According to this research, defending barristers exhibited a presumption of guilt and 
were closed to alternative explanations by the defendant.231 Barristers were reported to 
have displayed an over-eagerness to accept guilty pleas and that they made no attempt to 
test the foundations of the defendant’s willingness to capitulate. The research claimed 
that barristers were involved in manipulating the defendant through subtle psychological 
pressures to force them into entering pleas which counsel had decided as appropriate. 
Counsel were seen to gain the trust of the defendant but evinced ‘little interest in 
scrutinising the evidence or in attempting to convince the defendant of its weight and 
probative value. Rather conferences [with the defendant were] treated as “disclosure 
interviews”, the purpose of which [was] to extract a plea of guilty from the client.’232  
 
These two studies have acted as the foundation of a critical view of the defence bar, 
which argues that a “guilty plea culture” is predominant among barristers. Sanders and 
Young, for example, conclude in their recent book on criminal justice that: 
 
…a substantial proportion of…barristers…continue to treat prosecution evidence 
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uncritically, ignore protestations of innocence, and advise that the defendant has 
‘no choice’ but to plead guilty.233   
 
This thesis has, however, identified two important limitations in the current literature. As 
was noted in Chapter 2, these earlier studies are based primarily on interviews with 
defendants, and there is a gap in the data which might identify how barristers themselves 
think about their work and how they come to decisions on plea. Moreover, these studies 
are potentially out of date, having been conducted prior to a multitude of important 
changes to the criminal justice process. To rely on these studies as an accurate depiction 
of the modern Bar is therefore problematic. 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that a complex 
process is taking place in how barristers approach the question of plea in individual 
cases. The descriptions conveyed by the interviewees in the present study do not 
conform to those previously given in the literature. As will be seen, the accounts 
presented here are nuanced and detailed, and cannot be described as justifications of an 
‘ideological character.’234  
 
The chapter begins by describing the methods the interviewees used in forming a view 
of the case against the defendant, and the various important factors that must be taken 
into account are highlighted. In describing the advice process it is hoped that the nuances 
and subtlety of advising a defendant on a criminal charge is conveyed. As shall be seen, 
the advice given to defendants does not lend itself to a monolithic explanation, but is as 
extraordinarily varied as each of the defendants and barristers involved. This chapter has 
tried to capture that variety and explain general trends where possible.  Secondly, the 
chapter will explore how tactical decisions are made on the basis of sentence. There 
appears to be a number of difficult ethical and practical problems that a barrister must 
overcome in deciding what advice to give. That barristers have given consideration to 
these problems is indicative of a highly complex process. Thirdly, how the chances of 
                                                 
233
 A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2007) 428. 
234
 A. Mulcahy, ‘The Justifications of Justice’ (1994) 34 Brit.J.Criminol 411, 426. 
 67
conviction and the potential sentence are conveyed to the defendant will be discussed. 
This will include an exploration of the terms that are used to describe to the defendant 
the likelihood of conviction or acquittal, the differential in sentence that might be 
achieved, as well as the tone and manner taken when giving advice. As will be shown, 
there appear to be at least two ways in which barristers deliver advice to the defendant. 
Neither the “persuasive” or “facilitative” approaches discovered correspond with a guilty 
plea culture description. A critical analysis will be included in each section, reflecting 
what the interview participants have said against the broader context of the current 
literature and development of the law. 
 
2. Constructing advice 
 
a. Forming a view 
 
Before a barrister can advise a defendant on plea he or she must form a view about the 
prospects of the case and the benefits or disadvantages of pursuing various avenues of 
possibility. As described by Morison and Leith, a barrister’s first task is to evaluate the 
case to decide whether a plea of guilty or not guilty is appropriate.235 In forming an 
opinion the barrister must attempt to take an overall view of a plethora of information 
including witness statements, physical evidence, police reports and surveillance, 
forensics, and police interviews of the defendant, together with what the defendant says 
about the prosecution case. Because the number of criminal offences is so many and the 
factual circumstances infinite, it was difficult for the interviewees to explain a standard 
procedure as to how they approach a case. There are, however, certain features that 
remain common to all or most of the interviewees’ accounts of how they begin to form a 
view of the advice to be given. 
 
Without exception all of those interviewed began any case with a reading of the 
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prosecution disclosure given to them in their brief to assess the strength of the Crown’s 
case against the accused.236 This allowed defending barristers to form a preliminary 
strategy before meeting the defendant as to whether this was a case that would probably 
fight or plead. Often, although not always, this view was assisted by a proof of evidence 
that had been given by the defendant to the instructing solicitor. As E1 explained her 
approach:  
 
 I mean you will be given the brief so you read the statements and then you 
make a decision whether you think the evidence is strong or weak…I read 
the statements before I’ve read my defendant’s proof, if there is one, mainly 
because I think, I prefer the prosecutor’s view initially and then to get [the 
defendant’s] idea of it. 
 
Taking the prosecution case first is not unusual given the nature of an adversarial trial 
where it is the prosecution who must prove their case. Evaluating whether the Crown 
can do so on the papers is a logical first step. Being able to make a realistic assessment 
of the Crown’s case was often cited as a reason for why some of the interviewees 
preferred to prosecute and defend cases as part of their practice. Some of the barristers 
interviewed approached the case as if they were prosecuting it to anticipate difficulties 
for the defendant. As I1 described: 
 
 My standard preparation of the case is to prepare a case summary as if I was 
prosecuting the case anyway before I have met the defendant, which will tell me 
if there are gaps in the prosecution case or whether the evidence is overwhelming 
or whether the gaps are likely to be filled…If I thought the defendant really had, 
was in trouble, I would prepare a list of difficulties that he has got. This client 
next week, I had a list of 15 problems he had. 
 
Most of the interviewees felt that the police interview was a crucial starting place in 
assessing the Crown’s case. Admissions in interview were considered, for obvious 
reasons, highly damaging to the prospects of a trial and generally indicative of how the 
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defendant would be pleading anyway. A2’s response was typical:  
 
 …the first place I would look I suppose is the interview because I think that’s a 
good place to start. What someone said and did when they were first spoken to 
about the allegation is usually a good indicator of where the evidence stands and 
a good place to start in the advice that you’re going to give. 
 
Not all those interviewed said they had a clear idea as to what the defendant’s response 
was to the allegation from the briefs given to them by instructing solicitors. In common 
with a study of the Crown Court in the early 1990s, some of the more junior barristers 
reported turning up at court without being given a proof of evidence by the solicitor, and 
were frequently served with the prosecution evidence late.237 This therefore involved 
having to familiarise themselves with the case in a relatively short period of time and 
discuss with the defendant what they had to say for the first time at court. Belloni and 
Hodgson and Sanders and Young have argued that late briefing increases the chances 
that a guilty plea will be advised.238 Equally, however, in common with the Crown Court 
Study, the interviewees felt that they were mostly well-prepared for their ‘Crown Court 
stuff’239 and that they would not advise defendants until they felt they were well 
acquainted with the case against the accused. Sanders and Young assume that a barrister 
cannot properly prepare for a case in the short period before meeting a defendant if the 
barrister has only one day to read the brief, and that guilty pleas are a natural result of 
hurried, poorly prepared work.240 However, Tague argues that the high rate of guilty 
pleas cannot necessarily be attributed to short preparation times and experienced 
litigators need little time to assess the likelihood of conviction.241 According to Tague, 
barristers boast of their ability to prepare cases at short notice, and can adopt formulaic 
methods of cross-examining the prosecution case leaving little reason to resort to a 
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guilty plea out of desperation.242 In the present study the interviewees believed that they 
were in fact generally thoroughly prepared for Crown Court cases. Interviewees agreed 
that short periods of preparation were not a bar to case preparation, and they often 
worked extraordinary hours or refused other work to make sure that cases were prepared 
properly. M1 described how the court would not tolerate shoddy case work and that he 
often had ‘to stay up preparing cases…sometimes into the early hours of the morning in 
order to satisfy judges, preparing skeleton arguments, doing this that and the other.’ 
Contrary to the view of critics of the Bar, interviewees believed that they had a duty to 
the defendant to prepare adequately and they perceived strong pressures from the court, 
solicitors, and the Bar itself to be thorough in how they dealt with cases.    
 
Armed with a clear idea of the Crown’s case, the defending barristers explained that they 
generally had a conference with the defendant and solicitor, or solicitor’s representative, 
where the case was discussed. The standard approach detailed by a majority of the 
interviewees was to take the defendant through each part of the relevant evidence, seeing 
what explanation, if any, the defendant had. This approach of questioning the defendant 
was common to all those interviewed in that they would put each relevant part of the 
Crown’s case to the defendant for them to answer. This style of questioning has been 
reported in other studies, most notably in Standing Accused.243 The behaviour of counsel 
described there was explained by the authors as counsel being uninterested in the 
defendant’s account, that they had already accepted the Crown’s version of the events 
surrounding the alleged offence, and that guilt had been presupposed. Although for all 
intents and purposes that is how counsel’s behaviour might appear, the barristers 
interviewed in the current study explained their technique differently. Barristers here 
adopted a robust style of questioning, not because they necessarily assumed guilt, but 
because they wanted to project the chances of success of the defendant’s account against 
the Crown’s in front of a jury. Ultimately, unless a half-time submission by the defence 
succeeds, a defendant must introduce a reasonable doubt.244 L2 explained the need of an 
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explanation from the defendant:   
 
…“the prosecution’s case is Joe Bloggs and Fred Smith say you were there, they 
both know you and they say you hit him over the head with a glass. What do you 
say? Are they lying because they’ve got it in for you? Have they got it wrong 
because they saw you earlier in the evening? What are you saying to me?” 
Depending on the answer you might sit there and say, “in which case you are 
saying they are lying. Why are they lying?” And you wait for whatever the 
reason may be. Once you’ve got those instructions that relate to specific 
circumstances you sit down and say, “well those are your instructions, there are 
the following holes in your case, have you got an answer to them? Yes, no?”  
 
Those interviewed therefore set their advice within the context of an outcome at the trial. 
If the defendant was unable to provide them with a convincing account within the 
relatively unpressurised atmosphere of a conference, the defence case was likely to 
wither under cross examination from the Crown. As Tague says, before meeting the 
barrister, a defendant may have believed his defence unassailable while the solicitor has 
not provided a realistic evaluation of the case.245 The barrister’s role has traditionally 
been that of an objective professional who brings his or her courtroom expertise to the 
case to provide an honest assessment which can appear crushing to a defendant. In 
Standing Accused, the researchers did not ask the barristers they observed working why 
they had given advice in such terms and relied upon either their own interpretation of 
what they had seen, the reaction of the defendants, or that of the clerks who represented 
the solicitor’s firm.246 While some barristers may have been overly abrupt or too easily 
dismissive of the defendants’ accounts, the motive for such advice may have been 
explained in these terms. Tague argues that that the reason for this style of advising 
(including an eventual recommendation of a guilty plea) ‘for whom a conviction seems 
very likely’ is paternalistic, rather than as part of a guilty plea culture.247 From the 
accounts given by the interviewees in this research, barristers questioned defendants out 
of a genuine concern that an unsubstantiated account might result in a conviction after 
trial and a concomitant higher sentence. The manner and motive for how advice is 
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conveyed to defendants is explored further below.  
 
Contrary to the account of the criminal bar given in Standing Accused248, the 
interviewees in the present research said that they did not take the Crown’s case as 
authoritative nor did they appear to be closed to alternative explanations given by the 
defendant.249 McConville et al’s research depicted barristers as ignoring defendants’ 
protestations or alternative accounts250 and seems in conflict with the complex 
management of facts and witnesses that interviewees in the present research described. 
The current research was unable to ascertain the extent to which briefs given to counsel 
were fully prepared, however, interviewees described receiving a variety in the quality 
of preparation done by their instructing solicitors.251 Those who received poor 
instructions were keen to point out that they made efforts to find out from the defendant 
their account and prepare the case adequately. Many described how meeting the 
defendant radically changed their view either because of the defendant’s explanation, 
refutation, or general character. A very senior barrister, D1, was anxious to point out that 
a defending barrister needed to know what the defendant said about the allegation: 
 
 You need to know what the client is saying about an allegation. After all he may 
have a completely overwhelming defence which just isn’t apparent on the 
prosecution papers. 
 
E2 was able to describe a particular case where her view of the prospects of conviction 
changed completely after speaking with the defendant: 
 
 …when I went to do the trial first off, without any idea about what he was going 
to say, then I was saying look, there’s this, this, this, and this. And actually he 
was really compelling in his explanation and there was something about him that 
just rung true…we just ran the trial this year and he was acquitted. You see, so it 
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was brilliant. But it just goes to show that my perception of the strength of the 
evidence may be wrong, because the really important feature of the strength of 
the evidence is how well it is going to come across. 
 
Even if the account given by the defendant was fantastical, one barrister felt it was 
incumbent upon him to make sure that the account put forward by the defendant was 
properly explored before he could give advice on plea. Rather than dismissing a 
defendant’s explanation, H1 went to long lengths to verify through medical evidence 
whether he was suffering from a psychological condition when in fact, according to both 
a psychologist and a neurologist, the defendant was malingering. Indeed H1 and a 
number of others commented that in more ordinary cases it was occasionally impossible 
to advise thoroughly because the prosecution had not served all their evidence. Overall, 
the interviewees gave a very strong impression of wanting to know the complete case 
against the defendant, and his or her account before giving their advice on plea.   
 
b. Timing of advice 
 
Those interviewed located their first contact with the defendant as being on the day of 
the plea and case management hearing (PCMH) or at some time prior to that hearing.252 
Since the PCMH was introduced, the trial barrister should be the barrister who conducts 
the PCMH.253 From the present research it was impossible to know whether that 
requirement is being complied with254 although the Carter Reforms to the Graduated Fee 
Scheme should assist in getting barristers to do their own PCMHs.255 The more senior 
interviewees dealing with more serious and complex cases generally located their first 
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contact with the defendant as a conference with the defendant and solicitor either in 
chambers or at the solicitor’s office. Those of five or less years call reported often 
meeting defendants at court on the morning of the PCMH. Therefore, a variety of 
scenarios were reported. In more serious cases there tended to be better preparation of 
cases by both prosecution and defence, with counsel being instructed well in advance of 
the trial. In simple, minor cases, counsel was often instructed only shortly prior to 
meeting the defendant. However, when asked, those interviewed reported unease with 
advising unprepared, especially in the pressurised environment of the court setting and 
were conscious of the problem of a defendant making a hasty decision. D1, a QC, who 
commonly represented defendants involved in organised crime and serious violence 
described how he came to his decision on how to advise: 
 
 D1: If I think it’s a case where there is a very strong prospect of conviction, I 
normally have a conference with them in which I do not discuss the question of 
plea. It’s getting to know them, it’s getting to have a feel for them, it’s getting 
them to trust me, it’s getting them to know that I have worked on the case, that I 
know this and that and so on. And making sure that I haven’t missed anything 
important. 
 
 JB: So, you would be reluctant to advise on plea at all at the first meeting? 
 
 D1: Very, very reluctant. I can’t think of a case for many years where I have 
done that. Then I will go away, talk it over with the junior and the solicitor, and 
in the light of what we think about the realistic prospects go back and see the 
client again. 
 
I1, a more junior barrister of 12 years call, showed an awareness of the pressure and 
dangers of defendants reacting to evidence and making decisions on plea without having 
time to think: 
  
 Sometimes they are reacting to evidence that has been served on the day of the 
hearing that changes things. Sometimes they have not had a conference with the 
solicitors before, they haven’t had enough interaction with the lawyers…I think 
that usually we have plenty of time before the PCMH to consider their position, 
so they know what they want to do. If it’s a big case, a complicated case, 
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hopefully there’s been a conference in advance of the hearing. If there was a 
particular difficulty where I didn’t think they’d had enough time, I would ask the 
judge for further time whether it be that day or to another date. There is no 
particular difficulty with that. 
 
J1 echoed these concerns of a defendant being made to make a decision too quickly, 
especially when they were meeting and receiving advice from counsel on the case for 
the first time: 
 
 What I’m anxious to head off is at court there obviously is a higher degree of 
tension, and what I’m anxious to avoid is someone feeling that they’ve met me 
for the first time or a barrister for the first time and that what they hear is that 
they have to plead guilty. They’re not actually been told that but I’m anxious to 
avoid them latching onto that… 
 
These accounts by barristers of their own behaviour are in sharp contrast to what 
appeared to be inferred by McConville et al in Standing Accused. In the fast-paced 
environment of the court, where the defendant may be meeting their barrister for the first 
time, ‘the atmosphere [in conference] is marked by severe tension in which decisions 
can no longer be deferred but are required immediately.’256 However, when asked 
specifically, the interviewees in the present research argued that a defendant lost little or 
nothing from taking time over their decision. According to the barristers in this study 
judges were happy to preserve credit for a guilty plea at PCMH if the defendant needed 
time to consider their position. J1 explained: 
 
If I don’t want them to plead guilty at the moment because it seems they’re not 
quite settled in their view of what they want, I will just asked the judge for more 
time. I will put it over a week so this person can think about it. 
 
Being able to preserve credit is significant in reducing the pressure under which 
decisions over plea are taken. A decision over plea is not therefore necessarily subject to 
the rushed, pressurised immediacy described in Standing Accused. Rather, a defendant 
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may deliberate over the decision in a more considered fashion and enter a plea made on 
the basis of a sensible assessment of the evidence. The interviewees made clear that they 
would not allow a defendant to enter a plea, if they believed that the defendant had not 
fully considered the implications of their choice. 
 
The timing of advice and how a barrister forms a view of the evidence were general 
matters discussed with each of the interviewees. There were also two specific matters 
relating to evidence and procedure that were raised with interviewees relating to how 
they formed a view of the case against the defendant. The admissibility of the 
defendant’s bad character was volunteered by the interviewees, without prompting, as of 
central concern in approaching what advice to give. The impact of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2005 relating to plea and case management hearings were also 
discussed in detail with each of the interviewees as the researcher believed the Rules 
might have had a significant impact on the timing of advice. The Rules created a series 
of deadlines and procedures that attempted to improve the efficient running of criminal 
cases through the court. 
 
That is not to argue that other factors relating to evidence and procedure are not 
important in criminal cases. Quite to the contrary, as the interviewees explained, it 
would be impossible to provide a definitive account of what different legal rules in 
combination with the facts of cases produce the final advice given. Other law relating to 
evidence and procedure are highly significant in deciding how cases are approached, 
however, both bad character and plea and case management hearings were identified as 
of burgeoning importance in the advice process. Both areas were therefore focused on 
during the course of the interviews and in the analysis provided here, and are illustrative 
rather than encompassing of the type of considerations that a barrister must weigh up in 
approaching a case. That these two factors are only a small part of the complexity of the 
advice process assists the argument that the current literature is missing vital empirical 
evidence about what motivates barristers’ advice. 
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c. Bad character 
 
Through the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the government introduced 
substantial changes to the admissibility of bad character evidence in criminal trials. 
Although the defendant’s bad character was previously admissible under common law 
‘similar fact’ principles and the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, sections 98-113 replaced these rules giving much wider scope to the court in 
considering whether the bad character of the accused or non-defendants should be heard 
by the jury.257 The controversy surrounding these provisions is well known and will not 
be rehearsed here. Suffice it is to say that a large part of the legal profession and 
academia expressed disquiet at the prospect of an expanded role of bad character in 
trials.258  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003, sections 98 to 113 abolish the common law rules on the 
admissibility of the previous bad character of the defendant, and introduce seven 
“gateways” through which it may now be introduced at trial. As the Court of Appeal 
noted in Hanson259, one of the most commonly used of these gateways is evidence 
relevant to an important matter between the defendant and the prosecution.260 Through 
this gateway the prosecution may, among other things, introduce evidence that the 
defendant has the propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, or 
the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful.261 Therefore under the section, the 
prosecution may issue an notice of intent to adduce the defendant’s bad character and 
have admitted as evidence the defendant’s previous convictions for previous offences 
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including those for the same kind of offences with which he is now charged, and more 
generally, previous convictions demonstrating untruthfulness (provided that the 
defendant’s credibility is a matter between the prosecution and defence).262 In Hanson 
the court explained that while one prior offence of the same type would probably not 
show propensity263, however, unusual behaviour, such as starting fires or sexual abuse of 
a child on a single occasion might do so. Similarly, single offences with the same modus 
operandi as the charged offence might be sufficient.264 The period since the previous 
behaviour alleged to constitute bad character is also relevant as to whether it should be 
admitted.265 The prosecution may not use bad character to support a weak case.266 
 
The admissibility of the bad character of the defendant may have greater implications for 
the plea entered, rather than on the verdict of juries. Although the introduction of bad 
character might change the conviction rate, the more important effect might be the 
impact on the psychology of the defendant contemplating his or her chances of 
conviction and therefore their plea at PCMH. Recent research released by The Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform was unable to conclude whether bad character applications had 
any impact on plea, as applications were often made late or went unresolved until the 
morning of trial.267 In their Crown Court sample only 10% of defendants changed plea 
after the application was made.268 The Office for Criminal Justice Reform, however, did 
not collect case data on whether defendants changed their plea at the prospect of an 
application, although one Crown Prosecutor told them he ‘might put the defence on 
notice of [his] intention to consider bad character before making a formal application 
that might not be pursued. This was done in an attempt to save time or force a guilty 
plea.’269 None of those interviewed for that research said that they would advise a 
change of plea as the result of a successful application270, however, the present research 
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found that bad character was a very important indicator of what advice was given by the 
defending barrister prior to an application being made in the first place.  
 
Interviewees were asked whether any recent changes to evidence and procedure had had 
an impact on their advice to defendants. Nearly all, without prompting, immediately 
raised the issue of bad character. The majority of those interviewed felt that bad 
character had dramatically changed the way that they advise. In particular, the change 
had affected their advice where the prosecution seeks to show a propensity to commit an 
offence under section 103(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Almost all of the 
barristers interviewed felt that defendants with previous convictions for theft and sex 
offences faced great difficulty in sustaining a not guilty plea in the face of a successful 
application: 
 
…there are some cases where it becomes an open and shut case because the 
guy’s got some form which is going to go in. So, you say to him the first thing 
that the jury are going to know is that you’ve sexually assaulted a 15-year-old 
before, and that’s almost game over for you really.271 
 
A3 was equally pessimistic about a successful bad character application: 
 
And it’s spelt out to them in no uncertain terms that is, look, if your character 
goes in, you are probably dead.   
 
Despite a general perception that defendants with a substantial history of relevant 
criminal activity and reprehensible conduct faced severe difficulties in maintaining a not 
guilty plea, some felt that there were circumstances where bad character needed to be 
dealt with in the same way as any other negative part of the evidence. Because bad 
character under the legislation and Hanson cannot be relied upon by the prosecution to 
bolster a weak case, successful applications were not conclusive of their view about a 
defendant’s prospects. K1 believed that although a bad character application might be 
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successful, a defendant might already be thinking of pleading guilty due to the strength 
of the rest of the Crown’s case. 
 
K1: I wouldn’t imagine that there would be a scenario, very often, where a ruling 
on whether [bad character went before a jury] would totally altered the advice 
that you’d give…. 
 
JB: …So you don’t think that an application like that has, that the defendant’s 
plea has hinged on something like that? 
 
K1: No. There are very, very, very few cases where because of the nature of the 
safeguards of the legislation, where the crux of the prosecution case is dependent 
on a person’s previous convictions going in… 
 
Others felt that they as skilled advocates could find a way to neutralise bad character 
during the trial, despite the obvious difficulties it might create:  
 
There’s probably one or two where the bad character going in you just know will 
put such a slant on a case that if we are in trouble on those two points it’s just 
going to make the hill that much steeper. But, in the main and one’s arrogance as 
an advocate makes you think I can put a spin on that if it goes in anyway. You 
know, the Crown are so desperate that they’re now relying on things that he did 
five years ago. You can put a spin on it. 272 
 
A number of the barristers interviewed believed that an over reliance on bad character 
could potentially backfire on the Crown. Interviewees believed that juries did not like a 
prosecution case that seemed to rest on prior criminality. C1, a barrister who prosecuted 
more than he defended, explained: 
 
There are some cases where the prosecution apply and get it in, but it doesn’t 
help them because it allows the defence…to make a song and dance in their 
closing speech about how the, they haven’t got any evidence and they are using 
the past. Juries don’t like it actually, unless it strikes them as being relevant. So, 
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when prosecuting I would not make them, I would try to avoid making an 
application I thought was likely to backfire. 
 
For J1 there was an anxiety that defendants could be over awed by the prospects of their 
bad character going in, however, she felt that juries were able to approach character 
sensibly and that character itself rarely decided a case: 
 
J1: I really strain to have defendants not to be overly influenced by the bad 
character provisions, simply because in my view juries are pretty sensible and at 
the end of the day I don’t think that bad character actually makes juries convict. 
 
JB: But, it can sound very bad to a defendant? 
 
J1: It can sound bad for a defendant, and it can have an impact in terms of, “oh 
no what’s the point of having a trial, they will find me guilty.” So you have to do 
quite a lot of spadework in saying, “look, I know this looks bad, but”, and try and 
reel a defendant back from falling into pleading guilty out of a sense of 
hopelessness, which is obviously not the right reason to plead guilty. So I think 
the legislation does have an impact, not on the outcome, but on the way that a 
person feels in terms of how confident they are about the trial. 
 
The view of these interviewees is only partially supported by research carried out with 
mock juries. In Sally Lloyd-Bostock’s simulation of criminal trials in which jurors were 
given information about the defendant’s previous convictions, she found that the 
defendant was not only less likely to be believed as a witness, but jurors were  more 
likely to convict when the previous convictions were of a similar type to that charged as 
compared with a defendant of good character, or a defendant with previous convictions 
for disimiliar offences, or a defendant whose character went unmentioned.273 Lloyd-
Bostock also found that a defendant with a previous conviction for a sexual offence was 
generally distrusted by jurors compared to defendants of good character or those with 
convictions for dishonesty offences. However, contrary to the reason for why dishonesty 
offences may be introduced under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (to 
introduce evidence which questions the defendant’s credibility), Lloyd-Bostock found 
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nothing to suggested that dishonesty offences affected juror perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the defendant.274 Furthermore, defendants with previous convictions 
for dissimilar offences to that charged were more likely to be believed than defendants 
of good character or when character was left unmentioned.275 The research suggests that 
jurors subscribe to stereotypes of criminality; that defendants in court are probably 
involved in crime of some kind and are consistent in the type of offence that they 
commit.276  Importantly, the types and extent of evidence made available to Lloyd-
Bostock’s mock juries was limited when compared to the current statutory provisions. 
Therefore, the effect of evidence of bad character on juries may be more significant than 
that found in her research.  
 
On the basis of Lloyd-Bostock’s research, barristers are probably correct to advise a 
defendant of the damaging effect of previous, similar convictions, but not necessarily 
where the credibility of the defendant is attacked with previous, unrelated dishonesty 
offences. Counter-intuitively, defence counsel ought to consider adducing the 
defendant’s bad character when the previous convictions of the defendant are unrelated 
to the offence with which the defendant is charged, otherwise jurors may assume that the 
defendant has convictions of the same type and be affected accordingly. Out of all the 
barristers interviewed, only D1 believed that putting in his client’s previous convictions 
should be as a matter of course: 
 
Although it is rather counterintuitive I normally put in my client’s bad character 
anyway. Because I generally reckon that in the class of work that I do the jury 
will have worked out that he’s got bad character, they’ll very often think it’s 
worse than it actually is. 
 
As these interviewee excerpts and research illustrate, bad character applications do, and 
should have a profound effect on the pre-trial decisions of counsel and defendant. 
Despite some barristers stating that they could tackle bad character evidence as any other 
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part of the prosecution case, there was a widely held belief that the defendant’s bad 
character being admitted into evidence could sway the jury into returning a guilty 
verdict.277 According to the Lloyd-Bostock’s research, these perceptions of the effect of 
bad character are rightly held.  
 
More generally there was a consensus that bad character applications, although useful in 
some cases, were being made too often and were poorly drafted. Although the Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform concluded that applications were not being used to bolster 
weak cases, their conclusions were based on the beliefs of CPS lawyers only.278 In the 
present research, there was a sense that, as with much of the Crown’s paperwork, bad 
character applications are written by uninformed and/or overworked CPS caseworkers 
who, erring on the side of caution, made bad character applications without properly 
considering the case itself or the guidance on bad character from the Court of Appeal.279 
This is problematic as defendants end up facing applications to adduce their character 
when no application should have been made at all. As B1 commented: 
 
CPS prosecutors churn them out…because they are unable in many cases to 
make an informed judgement so they just churn it out, the prosecution barrister 
picks-up the brief and probably doesn’t give it a great deal of thought. I mean, 
very few prosecution barristers when briefed in connection with one by the CPS 
will then decide off their own bat to drop it, they’ll just go ahead with it.  
 
This means there is a break down in prosecutorial discretion, creating an additional 
pressure for the accused and his barrister to deal with. Even though the judge may 
eventually exclude the evidence, it is the prospect of an application which can affect the 
defendant, who very often must enter a plea before an application is made, but pending. 
Of course, mitigation on a plea of guilty and credit might be more difficult to sustain 
when the defendant changes their plea as a result of a successful bad character 
application. As C1 said: 
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Defending one would prefer to at least appear to be entering a guilty plea without 
a bad character having made the difference because it makes the mitigation about 
credit a bit more difficult, I think, if it flies in the teeth of a successful 
application. 
 
A defendant must therefore be advised to consider a guilty plea before a bad character 
application is made to effectively maintain the greatest credit and mitigation possible.  
 
d. Plea and case management  
 
In 2005 the Criminal Procedure Rules were issued to govern the passage of cases 
through the courts. The rules are designed to enable courts to deal with cases ‘efficiently 
and expeditiously’280 and, amongst other things, set time limits for disclosure and 
applications to adduce evidence at trial. The purpose of the rules is to try and 
concentrate the minds of those representing the Crown and defence so that by the time of 
the plea and case management hearing a guilty plea, if appropriate, can be entered, and 
all relevant problems and issues are known so that the judge can issue orders to ensure 
trial readiness. Essentially the rules try to front load cases, ensuring preparation is done 
early and adequately, so that they do not later fall apart because of a delayed guilty plea 
by the defendant or failures in the prosecution case.   
 
It was identified in this research that the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 might have had 
an important impact on the timing and content of advice. Barristers were therefore asked 
whether the rules had made any difference to the progression of cases through the courts. 
Every barrister interviewed reported that the case management rules had had little, or no 
effect on the timing and manner in which cases were dealt with. E2 argued that while 
some of the reforms were sensible, other strains on the criminal justice system made 
them impossible to implement: 
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Every change that happens just rolls in and then rolls out again…the idea was 
that you’d be trial ready before the PCMH, but at the same time the CPS are 
recruiting more people, higher court advocates to work in-house…You’ve got the 
situation now where recently at Southwark, a really nice CPS HCA281 guy, but he 
turned up at court and he was saying to me that he could turn up and get 11 
PCMH files for plea and case management that day. So he hasn’t got time to read 
any of them before the day starts. He is effectively running his list as if he were 
in a magistrates’ court…And so you go through the form and the form says bad 
character, and he has to say 14 days, any bad character application in 14 days. 
Never can be done in 14 days, everyone knows that.  
 
E2’s observation of the lengthy time lag in bad character applications was repeated in 
the Office of Criminal Justice Reform’s research. It was discovered that the average time 
for a bad character application was 121 days after the case was sent or committed to the 
Crown Court, well in excess of the 14 day requirement.282 
  
E2’s explanation corresponded closely with other barristers’ complaints about internal 
tensions in the system that were not being adequately funded or given the right amount 
of manpower and expertise to do things properly within the strict time limits the rules 
impose. As I1 reported: 
 
JB: The applications of bad character should be made then [at PCMH], the 
hearsay application should all be made then… 
 
I1: They should but they’re not. I mean they’re never made adequately by the 
time the PCMH happens. 
 
JB: And why is that? 
 
I1: Usually because the CPS would be trying to deal with it and they’re not very 
effective in lots of cases. Often because it’s too quick. The time limits are stupid 
for some. 
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JB: 14 days? 
 
I1: That’s pointless because you do not get the information on his old convictions 
in time. It just doesn’t work at all. So it’s a combination of bad drafting of the 
applications and just not having the information…There’s always orders at the 
PCMH to have these done and those orders are often, not ignored, but there’s all 
sorts of applications being made to all the way through to the trial hearing. 
 
According to F1, this problem is further exacerbated by the defence fee scheme. As he 
pointed out, defence barristers are not incentivised under the Graduated Fee Scheme to 
do the preparation for PCMH, unless they can guarantee that they are also doing the trial 
itself: 
 
…if I couldn’t cover the trial there is no fee structure which allows me to be paid 
for all the work I’ve done already. So, I’m afraid from a mercenary point of view 
the Bar approach things in very much the same way as they did the old PDHs. 
That is you read the papers, you get the client’s view, you tick whatever box is 
on the form you really need to tick and then you wait and see what happens in 
four months time when it’s in for trial. 
 
If the prosecution have not disclosed evidence properly at PCMH, nor made applications 
such as to adduce bad character, the defence barrister might not be able to say whether 
there will be a trial at all being unable to advise the defendant of the nature of the case 
against him.  
 
The general view which emerged from the interviews was that the Criminal Procedure 
Rules 2005 have been somewhat disorganised in their implementation and few changes 
to the quality, efficiency or expediency of the criminal justice system have been brought 
about as a result of their introduction. Interviewees who conducted defence work 
frequently complained about the speed of prosecution disclosure and the inability of the 
CPS to comply with any order given by the court.  
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The interviewees’ comments here reveal a complex working world that does not 
conform to a guilty plea culture. The interviewees were not merely waiting for 
applications to be made and evidence to be disclosed so that they could go through with 
the formality of advising a guilty plea, rather, the interviewees were frustrated because 
they were unable to properly form a view of the case against the defendant and advise 
properly about the respective choices available to the defendant.  
 
The effort described by interviewees in the present research in making sure that they had 
satisfied themselves that the defendant’s account together with the prosecution case and 
evidentiary law had been properly considered is in marked contrast to the description of 
barristers in Standing Accused. The description given by McConville et al is one which 
depicts barristers as gaining, at best, a superficial understanding of the case, which 
presupposed a plea of guilty to the offence and ignored defendants’ protestations of 
innocence. The interviewees here were able to articulate a complicated process where 
the strength of prosecution and defence case were thoroughly considered by them. The 
interviewees described a careful approach where the evidence was carefully weighed up 
and defendants were given sufficient time to consider their plea. According to the 
interviewees, evidence and procedure were thoroughly considered in each case, 
however, also relevant were tactical decisions relating to sentence. This chapter will now 
explore the explanations given by the interviewees on how sentence played a role in 
what advice was given to defendants. 
 
3. Tactical considerations relating to sentence 
 
According to the accounts given by those advising defendants on plea, a series of 
complex decisions had to be made about the strength of the evidence and the chances of 
a conviction or acquittal in a trial. Furthermore, important tactical decisions had to be 
made that, though external to the likelihood of a finding of guilt, were nevertheless vital 
to defendant decision-making: those relating to a potential final sentence. Discussed 
below are three factors that were identified from Chapter 2 and the barristers themselves 
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in interview as being considerations central to whether a defendant should go to trial or 
not. All are in some way eventually related to sentence, something which might in some 
cases be as, if not more important than the likelihood of conviction.  
 
As with those particular factors considered in relation to evidence and procedure, the 
following paragraphs do not serve as a definitive account of the sentencing provisions 
that a barrister must consider when approaching a case. The factors mentioned below, 
are illustrative of the types of matters that a barrister must take into account when 
thinking about what advice to give to a defendant about plea and sentence.  
  
a. Using a trial to expose mitigation and the defendant’s character 
 
A number of the interviewees discussed the tactical benefit of advising a defendant to 
enter a not guilty plea when a trial might expose the mitigating elements of the offence 
and the defendant’s character that appear much worse on paper, even though an acquittal 
itself was highly unlikely. B1 classified this option as a ‘glorified Newton’283, using the 
trial as a way of gaining a favourable factual basis for guilt and allowing the judge to 
make an assessment of the defendant’s character while they give evidence.284 As B1 
explained: 
  
…there are some cases which appear terrible on paper and so you might think the 
client should really be thinking about pleading guilty but you meet your client 
and you take the view that they are far more an attractive individual or less 
unpleasant an individual as the prosecution papers seem to suggest. And that is 
because the prosecution witnesses may have an axe to grind and they are painting 
a very dismal picture of the defendant. So, if you go to trial despite the fact that 
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the client will at the end of the day still be convicted, the judge will see the 
defendant for the person he really is, and by the same token will see the 
prosecution witnesses for the people that they are, and so the whole complexion 
of the case when it comes to sentencing will have changed so dramatically. 
 
Therefore a barrister occasionally has to weigh up the advantages of going to trial, and 
subsequent loss of sentencing discount, against the potential benefit of putting a 
compelling, or personable defendant in the witness box against a prosecution with ‘an 
axe to grind.’ Although rarely used, this possible route of using a not guilty plea to 
expose a defendant’s character illustrates the complexity of a barrister’s task. Here the 
barrister must make a detailed examination of the strength of the evidence, the character 
of the accused and prosecution witnesses, as well as the likely response of the judge to 
different versions of the alleged offence. The barrister is required to make a fine 
judgment call on the basis of experience: 
 
…there are also some cases where you actually lose nothing at all for fighting I 
think. I had one recently and in fact we were acquitted. It was just a case that I 
know, I knew I could smell it on the papers on a plea that the judge would have 
found what we had to say quite hard to take, would have found it hard to accept 
even if the prosecution had accepted it…you know I had to call my client for the 
judge to get a totally different flavour of the case.285 
 
Interviewees who discussed this tactical use of a not guilty plea clearly did not seize the 
chance to get a defendant to enter a guilty plea as would otherwise be typical under the 
McConville et al portrayal of the Bar. These barristers displayed a keen tactical sense of 
how the defendant’s interests could be best preserved and promoted. That a trial was 
considered appropriate where a defendant was clearly guilty of an offence is in complete 
opposition to “guilty plea culture”. 
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b. The discount and sentencing 
 
Given the attention paid to the sentencing discount on guilty plea in the literature, most 
notably by McConville and Baldwin, it was determined that the barristers in this 
research should be questioned about how they advise on the available discount as well as 
their perception of its effect on defendants. In Negotiatied Justice, McConville and 
Baldwin observed defendants being pressured by barristers into pleading to offences in 
the face of the discount.286 Their research found that some barristers were seen to use the 
differential between sentence on conviction with the perceived discount on a guilty plea 
to extract a plea. This important element of the discount and ‘advising in strong terms’ is 
discussed below. The discount is also discussed within the context of charge bargaining 
in Chapter 5. Here the effect of the discount is dealt within in itself, rather than as a 
potential tool used by ‘manipulative’ barristers to persuade the defendant to choose a 
course of action that they believes is best. The relevant law and literature was discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2. As will be recalled the discount has been enshrined in statutory 
law and guidelines from the Sentencing Guidelines Council. The following section 
examines the responses given by the interviewees regarding the application and effect of 
the discount on defendants. 
 
i. Is the discount being properly applied? Evidence from the research. 
 
Participants reported varying descriptions of how strictly the discount is now being 
applied by the judiciary, although the majority within London said that that sliding scale 
was not being put into practice. B1, a barrister with a 100% defence practice, felt that 
judges were justifiably flexible about how the discount was given to defendants. B1 said 
that in his experience even late pleaders were liable to attract a full discount because of 
judicial pragmatism over court targets287: 
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By and large judges are relatively flexible about giving the one third discount 
because if they start playing hardball with the discount they know that a case that 
could carve might not carve and judges are under pressure like every other part 
of the court system to crack cases. I mean, everybody has their targets. Judges, 
shouldn’t overlook that, judges are under the same pressures. So, it’s always 
possible to dress up a belated guilty plea in a way that will still attract before one 
third discount. For example, papers were served late, trial Counsel didn’t have a 
conference until late, there’s been a plea to only part of the indictment, and so on 
and so forth. 
 
The observation made here by B1 supports the studies of Moxon and Baldwin and 
McConville, who found high discounts being given to late pleaders.288 It does not 
necessarily mean that the discount is higher than that which can expected on an early 
plea, rather that credit is preserved and then dressed up by the judge and counsel as a 
plea that could not have been entered earlier.  
 
I2, a barrister who mainly prosecuted, but also sat as a Recorder, even went as far as to 
say that he believed that the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s sliding scale discount was 
‘shameful’, in that 10% at the doors of the court was just not enough. Speaking with 
some insight into judicial practice I2 said that ‘with very few exceptions judges ignore 
the Sentencing Guideline Council on the 10% rule.’ 
 
This should be contrasted with K2, a senior prosecutor who, while confirming that the 
sliding scale was being disregarded, felt that this was wrong: 
 
…despite the best efforts of the Sentencing Guidelines Council who have now 
laid down the sliding scale from a third down to 10%, judges are routinely not 
applying that…So you’re still getting, you still get judges who will give a full 
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third discount for a plea at the doors of the court because they will say you’ve 
saved the public expense of a trial. But, the expense of a trial is not really the 
time in court…And all the witnesses have been inconvenienced, they’ve all been 
putting off their holidays. You know, there’s a massive amount of work that goes 
on and I think the message has to be, to be underlined by judges, that you really 
will get substantial credit for an early plea. 
 
The views held by B1, I2 and K2 are predictable given their practice and position in the 
criminal justice system. B1 practising solely in defence work would argue in favour of 
disregarding the scale, if it inevitably resulted in lesser sentences for the defendants that 
he represents. The position of I2 is also explicable in these terms. As a member of the 
part-time judiciary, he seemed to sympathise with the pragmatic, target driven, 
argument. K2, on the other hand, as a senior prosecutor, might wish to encourage early 
guilty pleas, especially when a great deal of cases crack through last minute pleas. Any 
preparation done by her or the CPS staff working towards trial would be wasted by later 
pleaders and might be professionally frustrating as well as expensive. The position of K2 
is very similar to the reason why the Sentencing Guidelines Council fixed the sliding 
scale as they did. As explained in the Reduction in Sentence for Guilty Plea Guidelines, 
Annex 1 First Reasonable Opportunity: 
 
The key principle is that the purpose of giving a reduction is to recognise the 
benefits that come from a guilty plea not only for those directly involved in the 
case in question but also in enabling Courts more quickly to deal with other 
outstanding cases.  
 
The purpose of the sliding scale is therefore to get guilty pleas out as soon as possible 
and attempt to bring down the cracked trial rate. Certainly, in the long term, if the sliding 
scale properly applied did produce earlier guilty pleas, the policy goals of the discount 
would be undermined if the view of B1 and I2 were to continue to represent practice in 
the Crown Court. It seems, however, that it may be difficult to avoid giving late guilty 
pleaders high discounts, and in some cases desirable to let the practice continue. As 
discussed above, some interviewees reported that evidence was often served late and that 
applications by the Crown were regularly delayed to the point that they would not let 
their defendant enter an early guilty plea. In these cases, only once the barrister and 
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defendant are fully appraised of the Crown’s case should a guilty plea be entered, with, 
arguably, full credit preserved. Applying the discount too rigidly in these circumstances 
might unfairly penalise such defendants. Other justifications for a hard line approach to 
the discount such as the cost of lawyers’ fees and witnesses’ time as well as the distress 
to victims, however, constitute good reasons why late pleas should be avoided in most 
cases.289  
 
ii. How the discount is discussed with defendants 
 
It is important to note from the beginning that under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, 
a barrister is now required to advise a defendant about the credit received for a guilty 
plea, and must tick a box on the Plea and Case Management Hearing Advocates 
Questionnaire to indicate to the judge that they have done so.290 Therefore, at some point 
prior to the PCMH a barrister must broach the subject of the discount even though 
counsel might not think that a guilty plea is appropriate and the defendant is determined 
to proceed to a trial. How the discount was raised with the defendant was discussed with 
each of the barristers interviewed.  
 
According to the interviewees, when and how a defendant is advised on the discount 
seemed to be dependent on the barrister’s assessment of the case. When a barrister was 
confident that either a not guilty plea was appropriate or, in some cases, the defendant 
had indicated a desire to go to trial, advice on the discount was ‘slipped in at the end.’291 
Therefore, the focus of the discussion with the defendant who was to plead not guilty 
was entirely on the merits of the case against them, with the discount mentioned as a 
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mere afterthought. B1 explained that by the time the discount is brought up with the 
defendant, the issue over plea had already been resolved: 
 
I will say obviously if you are pleading not guilty today I have to tell you that 
blah, blah, blah. The clock starts running... But by then… the client is saying no, 
it’s definitely not guilty and I know it’s going to be not guilty then that is just a 
formality. The client is not really listening. 
 
Conversely, barristers were of the opinion that a defendant who faces an overwhelming 
case or wishes to plead guilty can be advised immediately of the discount that they will 
receive without difficulty.  
 
Interviewees identified the more difficult cases as being those where the defendant was 
wavering on whether to enter a guilty plea, and has not yet made up their mind. All of 
the barristers interviewed argued in defence of the discount in this situation. L2 was 
typical in saying that ‘with a lot of people it clarifies in their minds how sure they are 
about the account that they have given you.’292 To many, the discount acted as a 
sufficient benefit to tip a wavering, guilty defendant into entering a plea. When 
questioned about whether barristers felt that defendants might be compelled to plead 
guilty because of the discount, none agreed that the discount, in general, posed any such 
risk. When asked whether he believed the discount to represent an unfair pressure, M1 
said ‘I don’t think it is unfair. I think that it encourages those who should plead guilty to 
plead guilty, generally speaking.’ N2 equally felt that the discount posed little risk to 
defendants: 
  
…lay clients who have a good run have been advised that they have a good run. 
I’ve never come across one who then wants to plead guilty out of some 
remorse…Very rarely when facing a weak case does any barrister get somebody 
coming to them and saying I know the evidence is weak, and I know I went no 
comment in the interview, but I just want to cop it. If they’ve got a good case 
they’ll usually see it out. 
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According to virtually all of the interviewees, the discount was proper in that it provided 
sufficient incentive to those who were de facto guilty to plead, but placed little pressure 
on defendants who had a good chance of acquittal. Nevertheless, critics of the 
sentencing discount have argued that the discount places unacceptable pressures on 
innocent defendants, and it is to this problem to which we now turn.  
 
iii. Does the discount place pressure on de facto innocent defendants?
  
Previous analysis of the discount has argued that the offer of a reduced sentence places 
unacceptable pressure on innocent defendants to plead. The threat of a higher sentence is 
said to cause innocent defendants to plead293 and that because of the discount, ‘many 
innocent persons will thus inevitably face advice from their barristers about the 
advantages of pleading guilty.’294 This is combined with a critical view of defence 
barristers who are accused of using the discount as ‘powerful ammunition to fire at 
defendants’295 in order to settle cases by guilty plea for their own unscrupulous reasons. 
Ashworth and Blake’s more moderate view is that:  
  
…the English system, with its large discount for pleading guilty, militates against 
the “free-choice” of the defendant. The committed defence lawyer should 
recognise this, and strive to maximise the client choice within the structure of the 
legal system as it exists.296 
 
According to Ashworth and Blake the discount itself creates an overwhelming pressure 
that prevents a defendant from making a voluntary choice on plea.297 
 
However, this chapter argues that these critics misstate the problem faced by defendants, 
and conflate several issues that should be considered separately. Firstly, the current 
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literature does not distinguish between de facto innocent defendants and those 
defendants who should contest their case at a trial because they have a good chance of 
acquittal. Discussing de facto innocent defendants is a poor tool for analysing the 
criminal justice system because the arbiter of guilt and innocence is the evidence and the 
trial itself. While it would be desirable for de facto innocent defendants to plead not 
guilty and be found not guilty, the defendant and his or her representatives must deal 
with the reality of the chances of whether the defendant will be acquitted or convicted on 
the basis of the evidence. Secondly, the literature does not isolate the effect of the 
discount by itself, and the effect of the discount as a tool used by unscrupulous barristers 
who wish to manipulate defendants. These are two separate issues: the first is a feature 
of the criminal justice system, whereas the second relates to the potential misbehaviour 
and culture of actors within the system. 
 
Thirdly, the defendant, if allowed to choose his or her plea (without coercion), is always 
given a “free-choice”. Because one course of action is highly undesirable does not 
necessarily mean that the defendant is denied “free-choice”.298 A defendant who pleads 
guilty when faced with the choice of a trial with the possibility of conviction, followed 
by a heavy penalty, or admitting guilt and receiving a one-third reduction, is making a 
free-choice on the basis of the two outcomes. This may seem like a semantic point, 
however, Ashworth and Blake seem to imply that “the committed defence lawyer” 
should be trying in some way artificially diminish the role of the discount in plea-
making decisions. Rather, a committed defence lawyer should strive to accurately 
convey the risks undertaken by the defendant in making their choice and ensure that they 
properly understand the consequences of each course of action.  
 
This section will now deal with the first point relating to de facto innocence and the 
reality of barristers and defendants making decisions in relation to the evidence. The 
discount is discussed here as a feature of criminal justice and its impact on defendants. 
Defendant choice is discussed in more detail in the next chapter in relation to plea 
bargaining.  
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While there may be defendants who face criminal charges who are de facto innocent, 
their actual position, as far as the court and their representatives are concerned, is 
dictated by the prosecution and defence evidence. As Easterbrook says: ‘innocent 
persons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents 
appear to be guilty.’299 Defendants are therefore advised by their barrister about the 
chances of conviction on the prosecution papers, in light of the positive case asserted by 
the defendant. It may be that an entirely innocent defendant is accused of a crime where, 
as a matter of poor fortune and coincidence, the evidence against them is exceedingly 
strong. However, to the defence barrister the true status of their client in terms of factual 
guilt is unknowable, and they must advise on the evidence to be put forward. It may be 
that barrister can make an informed guess as to whether the defendant is telling them the 
truth, but guilty defendants can mimic innocent defendants with some ease.300 Barristers 
can only assess a defendant’s legal guilt on the basis of the evidence, therefore a de facto 
innocent defendant who pleads guilty in the face of strong evidence, and in response to 
the offer of the discount would be exceedingly difficult to detect. Such de facto innocent 
defendants are indistinguishable to barristers from de facto guilty defendants in most 
cases. As K1 explained: 
 
Well, it’s difficult to know isn’t it? You are only looking at it from the point of 
view of an assessment of the evidence, but you don’t know the reality of what 
took place. And you don’t know the factors that may influence somebody. If 
there’s one person’s word against another’s you may think well, that is not very 
strong, and if somebody says I want to plead guilty they may know more about 
the other person than you do, like, they are telling the truth…[the defendant] 
would not be very good [at trial] because they would be lying, whereas the other 
person would because they’re telling the truth.  
  
In this sense, barristers advise and deal in chances of conviction on the papers and are 
blind to de facto innocence or guilt. A barrister essentially tries to predict the outcome at 
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trial and cannot readily distinguish between a de facto innocent defendant against whom 
there is strong evidence and a de facto guilty defendant against whom there is strong 
evidence. The defendant must be assisted to make a choice on the basis of the evidence 
against them and be given advice to properly evaluate the risks of conviction against the 
benefits of pleading guilty, and the advantage of the discount. To say that the discount 
places pressure on innocent defendants is therefore too simplistic. The correct problem is 
characterised as whether defendants are given a proper evaluation of the risk they are 
undertaking by their barrister and whether defendants, together with what they know, 
properly calculate the risks they face.  
 
It has been said that innocent defendants are pressured into pleading guilty by their 
barrister, who at best, overestimates the chances of conviction. Pointing to the Crown 
Court Study carried out by Zander and Henderson, McConville believed that the cracked 
trial statistics raised concerns about whether barristers accurately convey the chances of 
conviction to defendants. In more than one quarter of cracked cases, the prosecuting 
solicitor believed that the defendant had a 'good' or 'fairly good' chance of acquittal; and 
prosecutors viewed the guilty plea outcome as 'good' in 13 per cent of cracked cases 
because, without the plea 'it would have been difficult to get a conviction'.301 The 
difficulty with McConville’s conclusion is that these are the opinions of the prosecuting 
solicitors who are not ideally placed to assess the chances of conviction. Firstly, they are 
not the prosecuting barrister, and therefore perhaps are less likely to be able to make 
completely accurate predictions about how the evidence might play out in a trial. 
According to another part of Zander and Henderson’s study, in only 9% of cases where 
the defendant pleaded guilty did the prosecuting barristers believe that the defendant had 
a ‘fair chance of acquittal.’302 Secondly, neither the prosecuting solicitor nor barrister 
had met the defendant and did not know the defence case.303 Although prosecuting 
solicitors may be good at spotting flaws in their own case, a defendant when questioned 
about the case by his advocate may be a less than compelling witness, produce a very 
poor account of the alleged offence or otherwise give the defence barrister every reason 
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to believe they might be convicted. Barristers are ‘straight-jacketed by their instructions’ 
and cannot ethically suggest that defendants change their defence.304 That is not to say 
that defence barristers are infallible in their predictions relating to the chances of 
acquittal, however, perhaps prosecuting and defending barristers are better placed to 
predict the possible outcome of a Crown Court case.  
 
As discussed above, the interviewees in this research reported that the discount on a 
sentence of imprisonment, by itself, did not generally persuade defendants who they 
believed should be contesting the case into pleading guilty instead. Here, interviewees 
argued that defendants pleaded guilty in the face of the discount when they had a poor 
case and the advantages of a third off a sentence of imprisonment outweighed the 
chances of an acquittal. The only circumstances in which interviewees felt that a 
defendant who should contest their case might be put at risk were when the discount 
made the difference between a custodial or non-custodial sentence. K2 expressed 
reservations about the effect on a defendant of the custody threshold:  
 
I think that it depends on, if a defendant is not of good character, and therefore 
has less of a reputation to lose, and if he’s got to family commitments, I think 
that it would be highly likely in those circumstances that he might plead guilty to 
a crime he didn’t commit. Let’s say a commercial burglary or something, but I 
think that it would be very limited circumstances where that would happen…we 
are only talking about those offences that fall upon the borderline in any event 
and I think probably the difference would be that a person of good character is 
not going to plead guilty to even a shoplift, they’re not, because they have so 
much to lose. Once you’ve lost your good character then I think the stakes are 
rather different and your liberty rather more important. 
 
C1 was very unhappy about advising defendants whose choice of plea might put them 
either side of the custody threshold. He feared a defendant might make the decision on 
that basis alone: 
 
C1:…I’m very loath ever to say that the discount may turn a, or change a 
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sentence i.e. from custody to non-custody, unless I’m pretty sure of my grounds 
on that. And that would be quite a hard call. I mean that would mean an offence 
that wasn’t particularly serious. One has to be very careful with that. 
 
JB: Would you be happy advising on that? 
 
C1: Yes. I mean I do say that sometimes. I mean I do say but, I would usually put 
it in these terms which is following the trial, the prospect is practically 
impossible, whereas in the event of a guilty plea, a relatively early guilty plea, 
you maintain the possibility of a non-custodial sentence. 
 
JB: And why is it that you feel uncomfortable, just to clarify? 
 
C1: Because, because of the question of credit there is the risk of the client 
jumping at the carrot of credit and then regretting it later, so I think I would 
always be cautious… 
 
Perversely, the problem of the discount and the custody threshold was something 
encountered much more by junior barristers with less experience of advising defendants 
on sentence. Barristers of ten years call or more are dealing with more serious cases with 
sentences in ‘round figures’305 and forgo the difficult task of advising a defendant faced 
with a decision that may make the difference between custody or community 
punishment. E1, a junior counsel of less than five years call seemed to be unaware of the 
risk, and may have encouraged defendants to plead by the style of her advice: 
 
I say to them to be practical about it, and your life is up for grabs here, and if you 
plead now you’re going to get a community sentence and you’re going to be able 
to go back to your job tomorrow and move on. If you don’t plead guilty you’ve 
got a long drawn out process, we’ve got a trial, you’re probably going to lose, 
you might go to prison and they’ve got to think about those things…   
 
Being ‘practical’ to avoid trial and ‘go back to your job tomorrow’ is an invitation to an 
apprehensive, risk-averse defendant to plead.  
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According to the interview data, the danger to a defendant who should contest his or her 
case appears to be far greater on the custody threshold than when the discount takes the 
form of a reduction in sentence. None of the interviewees accepted that a third discount 
on a sentence of imprisonment remotely approached a sufficient incentive to encourage 
such defendants to plead guilty, despite the existing literature that argues that the 
discount is a principal tool used in “extracting” guilty pleas. As argued above, the 
literature, written before the current scheme of discounting, puts forward the idea of the 
“innocent defendant” but then fails to acknowledge by what standard both defendants’ 
representatives and the court judge innocence itself. While it is accepted that the 
discount may represent pressure on the accused, that pressure generally only becomes 
decisive in what plea is entered when combined with the weight of the case brought by 
the prosecution. Of course, this requires that the defendant is represented by a 
competent, reputable barrister who can identify the chances of conviction and accurately 
convey the risks to the defendant. This includes a thorough exploration of the 
defendant’s account, as well as understanding the danger that a defendant might make a 
false confession about his or her guilt. The barristers here seemed confident that they 
could do this, although, as E1 showed, there are situations where the barrister 
misrepresents the risks of trial to the detriment of the defendant.   
 
The discount of prison sentence alone, without pressure from the barrister, is probably 
minimal in decision-making on plea where the defendant has an arguable defence. That 
is not to say that the discount may not be used as an effective part of a barrister’s 
persuasive technique in getting a defendant to plead, if the available discount is 
combined with a negative assessment of the evidence. As previously mentioned, and 
discussed below in the next chapter, a barrister who believes that a conviction is likely 
may be highly justified in emphasising the sentence differential. In respect of the 
discount affecting the form of sentence, it is likely that the discount alone can place 
defendants under strong pressure to plead guilty, particularly defendants of bad character 
for whom liberty is rather more important than reputation. In these circumstances it may 
be difficult for a defence barrister to advise a defendant so that they properly evaluate 
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the risks that they are undertaking and focus on the otherwise positive assessment of the 
defence case. This problem appears to be exacerbated by having inexperienced barristers 
who either emphasise the benefits of a non-custodial sentence or are unwilling to go 
behind the reasons for the defendant’s plea and provide reassurances. As is discussed 
below, this is a negative effect of having a detached counsel who acts in a merely 
facilitative role.     
 
The sentence discount again illustrates the countless quandaries that a criminal case 
presents for a defence barrister. The interviewees do not appear to be part of a guilty 
plea culture but conscious of their role in providing advice to the defendant so that they 
might make an informed decision. Although some junior barristers interviewed did not 
recognise that a defendant may inflate the risk of going to trial, especially when the 
defendant might avoid a custodial sentence, others were able to explain their feelings of 
professional responsibility in helping a defendant to make the right decision. While none 
of the barristers agreed that the sentence discount represented a risk to de facto innocent 
defendants, this was explained with reference to the evidence and the strength of the 
case against the defendant. So-called “innocent” defendants were not innocent unless the 
evidence indicated. To the interviewees any defendant who pleaded in light of the 
discount made a good choice on the basis of the potential sentencing outcome and trial. 
 
c. The Goodyear indication 
 
In R v. Goodyear306 a five judge panel in the Court of Appeal outlined a new procedure 
to be followed in the event that a defendant wished to seek a trial judge’s specific 
thoughts on sentence before trial in the Crown Court. Under Goodyear, a judge may, if 
asked by the defence, indicate the maximum sentence he or she would be minded to 
impose if the defendant were to plead guilty at that stage of proceedings. Such an 
indication is binding on the judge and remains binding on any judge who takes control 
of the case until a reasonable time for acceptance has passed. The prosecution may not 
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initiate the process although the judge may remind a represented defendant that an 
indication may be sought. While it should be normal for a written basis of plea to be 
agreed, the court will hold a Newton307 hearing if there is disagreement between the 
defence and prosecution. Although the court expressly disowned the idea of plea 
bargaining in Goodyear, the implications of the judgment are clear. Defendants with the 
advice of their defence counsel and the Sentencing Guidelines now have a calculable 
and accurate estimate of the difference between sentence at trial, and sentence at first 
appearance. The court in Goodyear argued that in the current environment of sentencing, 
a defendant should have information available to him to make a fully informed decision 
on plea. The decision has been cautiously welcomed by some commentators, if only 
because Goodyear made the process of plea bargaining in English courts more 
transparent.308  
 
Exactly how Goodyear has been used in the courts in terms of the regularity of 
applications and the effect on defendant decision-making has not yet been studied. In 
fact scant commentary is available on the case other than general remarks about possible 
implications.309 The present research determined at an early stage that Goodyear 
indications may radically change the approach to advising defendants in some cases. 
Interviewees were therefore asked about the regularity with which Goodyear indications 
were sought, the usefulness of such indications and whether they believed that sentence 
indications created unfair pressures on the accused. Barristers were also questioned 
about any ethical difficulties that Goodyear presented. 
 
i. Application and use 
 
Goodyear was roundly applauded by the barristers interviewed, nearly all of whom felt 
that in at least some cases an indication from the judge could be exceedingly useful to 
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the defendant. A1 gave a clear example of how an indication allowed a defendant he 
represented to make a fully informed decision: 
 
The Goodyear case has helped in certain situations. I'll give you one example, a 
case of a fraud that I did, where at the door of the court the defendant when I 
advised him of some new evidence that was served that made the case against 
him stronger, and some of the defence preparation had not thrown up some of the 
points that I was hoping. I then suggested we go for a Goodyear indication which 
the client considered. He then gave me instructions to go for a Goodyear. We 
approached the judge on the day…an indication given was up to a maximum – 
subject of course to personal mitigation… It was helpful because the judge gave 
an indication which the client considered, considered overnight. Worked out the 
mathematics of the actual term he would serve, and without divulging any 
confidential information, he said I will plead guilty on having heard that 
indication. 
 
Here A1 described an intelligent defendant who was able to weigh up the indication 
against the risk of a trial and subsequent conviction. The defendant in this case was 
happy to know what sentence he was going to receive and to be able to make a rational, 
calculated choice on that basis. The clear argument in favour of Goodyear, for most 
barristers was that such an indication provides information that can fill in the gaps in 
their advice to a defendant. It is easy to imagine that a wavering defendant would want 
to know how they would be sentenced on a guilty plea and after a trial, in fact to many it 
would be the central consideration. As A3 said simply: ‘They want to know when that 
release date is, they want to know how much bird they are going to get. That’s what they 
really want to know.’ Other than fixed sentencing guidelines that reduced judicial 
discretion to a minimum it is difficult to know how else such information could be made 
available to defendants and their counsel.310 The use of Goodyear, according to the 
interviewees, seemed limited, with some having never asked for an indication and others 
asking for indications infrequently (3 times or less since the new practice was given 
approval in 2005). As will be discussed below, there are several apparent difficulties 
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with Goodyear in both practical and ethical terms. 
 
The interviewees also believed that Goodyear brought an unofficial process into open 
court. In common with the observations of numerous studies311 and the Court of Appeal 
itself312, many of those interviewed described continuing breaches of the Turner Rules313 
where judges would explicitly give indications to counsel of what a defendant might 
expect on a guilty plea pre-Goodyear even though that was expressly prohibited. Under 
the Turner Rules, a judge could never:  
 
…indicate the sentence which he is minded to impose. A statement that on a plea 
of guilty he would impose one sentence but that on a conviction following a plea 
of not  guilty he would impose a severer sentence is one which should never be 
made…The only exception to this rule is that it should be permissible for a judge 
to say, if it be the case, that whatever happens, whether the accused pleads guilty 
or not guilty, the sentence will or will not take a particular form…314  
 
However, as Lord Justice Rose more recently observed of Crown Court practice, that 
‘despite repeated judgements of this court to the contrary, counsel, in cases which are 
not wholly exceptional, have recourse to the judge, in his room, in order to discuss pleas 
and sentence.’315 Barristers of more than five years call recounted stories of judges being 
willing to give indications of sentence where they felt it might crack the case and move 
matters along. B1 recalled being called into the judge’s chambers for an unofficial chat: 
 
So you would go in and you would have a conversation, nudge, nudge, wink, 
wink. And the judge would say well he might as well plead, he is not going 
away. But, they wouldn’t say exactly what’s going to happen…But it would be 
basically custody or non-custody. Custodial or non-custodial. And that would be 
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it. 
 
Although probably in breach of Turner, this type of occurrence was, according to the 
interviewees, very common. Often the indication might be even more subtle, so that 
according to official records of judicial practice everything seemed above board. 
 
…there are stories of judges seeing counsel in their rooms saying loudly and 
being asked to give an indication, and saying loudly for the benefit of the tape, 
“certainly not, the Court of Appeal have made it quite clear that I shouldn’t give 
such indications”, and then as the barristers are rising to go putting the thumbs up 
sign in the air. 316 
 
L2 gave an account of a judge making known that only a fine would be imposed by 
pointedly inquiring into whether the defendant had a job: 
 
…he’d said “I’m terribly sorry Mr [L2], but the Court of Appeal have said we are 
not able to assist you.” “Thanks very much judge, forgive me for coming round.” 
“No, not at all.” As we were leaving he said, “oh Mr [L2], I noticed your 
defendant was arrested at work.” I said,”yes, yes he was.” He said,”that must 
have been embarrassing for him.” I said “yes, he was quite upset about it.” He 
said “does he still work?” I said, “yes.” “The same job?” “Yes.” He said, “must 
be quite well paid for that.” I said, “yes he is.” “Jolly good. Thank you very 
much.” Guilty. £600 fine. You see? There are ways of getting it across.  
 
In this respect, the introduction of Goodyear was welcomed by many barristers who felt 
that when matters were brought into the courtroom there was less scope for perceived 
negotiated justice and back-door deals. As K1 explained, giving sentence indications an 
official process that tied the judge’s hands once it was given meant that no nasty 
surprises could be in store for the defendant after plea: 
 
…Goodyear is negotiated justice that is in the open. And it’s easy, and it is safe, I 
think it’s better for the defendants. Because I had a case last year where…a guy 
had got a Goodyear indication from a High Court judge sitting in a Crown Court 
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centre. A week later, the case had been adjourned to him to think about things, 
week later went back pleaded guilty before the same High Court judge who made 
even more positive noises about things and then it was adjourned for sentencing 
for a PSR to be prepared. And it came up in front of a very, very, very hard 
judge…the High Court judge having gone off somewhere else. But, because the 
High Court judge said what he said when he had said it, there was nothing this 
judge could do…But, if it had been all been in the High Court judge’s room, 
none of that would have happened. 
 
ii. Whether Goodyear creates unfair pressures 
 
The introduction of Goodyear indications has brought an accompanied concern that 
defendants may be subject to unfair pressure to plead guilty- that defendants who could 
not be proved to be guilty might be tempted by the incentive of the sentence indication 
from the judge, especially if that indication is that the judge has ruled out custody. 
Interviewees were asked about the merits and difficulties of Goodyear, and at what point 
they introduced the idea of an indication to a defendant. The circumstances where an 
indication would be sought were highly specific and even raising the possibility of a 
Goodyear indication would only be done when it was clear that a defendant was unsure 
about the pros and cons of pursuing guilty plea. As D1 forthrightly argued: 
 
Some of my cases are always going to be a fight and the question of plea never 
crops up. The defendant’s got a sensible workable defence on the papers. It’s not 
my job to go round and try and persuade him to plead guilty. I can’t see that I’d 
even raise it. It would undermine his confidence in me and so on, in the absence 
of some sort of indication that the defendant might be interested in a plea. 
 
In a similar response to that given to the question on the discount, barristers felt that the 
indication did not create pressures on the accused that were necessarily unfair, unless of 
course the question of the custody threshold was raised. The interviewees felt that, on 
the whole, in the situation where there was an uncertainty about the nature of a plea, a 
Goodyear indication gave defendants exactly the information that they wanted: 
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F1:…in practical terms I think [Goodyear] works well. I think there’s always 
been a need to cut through all of this wooliness...And, where there is certainty 
you get clarity of thought. A lot of defendants find Goodyears quite useful in that 
regard. 
 
JB: You don’t think that places pressure on defendants to plead guilty where they 
might not otherwise? 
 
F1: For some it probably would. But, only in the same sense in knowing what the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Crown’s case are. You know, those put pressure 
on the  defendant to plead whether they’ve done it or not, if you want to run that 
argument.  
  
It is perhaps correct to say that the Goodyear indication does not create an unfair 
pressure on the defendant. Once a system of criminal justice has given the defendant 
choices which can determine the sentencing outcome, they should have that information 
available to the defendant about the consequences. Using the analogy of a surgeon and 
patient, one would not expect a patient to take choices about their care without knowing 
the risks that they exposed themselves to, no matter how unpleasant they may be. 
Equally, a defendant should be fully entitled to know if a guilty plea will allow them to 
avoid a custodial sentence on conviction. In that context, Goodyear is a sensible 
innovation that provides clarity in what options are available to the defendant.  
 
iii. Practical problems 
 
Goodyear is not without some serious practical difficulties which has rendered it almost 
useless in the case of serious offences. Firstly, according to the ‘labyrinthine’317 law on 
sentencing in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as amended by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008, in cases where the defendant is considered dangerous, the court 
may impose a life sentence or imprisonment for the public protection (IPP) for certain 
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so-called ‘serious’ offences.318 Offences for which IPP is available are those specified 
under Schedule 15 of the Act for which a sentence of ten years or more is available 
under normal sentencing provisions. Offences considered serious include grievous 
bodily harm with intent, manslaughter, and firearms offences as well as a large number 
of sexual offences. A defendant is considered dangerous if they pose ‘a significant risk 
to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of 
further such offences.’319  IPP sentences are indeterminate sentences, where the 
defendant must serve a minimum tariff period set by the court before being considered 
for release under licence by the Parole Board. According to section 229 and the guidance 
given in Lang320, the court in assessing dangerousness ‘must take into account all such 
information as is available to it about the nature and circumstances of the offence, may 
take into account any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of 
which the offence forms part, and may take into account any information about the 
offender which is before it.’321 To assess dangerousness therefore invariably requires the 
court to have a pre-sentence report prepared on the defendant, their personal history and 
pattern of offending. As the court cannot have a report made until the defendant pleads 
guilty, a defendant who is possibly ‘dangerous’ cannot be told by the court whether the 
IPP regime will apply while he or she maintains a not guilty plea. As is clear from the 
judgment given in Kulah322, if a judge is to give an indication before the issue of 
dangerousness has been resolved, it must be qualified by telling the defendant that there 
is a possibility that IPP may be imposed.323 The practical outcome is that in any case 
where IPP might be available, judges are refusing to give Goodyear indications. As L1, 
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a recorder, explained: 
 
I do agree there are difficulties with Goodyear. IPPs where you’ve got assess the 
dangerousness is another example. I would never give an indication as a recorder 
of Goodyear where dangerousness had to be assessed. Because if you give an 
indication and then you get to report back saying he is a danger, you put yourself 
in an impossible position.  
 
Therefore, any serious violent or sexual offences now, for all intents and purposes, fall 
outside the scope of Goodyear, and defendants charged with these offences cannot 
discover from the judge the sentence they would faced with on a guilty plea. This creates 
a serious lacuna in the law and prevents those charged with these serious offences from 
having sufficient information to make a properly informed decision on plea. 
 
The second problem highlighted during the research was the tendency of judges to pitch 
their indication too high. Because the indication becomes binding once given, judges 
were reported to be anxious not to bind their own hands by indicating inappropriate 
sentences. The result, some barristers found, was that asking for an indication could 
back fire, resulting in defendants, who may have previously pleaded to offences, going 
to trial: 
 
N2: [Goodyear] can entrench positions, which is a problem. You might have 
somebody who has all the things that I talked about earlier- a lot to lose if they 
went to prison. They might have been on the verge of pleading guilty, bringing 
matters to an end, accepting responsibility for what they’ve allegedly done, 
putting it all behind them, all of that, and obviously getting a lesser sentence at 
PCMH. They might have been on the verge, and I’ve come across this, on the 
verge of that, and you mention, perhaps foolishly on my part the Goodyear 
procedure. And you use a Goodyear procedure and as soon as the judge has said 
I can’t promise, I can’t rule out custody, custody is an option, it can almost 
entrench the want to plead not guilty…Because you can happily say to a lay 
client on one of those borderline cases, look, I can’t rule out custody, custody is 
an option. It’s probably more likely than not going to be custody. But, there is a 
significant chance that this will be a suspended sentence, especially in front of 
the right sort of judge. A lot of lay clients will react positively to that advice in 
those terms. When they go in front of the judge and the judge says, sorry I can’t 
rule out custody… 
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JB: It sounds bad? 
 
N2: Yes. It spooks them. I don’t know what it is, but what I found in one 
particular case, and this person went on and had a trial and was found guilty and 
went to prison. And, I think if it had not been messing around with the Goodyear 
they would have put in a plea and probably had something like a 40% chance of 
them staying out 
 
Paradoxically, cautious judges not wishing to underestimate the potential sentence may 
give defendants an inaccurate indication of their true position, and increase the number 
of trials as defendants reject the opportunity to plead guilty. Overall this is to the 
detriment of both the court and the defendant. Where a defendant should have pleaded 
guilty to an offence, they may go to trial with a weak defence case, be convicted and 
receive a higher sentence as a result.  
 
A third difficulty is that Goodyear indications are the same as any other sentence in that 
they may be subject to an Attorney-General’s Reference to the Court of Appeal, if the 
prosecution believes that the judge has been too lenient.324 Therefore a defendant may 
plead guilty on the basis of a certain sentence, only to find that it is increased on appeal. 
Despite raising serious questions about whether the defendant was led into pleading on a 
false basis, none of the decisions of the Court of Appeal recognise this to be 
problematic. 
 
iv. Ethical problems 
 
In Goodyear, the Court of Appeal made clear that a written basis of plea should be 
agreed before asking the judge for an indication.325 However, the Court did not seem to 
countenance the professional difficulties Goodyear produced for barristers. Some 
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interviewees believed that Goodyear was unlike any other situation, and that it has 
created potentially serious ethical problems for barristers. Before exploring this further, 
it is worth outlining exactly what a barrister’s ethical duties entail. Under the Code of 
Conduct of the Bar, ‘a barrister must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the 
Court.’326 Furthermore, according to the Code, if a defendant makes a confession to the 
barrister of guilt it ‘imposes very strict limitations on the conduct of the defence. A 
barrister must not assert as true that which he knows to be false.’327  Even though not 
amounting to an outright confession, the Code does also conceive of situations ‘where 
statements are made by the defendant which point almost irresistibly to the conclusion 
that the defendant is guilty but do not amount to a clear confession.’328 In both these 
situations it may arise that a barrister cannot continue to conduct the defence and must 
withdraw.329 
 
In asking for a Goodyear direction and agreeing a written basis of plea with the 
prosecution (which is normally signed by the defendant himself) the defence barrister 
puts forward a basis of guilt that the defendant has told them they agree to, while still 
maintaining a not guilty plea. This is a distinctly odd position for the barrister. On the 
one hand they have instructions from the defendant which amount to a denial of the 
offence, whilst on the other they are assisting the defendant to construct an account 
which admits guilt. In putting forward a basis of plea the barrister must treat the facts 
admitted therein as a fantasy. However, if the defendant accepts the indication, and 
wishes to plead guilty, the barrister may in a moment disregard the previous not guilty 
account and adopt that which was put forward in the basis of plea. If, on the other hand, 
the defendant refuses the indication, the basis is disregarded, the not guilty plea is 
maintained and the defence team proceeds to trial. This is difficult on ethical grounds for 
a number of reasons. If the defendant accepts the indication and changes their plea, it 
might be suggested that the barrister is at least at risk of misleading the court unless he 
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or she investigates with the defendant why they wished to change their plea. If we are to 
accept that the basis is purely hypothetical up until the point at which the defendant 
adopts it as the ‘true’ account, it is incumbent upon the barrister to investigate the 
reasons why and explore the prosecution evidence afresh. To not do so, knowing that the 
defendant has asserted an alternative account to them, may at least be recklessly 
misleading the court, or, in some cases, failing to protect the defendant’s best interests. 
J1 explained the rather drawn out process that she went through with defendants who 
want to accept a Goodyear indication. J1 found it was always necessary to explore the 
prosecution case with the defendant again: 
 
J1:…some people might say I want to be guilty [after an indication], and then if 
that happens then you have to be very careful to say hang on a minute, I have a 
set of instructions that are consistent with a not guilty plea, if you tell me that 
you now want to plead guilty that’s fine it’s up to you…and you’d have to go 
through the prosecution case, finding out exactly what they were admitting to. 
So, it’s fine when it’s all theoretical but once someone actually says I am now 
having heard all that I want to plead guilty, then it changes. 
 
JB: And then you have to go back to the evidence again? 
 
J1: Yes, say a robbery, street robbery, mugging or something like that and they 
said they were never there. Then you would then have to go through well, this 
was the description of the attacker, and where you actually go through to make 
sure this person is admitting to something. Because if in the account that they 
give which contained admissions you might end up thinking well actually they’re 
not admitting to robbery at all…So other things may be thrown up and might 
actually get you a true position, but which is still consistent with a not guilty 
plea. 
 
While J1 was able to describe her practice, none of the other interviewees explicitly 
mentioned investigating the reasons for the change of plea after an indication.  
 
The other possibility is that the defendant rejects the indication and wishes to continue to 
trial. In that circumstance, some barristers argued, provided that the defendant has 
maintained a not guilty plea, and has not made any actual admissions, no ethical 
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difficulties arose. On the other hand a significant minority of interviewees felt very 
uneasy with discussing alternative accounts with the defendant at all. Commonly these 
barristers did not ask the defendant to assert any positive account whatsoever, and 
alternatively took the prosecution’s opening of the case as the written basis of plea. N2 
believed to do otherwise could cause significant problems leading to professional 
embarrassment: 
 
What you tend to have to do is turn that basis in terms of a hypothetical…and it’s 
always on the basis of the prosecution evidence. So the prosecution evidence is 
this, they may be of the view that they can only establish this on their evidence. 
So, that’s how they would open it against you. Would you, if custody could be 
ruled out, this is how I phrased it, would you, if custody could be ruled out, be 
prepared to have the case opened against you on basis and accept responsibility 
for it on that basis. If they say yes to that, you do your Goodyear, and the judge 
says no, its custody, I don’t think you are then embarrassed.  
 
This is perhaps the correct approach. If a barrister is to explore in any kind of detail the 
commission of an offence, even on a hypothetical level, there must soon come a point 
when that detail begins to sound like an admission of guilt under the Code of Conduct 
section 3, para 12.6 described above. By adopting the Crown’s case and not asking the 
defendant for any details, the barrister can avoid any admissions and professional 
embarrassment. This minority of barristers interviewed came from the more junior end 
of the Bar. No such concerns about professional embarrassment or the method of 
adopting the Crown’s opening were explained by the senior members interviewed. The 
QCs and Recorders interviewed minimised ethical concerns over Goodyear saying, for 
example: 
 
Well, when I was in my 20s I used to worry myself sick about that, but now I 
don’t.330    
 
The small number of barristers interviewed here seemed to suggest that more senior 
members of the Bar were concerned with moving cases along and “pragmatism”, and 
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worries about misleading the court, or failing the ethical code in Goodyear indications 
were confined to junior barristers of less than 15 years call. 
 
The discussion of Goodyear, its use, practical and ethical problems, reveals a diverse, 
thinking Bar that closely monitors changes in the law and is able to give carefully 
considered opinions about how their own practice in relation to pleas might be affected. 
The interviewees demonstrated a wide understanding of the possible impact of a 
Goodyear on a defendant: when and how a Goodyear might be sought from a judge; the 
practical problems with Goodyear in terms of serious offending and the approach of 
judges; as well the ethical dilemmas that Goodyear might present in conducting the 
defence. These interviewees were not focused on guilty pleas, but were careful to weigh 
up how a defendant might be served by the various courses of action available to them. 
This research demonstrates that a number of barristers, in this case at the junior end of 
the Bar, take their ethical duties to the defendant and court very seriously.  
 
4. Advising in strong terms- two different approaches 
 
After considering the various elements which may influence advice on plea it is now 
necessary to draw together those factors to describe how barristers convey their 
assessment of the case to the accused. According to the Bar Standards Board Code of 
Conduct ‘a barrister acting for a defendant should advise his lay client generally about 
his plea. In doing so he may, if necessary, express his advice in strong terms. He must, 
however, make it clear that the client has complete freedom of choice and that the 
responsibility for the plea is the client's.’331 No further explanation of the wording used 
in the Code is given, and neither of the Court of Appeal authorities which specifically 
mention ‘advising in strong in terms’, Turner and Goodyear, give any clarification.332 
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As barristers had previously been said to “manipulate”333 defendants into entering a 
guilty plea through the manner in which they advised, it was felt to be highly relevant to 
explore with those interviewed what they felt ‘advising in strong terms’ to mean.334 This 
not only involved an exploration of how barristers explained their advice as a simple 
evaluation of the defendant’s case, but also a general approach as to how they might 
convince a defendant that a course of action was appropriate.  
 
When asked, all of the barristers agreed that they provided defendants with an overall 
evaluation of the prospects of a not guilty verdict at trial, although all of the 
interviewees, except B1, felt that expressing the chances of an acquittal or conviction 
were best left to linguistic approximations rather than mathematical figures. Phrases 
deployed by barristers ranged from ‘There is no way in 1 million years that [you] will be 
acquitted’335, to ‘the evidence from certain witnesses is very strong and the jury may 
have difficulty in accepting [your] account’336  to ‘You can say this is a strong case, or 
coupled with the defence that you seek to advance [your case] has these problems.’337 
These approximations were widely regarded as sensible as predicting a jury trial was 
more of an art than a science. Furthermore, figures given to defendants were felt to be 
dangerous to the barrister’s reputation if later they proved incorrect. The fact that jury 
trials do occasionally produce odd outcomes informed the overall approach many of the 
barristers spoken to. As will be discussed below, the difficulty of predicting a trial 
verdict meant for some of the barristers that certain “robust” styles of advice were to be 
avoided.  
 
Interviewees were also anxious to ensure that defendants had understood their position 
and believed that they gave a very thorough explanation of the criminal justice process. 
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A1 explained that a barrister often needed to take great care in communicating their 
advice to vulnerable defendants or those of low intelligence: 
 
I’d hope that the defence solicitor, myself, we would have to, we communicate. 
And it is for us to communicate our advice to our lay client, whether they be 
vulnerable, young, old, maybe from a different culture may be a foreign national, 
it’s part of our duty that they understand...if it was a vulnerable client, say of 
young years or someone elderly or someone with mental health problems then 
you would have to tailor your advice accordingly. 
 
Those interviewed felt it was their job to make sure that the defendant has understood 
fully the case against them as well as the mechanics of the criminal justice process, and 
many gave anecdotes of the lengths they had gone to explain matters to young or foreign 
defendants or defendants with learning disabilities to explain their advice. Interviewees 
recalled how some defendants ‘would have done whatever I told him, guilty or not 
guilty’338 and therefore great care needed to be exercised to ensure that the plea entered 
was voluntary.  
 
It is worth noting that almost all of the barristers interviewed thought that it was 
unprofessional to advise a defendant with the words “I think you should plead guilty.” 
Rather, barristers adopted indirect modes of advice which avoided giving an opinion 
directly on what the plea should be. On a review of the interview data it became clear 
that two approaches could be discerned. While it would be incorrect to say that barristers 
either fell into either one of diametrically opposed camps, the descriptions that barristers 
gave of their work left a distinct impression of how they viewed their role and how 
persuasive in their advice they were allowed to be. Two barristers, L1 and H1, have been 
selected who are felt to best express these two approaches which have been labelled 
“persuasive” and “facilitative” respectively.339 The other barristers interviewed in the 
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study tended towards one or the other of the approaches as exemplified by L1 and H1, 
although the majority could be described as facilitative advisors.  
 
a. The persuasive approach 
 
Put simply, the barristers who advocated the persuasive approach of advising felt it was 
their duty to convince a defendant who had a poor chance at trial to plead guilty. L1, a 
senior barrister with extensive experience practising in the Crown Court on the Midlands 
Circuit, felt that it was his job to ‘stamp his personality’ on a conference with a 
defendant, assuming control of the situation. Experienced criminals wanted ‘straight 
talk’ and if he thought ‘that they should plead guilty, I don’t hesitate saying so.’ L1 
continued: 
 
If I think pleas are necessary I will tell them. And if they say, for example, “well 
does that mean you don’t believe me”, I will say to them “I’m not here to 
pronounce on whether I believe you, I’ve only just met you, I don’t have a view 
on your veracity, I wouldn’t dream of trying to pronounce on you in any 
judgemental sense, I’m looking at the evidence. And, on that evidence, I think 
you stand an overwhelming chance of getting convicted.” 
 
When it was put to L1 that particular evidence could be stressed in a way to persuade a 
defendant to plead guilty, he replied: 
 
Absolutely. I will readily accept that what I’m doing a lot of time and giving 
advice is persuading them to my view. I accept that and that is in fact what I’m 
doing. If I have a view and it’s a strongly held view and I think for example the 
defendant is going to be his own worst enemy in the witness box or his previous 
convictions are going to go in, for example, and I have formed the view…But, if 
I’m in good hands with a good solicitor and he’s said, you’re right, this bloke 
needs cracking on this, this or other basis, in my opinion, I’ll come at it, on my 
own view, fortified by what the solicitor said and I will, effectively, yes, I accept 
that I seek to persuade the client that what I say is right, and give him the 
reasons. He’s entitled to know exactly what I’m saying and why I am saying it. 
And I will be totally open with him about it.  
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L1 was adamant that his role was to persuade defendants to his point-of-view of the case 
if he felt a guilty plea was necessary. When L1 was asked what he would do with a 
defendant who stood very little chance at trial who nevertheless wanted to enter a plea of 
not guilty he explained: 
 
…if somebody is absolutely adamant that they are not guilty and you explain to 
them the consequences of their bad character going in, and the loss of credit for a 
plea of a third, and whatever it may be, the IPP ramifications and dangerousness, 
and they say, “been there, done it, know the score, I’m not guilty gov’ or you can 
get out and get another barrister” sort of thing. Well, that type you let them plead 
not guilty. I would still not back off in my advice. I would probably go and see 
them in prison afterwards or in chambers and I would insist on having a firm 
session on my terms. 
 
That is not to say that L1 felt that any conduct was acceptable. L1 felt a duty to be 
‘professional’ throughout and that his advice had ‘got to be the sort of advice that you 
would be content with the client leaving the room and going out to the local press and 
saying do you know what my barrister has just said to me and print it.’  
 
L1 also believed that it was sometimes necessary to take a different approach when 
advising vulnerable defendants as opposed to more hardened criminals:   
  
…it’s like any situation in life, you have to weigh each client as they are. And 
there might be a very vulnerable, tearful young woman who has had her fingers 
in the till and has been stealing and is in tears while in conference with you. 
You’ve got to treat that person in a very, very different way from your serial 
rapist, or your child of 12 who may be overwhelmed by the environment. 
 
Despite adopting a highly persuasive style of advising, L1 believed that the defendants 
he advised entered pleas voluntarily: 
 
…in my case I would never let a person enter plea of guilty unless it was their 
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own free will, I wouldn’t dream of it. But it is of their own free will based on 
counsel’s advice.  
 
To L1 the role of counsel was to convince a defendant to plea guilty, if it was strongly 
felt to be in his or her best interests. As long as counsel remained ‘professional’ 
throughout, all they were doing was ensuring that the defendant understood the reality of 
his or her position in order for them not to make, as L1 saw it, the wrong choice.  
 
However, the problem with the persuasive approach is that the barristers who adopt it 
may undermine an essential tenant of common law jurisdictions: that the plea entered by 
a defendant charged with a criminal offence is informed and voluntary.340 While L1 and 
other barristers insisted that guilty pleas were entered of the defendant’s ‘own free will’ 
this is difficult to sustain when, by the interviewee’s own admission, he sought to 
persuade the defendant of the fallacy of entering a plea of not guilty. While there is 
always a tension between giving advice and allowing the defendant complete freedom of 
choice341, there is a significant difference between giving the defendant a clear, 
unfettered view of the chances of conviction versus the benefits of a guilty plea, and 
actively persuading the defendant of a particular course of action. The literature on 
lawyer-client relationships has overwhelmingly found that defendants are highly passive 
in the relationship and commonly follow the advice they are given.342 Defendants have 
been described as ‘dependants’ in the criminal process343 and because of socio-economic 
factors combined with the stress of criminal proceedings clients are in a particularly poor 
position to take control of their own defence.344 This would suggest that while L1 
maintained that pleas are entered voluntarily, they are in fact entered at the persuasive 
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191. 
 121
advisor’s bidding. The disempowerment of defendants and the removal of defendant 
autonomy by persuasive advisors over plea endangers positive perceptions of the legal 
profession- while a plea remains the defendant’s choice it is more difficult to attach 
sinister motivations to the advice given by their lawyer. More importantly, a 
commitment to defendant autonomy protects defendants against those legal advisors 
who would wish to manipulate them to satisfy self-interest. In an environment where the 
choice of the defendant is promoted, dishonest manipulation by any one individual may 
become more difficult. 
 
Whether persuasive advisors generally place innocent defendants at risk is a different 
matter altogether. Those who seek to persuade defendants to enter a guilty plea do not 
necessarily do so out of ‘self interest, convenience, or the desire to foster good working 
relationships with others.’345 In Standing Accused and Negotiated Justice, barristers 
were seen to be using broadly similar techniques to convince defendants to enter a guilty 
plea.346 Those studies explain the motive of defence lawyers in preferring guilty pleas as 
based on two common, shared perspectives: that defendants are unworthy, and, 
undeserving of a trial.347 This criticism is made, and often is repeated348 under the broad 
description “guilty plea culture”, without a formal exploration of why or whether 
barristers might hold these views. Barristers in the current study expressed a mixture of 
bafflement, worry and even anger when asked late in the interview whether a guilty plea 
culture existed at the Bar. Such a culture was not something they recognised and many 
seemed genuinely horrified that this was an accepted perception in the academic 
literature. Rather, they reiterated, guilty pleas were advised because it was felt a guilty 
plea was the appropriate course of action for the defendant based on the available 
evidence. Barristers were not advising persuasively out of any belief that the defendant 
was unworthy or because of a courtroom culture of ‘it’s us against you little man and 
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you’ll do what we tell you’349, but out of a paternalistic belief that they were advising the 
defendant in their best interests.350  
 
G1 took this view, explaining that persuading defendants was in their interests, as well 
as the system as a whole:   
 
G1: I think that in most cases you should advise robustly. That’s the whole 
process. You should advise on what you think. Because no one is an advantaged 
by defendants pleading not guilty and having trials and being convicted and 
having very long sentences. 
 
JB: What do you mean by that? 
 
G1: Some defence barristers take, don’t advise robustly or advise in a different 
way. And if their clients then have a trial and are convicted then they will serve 
longer  sentences. My view is that doesn’t help the system one bit. You should 
advise on what you think and put it in clear terms. 
 
By advising a defendant ‘robustly’, persuasive advisors avoided the risks of a longer 
sentence, plus the system avoided having to go through a lengthy, expensive trial 
process. 
 
On the basis of these interviews, persuasive advisors did not advise guilty pleas out of a 
commitment to a guilty plea culture, but out of a paternalistic belief that defendants 
needed to be convinced of the wisdom of a entering a plea. While this may not harm 
many defendants, a move away from defendant autonomy can harm perceptions of the 
Bar and encourage those who might use persuasive techniques for their own benefit. 
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b. The facilitative approach 
 
H1, a barrister of 11 years call, described a very different approach to advising: 
    
…there are two sorts of approach at the Bar I see. If somebody should plead 
guilty, you make them plead guilty effectively. You advise in such a strong way 
that they are left with little or no option to plead guilty and take that advice. The 
other is to set out what you think their position is, in your view, regarding the 
evidence and then if someone says, “well, that’s all very fine, but no I am going 
to have a trial”, fine, you go along with it. And I tend to subscribe to that second 
school of thought. So if someone is insistent on maintaining a not guilty stance in 
the face of pretty strong evidence I’ll go along with that.  
 
H1 was very aware of an alternative approach at the Bar, but purposefully avoided 
advising in that manner: 
 
My approach has always been pretty much the same. I’ll sort of put the cards on 
the table and say “these are what your chances are”. And if someone turns round 
and says, “yeah, but I’m not guilty” I won’t take the next step which lots of 
people do which is get very, very forceful, very, very strong, saying, “this is 
ridiculous, you’ve got to plead.” 
 
H1’s conception of his role was therefore very different to that of L1. H1 as advisor was 
merely there to educate the defendant about the law and process, give him or her an 
assessment of acquittal based on experience and facilitate his or her choice. As with 
other interviewees identified as having the facilitative approach, H1 did not hide the 
repercussions of a not guilty plea from the defendant. Therefore, as described by many, 
‘a full and frank assessment’ of the case should be given351; barristers had a ‘duty to be 
straight’ with the defendant 352 and ‘not pull any punches.’353 However, once H1 was 
satisfied that the defendant was making an informed decision and had had time to 
consider their plea he was content to run the case to trial whether he believed it to be a 
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poor decision or not. Two particular reasons informed this approach to advising 
defendants. Firstly, H1 was interpreting his role as advisor according to his own, 
personal understanding of what a barrister’s ethical and professional obligations were. 
Several barristers whom this research has identified as facilitators wanted to make clear 
that the choice over plea belonged to the defendant, and they were obliged to respect the 
defendant’s autonomy in making that choice, as A1 explained: 
 
If the defendant wishes to contest what is a strong case against him or her then 
that is their perfect right.  I just advise them as to the strength of the case, I may 
well advise them to plead guilty, if they say no, I’ll say fine. These are the points 
we will develop, and this is the defence preparation we need, and will do the 
best. 
 
Secondly, facilitators pointed out the difficulty of predicting the outcome of a Crown 
Court trial, and several gave examples of defendants who had been advised in favour of 
a guilty plea being acquitted.354 The experience of being incorrect in assessing the 
evidence had taught these barristers the value of allowing a defendant to make their own 
choice.  
 
A facilitative approach is not without its difficulties. As Tague points out, encouraging 
more defendants to go to trial, rather than deferring to the defendant on the plea 
decision, could be exceedingly beneficial to the defendant.355 There appears to be a 
danger that risk averse defendants might avoid the uncertainties of trial and prefer a plea 
of guilty. Allowing vulnerable defendants, especially those on the custody threshold, to 
make their own choice without a more partisan approach by the barrister, could be to 
their detriment in the long run. E2 reported that some defendants who have a good shot 
on the papers may plead for some other reason which she did not appear willing to 
explore: 
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I’ve had that when they want to plead even though they’ve got a good shot on the 
papers. And, I’ll have to say to them “well, it’s your choice, but I think you’ve 
got a run.” They quite often do that if example their wife will get out if they 
plead. 
 
A barrister who gives advice, but emphasises the defendant’s choice knowing that they 
are acting irrationally or in an overly risk adverse manner, may in the long run fail their 
client’s best interests. As described in this chapter already, the pressures placed on a 
defendant by, for example, the possibility of staying out of prison can be overwhelming. 
It is certainly arguable that a barrister who can take a more realistic view of the risks of 
trial must attempt to shield the defendant from the pressures of the discount or third 
parties, and reassure the defendant so that they may take a sensible and reasoned 
decision. If Tague’s analysis is correct, and defendants and barristers are too often too 
easily frightened away from trial by the prospect of heavier sentences, perhaps barristers 
should more readily advocate a not guilty plea as a sensible choice. As Tague argues, 
there are often tactical reasons to prefer a not guilty plea. The chances of acquittal are 
often not outweighed by the small sentencing discount available, and a trial preserves 
the right to appeal on conviction.356 Perhaps those with a ‘decent shot on the papers’ 
should be encouraged to go to trial by a barrister who takes a partisan view, and does not 
simply concede to the defendant’s choice in every case.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the interview data given by barristers about how they approach 
advice on plea in the Crown Court. As has been shown, this data suggests that they do 
not adopt the view that defendants are ‘unworthy, and, undeserving of a trial’, but rather 
examine carefully the merits of each case on the basis of the prosecution case and the 
defendant’s account. All of the interviewees explained that they were open to alternative 
explanations from the defendant and did not treat the Crown’s evidence uncritically. 
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Although some barristers adopted robust styles of advising, this was to test the 
defendant’s account within the context of an adversarial trial. In this setting the 
barrister’s approach was a projection of whether the defendant and his or her case would 
withstand cross-examination, and ultimately result in an acquittal or conviction.  
 
In assessing the case against the defendant, these interviewees set out a complex set of 
considerations that included various matters of evidence and procedural rules, as well as 
tactical choices that affect sentence. These highly detailed discussions strongly suggest 
that “guilty plea culture” does not account for the sophisticated decision-making 
processes that these interviewees exhibited. These interviewees were able to talk 
knowledgeably about developments in the law and how those changes have affected 
how they approach advice on plea. This included an overall awareness of ethics and their 
professional relationship with the defendant. Those who subscribed to a guilty plea 
culture would not have engaged, as these interviewees did, with problems such as 
Goodyear indications, or concern for the defendant’s reaction to character evidence, or 
an appreciation for when plea should be entered after receiving advice. All of the 
interviewees appeared to have given careful consideration to the position of the 
defendant, and how his or her outcome could be optimised in terms of acquittal or 
conviction and sentence. 
 
This chapter has shown that there is no uniform approach to how advice on plea is 
conveyed to the defendant. There is a danger that the literature treats the criminal bar as 
a homogenous group capable of singular approaches to defendants and cases. To do so 
risks hiding the diversity of opinion within the profession as to how cases should be 
handled. As revealed here by the different styles of advising, there are a range of 
approaches that require careful scrutiny. As was implicit in Tague’s research, there 
appear to be two advising styles that have been described as persuasive and facilitative. 
It is suggested here that persuasive advisors, although advising robustly, do not seek to 
manipulate the defendant to conform to a standardised expectation of a guilty plea. 
Rather, these advisors are motivated by a paternalistic desire to seek the best outcome 
for the defendant. While such advising styles undermine defendant autonomy, and create 
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the potential for misuse, these advisors do not necessarily place defendants in jeopardy 
of wrongful conviction. The conflation of de facto innocent defendants with those likely 
to gain an acquittal at trial has stymied proper discussion of the basis of a barrister’s 
advice. These advisors adopt a persuasive style on the basis of the probable result of a 
trial and out of recognition that some defendants entering a not guilty plea may almost 
certainly risk imprisonment, or an unnecessarily longer sentence. Furthermore, the 
facilitative approach at the Bar is in common usage. Those who take this approach 
appear to give full and frank advice to the defendant on the merits of their case, but 
withhold firmer recommendations on plea, which they leave entirely to the accused. 
Facilitative advisors stand in marked contrast to those barristers observed at the time of 
the research in Standing Accused. On this basis, a re-evaluation of the critical view of 
the criminal bar is necessary. As described, however, such facilitative advisors may 
insufficiently protect the defendant from overestimating the risks of trial. A barrister 
who does not provide a thorough, reasoned judgement on the various options available 
to the defendant may invite those who should go to trial, by virtue of the merits of the 
case, to plead guilty. 
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Chapter 5: Plea bargaining 
 
1. The extent of bargaining in English Courts 
 
When compared with American courts, the scope for bargaining over plea in the Crown 
Court is restricted. Because an English prosecutor cannot recommend a sentence to the 
court, he or she cannot bargain with the defendant for their guilty plea in return for a 
sentence of imprisonment of a particular length, or a non-custodial punishment of a 
particular form.357 An English prosecutor has two tools available to them to negotiate 
with the defendant in order to produce a guilty plea and avoid a trial, both of which are 
potentially just as powerful as formal plea bargaining.358 Firstly, a prosecutor in the 
Crown Court may reduce the charges on the indictment, or agree not to proceed on one 
or several of multiple charges, in return for a guilty plea (“charge bargaining”). 
Secondly, the prosecution and defence may agree a basis of plea (“fact bargaining”). A 
basis of plea agrees a written factual basis for the offence and restricts the judge’s view 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances on sentence. This highly potent form of 
bargaining has been somewhat neglected in the literature,359 but was explored with the 
interviewees in this research and is discussed here. 
 
In the current literature, very little appears to be known about how and why barristers 
initiate plea bargaining. With regards to defending barristers, Sanders and Young 
attribute plea bargaining to a mixture of economic and cultural incentives, combined 
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with being a way of managing caseload.360 Accordingly, barristers take on too much 
work and, while running some cases as trials, attempt to persuade defendants in others to 
accept pleas to lesser offences as a way of keeping the brief.361 However, the reasoning 
given is based on older studies of the Bar, or on contestable assumptions about the poor 
quality of young barristers choosing to practice criminal law.362 A further limitation of 
these conclusions is that they do not include interviews with defending barristers 
themselves to discover why they engage in plea bargaining.  
 
The role of prosecuting counsel has been explained with reference to the contradictory 
guidelines and sentencing law on when pleas may be accepted to alternative offences363, 
and the various incentives and disincentives of settling cases before trial. Studies 
conducted before the CPS determined charge at the police station demonstrated a 
reluctance by barristers to contradict the instructing CPS officers and a tendency to 
maintain charges when the case should either have been discontinued or the charges 
downgraded.364 Here too the available research has, on the whole, not sought to 
understand prosecution barristers’ motivation in settling case by reference to barristers 
themselves.     
 
2. Charge and fact bargaining 
 
The phenomenon of charge and fact bargaining is extremely common in the Crown 
Court, however the exact extent of its occurrence is difficult to quantify.365 Prosecutors 
in the Crown Court are given wide discretion as to what charges should appear on the 
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indictment and may vary them in order to agree a plea of guilty.366 It is not necessary for 
a prosecutor to invite the approval of the judge in accepting a guilty plea to a lesser 
charge, however, the judge may now adjourn proceedings until the prosecutor has 
consulted with the Chief Crown Prosecutor, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or, in 
certain cases, the Attorney-General regarding the change in charge.367  The barristers 
interviewed described their regular involvement in bargaining over the charges on the 
indictment. As A2 said of the regularity of negotiation: ‘…you do it all the time. In fact I 
was doing it this morning. Yes, yes, everyday.’ Two studies have confirmed that many 
assault cases are settled by downgrading charges to less serious offences or removing 
charges from the indictment. Elaine Genders found that only 19% of her sample of those 
charged with section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 were eventually 
convicted of the same.368 Ralph Henham also found 62% of those charged under section 
18 eventually pleaded to a lesser offence.369 Several categories of offences seem 
particularly prone to downgrading at court given that some offences contain the 
elements of less serious offences.370 Research conducted on the charging of racially 
aggravated offences found downgrading to the non-racially aggravated offence in 
between one-fifth and one-third of cases.371 Equally, several sexual offences and 
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property offences differ from one another on the basis of a ladder of seriousness, where 
the difference between offences is a matter of mens rea or slight changes to the actus 
reus. It is reasonable to assume that these offences remain as open to negotiation as 
historic data suggests.372  
 
Whether the downgrading of charges is brought about by bargaining is not revealed in 
much of the literature, but given the wide reporting of plea bargaining it is possible to 
say that a number of the reductions in charge are probably brought about by negotiation 
between prosecution and defence. The difficulty in assessing the extent to which charge 
bargaining takes place lies in using methods that only evaluate the facts of the case or a 
statistical analysis of cases, but do not observe the interaction of prosecution and 
defence advocates. For example, a defendant may plead to a lesser offence because of 
complex negotiation between the Crown and defendant (which would not be apparent on 
the papers), whereas another defendant may plead to a lesser offence simply because the 
prosecutor downgrades the offence because it is a more accurate reflection of the facts of 
the case. This research makes no quantitative assessment of charge bargaining, however, 
the reports of negotiation by the interviewees leads to the conclusion that negotiation 
relating to charge occurs extremely frequently.  
 
Interviewees also discussed fact bargaining, whereby the defence agreed with the 
prosecution a suitable written basis of plea that described the offence for the purposes of 
sentencing. Such bargains were described as very important as a defendant could avoid 
aggravating features that were otherwise apparent on the basis of the prosecution 
evidence.  
 
This chapter considers three different elements of plea bargaining. Firstly, it reviews the 
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guidance given to barristers on when and how they should initiate negotiations over 
plea, and whether the ethical codes provide sufficient direction to barristers’ practices. 
The present research findings suggest that they do not, and where guidance is provided it 
is poorly suited to the reality of accepting lesser pleas. As will be seen, only one of the 
barristers interviewed made reference to any explicit guidance. Secondly, it explores the 
question of how bargains are entered into and how the decision to enter negotiations is 
made. Thirdly, the literature on plea bargaining and interview responses will be 
considered together to form an assessment of plea bargaining in English courts. This 
chapter will argue that under the current system, plea bargaining is both inevitable and in 
many cases beneficial to the defendant.  
 
a. Ethical guidance on when plea negotiation may take place 
 
In evaluating charge bargaining it is necessary to look at the ethical rules set down for 
barristers about how and when they may initiate negotiation. Remarkably, there is no 
ethical guidance whatsoever given to barristers in the Code of Conduct when they may 
seek a negotiated plea. During the Bar Vocational Course, little or no mention is made of 
plea bargaining, and a pupil barrister is entirely dependant on his or her pupil master to 
learn how charges may be bargained over.373 Defending barristers are therefore left to 
observe the plea negotiation culture of their chambers and of the few barristers they 
encounter as opponents.374 Of course the existence of ethical codes does not necessarily 
translate into ethical conduct. Numerous studies on lawyer behaviour have discovered 
that ethical codes regularly fail to address the complexity of real cases, and other drivers 
may act upon lawyer behaviour so that strict compliance is impossible.375 However, 
ethical guidance does provide lawyers with an important sense of perspective and work 
within a range of synergistic influences.376 The lack of ethical guidance from the Bar 
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provides no reference point as to what is or is not acceptable professional behaviour 
other than by inference from ethics rules relating to other conduct. This lacuna arguably 
creates inconsistency in how defendants are treated and prevents proper oversight by the 
Bar Standards Board of a significant part of criminal barristers’ work. As is argued 
below, the timing of when a bargained plea is sought may be crucial in ensuring 
defendant autonomy.  
 
The approach of prosecutors to plea bargaining and accepting pleas is regulated by 
several guidelines. These are discussed below in sub-section g. 
 
b. How plea bargaining takes place 
 
One of the fundamental objections to plea bargaining is that it is a feature of barrister 
collusion to produce a convenient guilty plea. A crude critique would be that barristers 
treat all defendants as feckless and dishonest, and adopt strategies to extract a guilty 
plea, which includes bargaining over plea.377 This guilty plea culture, critics allege, 
prevails amongst members of the Bar and explains the high plea rate in the Crown 
Court. The difficulty with this criticism is that none of the literature has observed or 
discussed with barristers how plea negotiation takes place.378 The present research 
therefore asked the interviewees how they approached plea bargaining and their reasons 
for initiating the process. Although it is accepted as a methodological limitation that the 
present research only discussed plea bargaining with barristers, the data strongly 
suggests that a guilty plea culture as described by McConville et al is not a sufficient 
explanation of current practice. 
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i. Initiating negotiation 
 
During the interviews conducted for this research, each barrister was asked how charge 
bargaining was initiated. Primarily, initiating negotiation over plea appeared to rest with 
the defence, rather than the prosecutor, although a prosecutor might, on occasion, 
approach the defending barrister. The defence barristers interviewed, described the 
process on a simple level as involving looking at the papers in combination with the 
defendant’s account (although not always) and then making a decision as to whether the 
case was “over charged”: 
  
I look at the papers, it seems to me that it is over indicted and I, sometimes 
before, sometimes after discussing it with my junior and solicitor, ring up the 
prosecuting barrister and say what about it?379 
 
Therefore, in some cases the interviewees made a simple evaluation of the evidence, 
decided that the current charge could not be proved (or there were significant evidentiary 
obstacles to proving the charge), but could see on the papers that there was a much more 
realistic chance of conviction on a lesser offence. The defence barrister would therefore 
contact the prosecution to see whether the Crown might reduce the charge. Barristers 
commonly approached their opponent in the robing room or telephoned them in 
chambers to discuss matters informally. This ability to approach one another in a 
relationship of trust was seen as a significant feature in favour of the independent Bar by 
those interviewed.  
 
According to those interviewed charge bargains involved making precise judgements 
about the strength of the evidence and using their experience to assess what could or 
could not be proven. The defendant’s instructions on what occurred did not always 
amount to a straight denial or admission of the offence. In many of the circumstances 
described by interviewees it was not that the defendant denied, for example, striking the 
complainant, or being in possession of the complainant’s property, or being involved in 
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sexual activity with the complainant. Rather, the defendant presented an alternative 
account that, although might provide a reasonable doubt to the most serious offence 
charged, would not provide a defence to an alternative lesser offence:  
  
…if you are defending you may say to your client, “well, I think there are 
difficulties with charge X, but charge Y is made out and on your instructions you 
are guilty of it…” Typical examples would be a robbery or is it an assault 
followed by theft…or is somebody guilty of a section 18, or section 20, or ABH, 
that kind of thing.380 
 
As Genders discovered in her research, those cases downgraded from section 18 to 
section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 shared common factual 
characteristics which meant that intent was difficult to prove. Similarly with the 
interviewees in the current research, the cases that were downgraded had evidentiary 
problems if charged as section 18, but not necessarily under section 20: 
 
…a number of the features which emerged as being influential in court outcome 
were closely related to the requirements of evidential sufficiency. That is to say, 
certain features which might clearly be used to denote the mens rea of intent 
were more evident in those cases which were convicted on a charge of section 
18, and less frequently present in those cases which were relabelled and 
convicted on a lesser charge.381 
 
From this interview data, it would appear that charges are often negotiated over because 
the facts of the case, in the assessment of the defence barrister, provided difficulties for 
the prosecution to prove the offence on the indictment, but did reveal guilt on a lesser 
charge. A defence barrister who enters into negotiation does so with an aim of 
convincing the prosecution that the current charge would be difficult to prove, and that 
the lesser offence is a more realistic reflection of the facts, at least on paper. 
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ii. Fundamental differences in how bargaining is approached 
 
A crucial difference between interviewees’ practices emerged from the interview data. 
This revealed a split in opinion as to whether the idea of approaching the prosecution to 
negotiate charges should be canvassed with the defendant prior to speaking with the 
prosecutor about the charges on the indictment. Some of interviewees said that they 
would never approach the prosecution without getting instructions from the defendant 
first. As J1 explained: 
 
 It would only be on instructions that I would approach a prosecutor. You know, 
the defendant would have to have given permission to the solicitor for me to 
make an approach… 
 
In those circumstances negotiations would only be entered into once the barrister has 
already received instructions from the defendant on their case, including the defendant’s 
account of the events surrounding the offence. If the defendant’s account was very weak, 
or the prosecution case together with the defendant’s instructions pointed towards a 
lesser offence, the defence barrister could advise them of their position and the 
prosecution could be approached with the defendant’s permission. In that situation, the 
decision to ask the prosecutor to downgrade the charge is reached by mutual agreement 
about how the case should be handled. 
 
However, many of those interviewed said they had no difficulty with speaking to the 
prosecuting barrister first, shortly after receiving the brief, if the papers looked weaker 
on the charged offence but contained the elements of a less serious offence. A2 
described the general process: 
 
You certainly couldn’t embark on any serious negotiation without your client’s 
permission. But, without meeting your client you can read the papers and take a 
view. Often barristers will ring each other up or send an e-mail to each other 
saying I understand you’re in the case of x. Blah, blah, here is some further 
evidence or something. And, the prosecutor may say to me would you take a plea 
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to theft? And then I would then say I’ve not seen him. My own view is that he 
should plead [to the lesser offence], counsel to counsel. But I haven’t seen him so 
we’ll see what happens. 
 
This raises a significant point about the pressure exerted on defendants and the advice 
process as a whole, and illustrates a difference between advising styles. The impression 
created was that at least a number of the barristers interviewed were looking for a 
potential way of convincing the defendant to plead guilty. Although some might ask the 
prosecutor informally so that they could advise the defendant should their account 
appear weak or amount to a lesser offence, other barristers admitted that they used the 
negotiated plea to persuade the defendant to plead guilty. As A2 continued, referring to 
how the benefits of a negotiated plea are made plain to a defendant: 
  
Every barrister does it differently. Some barristers shy away from giving very 
strong advice about pleading guilty. Because it’s not in their nature to do so. This 
is the evidence, that’s your instructions, thank you very much. And won’t say a 
word. Others are much more robust about it. I’m very robust and I think that 
someone should plead guilty, I’ll tell them so. 
 
Therefore, instead of the possibility of a negotiated plea coming out of a discussion with 
the defendant, these barristers could counter a defendant’s choice of pleading not guilty 
with the prospect of an already informally agreed negotiated plea with a relatively mild 
sentence as opposed to going to trial and being convicted on the current charge.  
 
The difference in advising styles raises fundamental questions about the role of the 
barrister in giving advice on plea, and the role of the barrister within the criminal justice 
system. If an agreement is reached between the defendant and barrister that their case 
might have certain weaknesses, and a plea to a lesser offence appropriate, the defendant 
retains some control over their case. Here the defending barrister remains a partisan 
advocate on the side of the defendant, only entering into negotiation once both are 
agreed that the defendant’s position in fighting a trial is untenable or might be better 
served with a plea to a lesser offence. The view expressed by those barristers who used 
the negotiated plea to convince defendants that a guilty plea was a sensible course of 
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action is based on an alternative conception of the purpose of the Bar. These barristers 
appeared to argue that a key function of the Bar was to ensure that the defence and 
prosecution could work alongside one another in a relationship of trust, settling cases 
where necessary to save both the defendant and the public purse the cost of a trial. As 
A2 succinctly argued against poor pay under legal aid and the elevation of Higher Court 
Advocates: 
 
An unforeseen consequence, or foreseen but as far as the government’s 
concerned an irrelevant consequence, is that good advocates oil the criminal 
justice process. They  advise their clients on pleas, they make admissions, they 
take decisions during the course of cases which shorten them, or run more 
smoothly. And experience and ability allows them to do that properly. If you start 
to pay people really badly, good people won’t come to the Bar, the legal aid 
criminal bar, and you won’t get that. So you might save a bit of money in pot A, 
but trials will go on longer, be very much more complicated, because the people 
conducting them won’t be terribly competent. So there’ll be more appeals, so the 
whole process is very short sighted. 
 
In A2’s description, barristers ‘oiled’ the criminal justice system by taking the right 
decisions over charge so that cases could be resolved without an unnecessary trial where 
defendants would undoubtedly be convicted and serve longer sentences. A2 was not the 
only barrister to perceive his role as barrister in this manner. Both F1 and G1 made 
comments after the interview had concluded, after the tape recorder had been turned off, 
that it was their role to convince defendants of the benefits of a guilty plea if a 
conviction was likely and a trial a waste of money. It should be emphasised that these 
interviewees did not have unscrupulous reasons for using the negotiations to weaken the 
defendant’s resolve in favour of a trial. As discussed in the previous chapter, these 
barristers gave advice in this way because they strongly believed a guilty plea was in the 
defendant’s best interests. As E1 explained of her motivation to convince a defendant 
that a plea to an offered charge under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 was necessary: 
 
E1:..as much as I say I never tell them to plead, I never tell them what to do, 
which I don’t in so many words, of course, I manipulate my knowledge to get 
them to do what I think is right for them.  And I think all barristers do. And I 
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don’t think actually you would be doing your job if you didn’t do that, and the 
longer I do it the more confident I am about doing it. The more faith I have in my 
own judgment about sentence, like the conviction, etc, so the more confident I 
am about giving very strong advice. 
 
JB: That that is actually in their best interest? 
 
E1: Yes. And saying look you’ve really got to plead, it really is in your best 
interests.  
 
In common with the difference between barristers adopting persuasive or facilitative 
styles this difference is equally significant in how advice is approached. As in the 
previous chapter, these contrasting views about what is and is not appropriate in how a 
defendant is advised raise fundamental questions about defendant autonomy and how 
best defendants can be protected from unscrupulous barristers. It will be recalled from 
Chapter 2 that the scholarship on lawyer-client relationships indicates that clients are 
highly passive dependents who, particularly in criminal cases, fail to take control of their 
own cases.382 Barristers who adopt persuasive styles of advising and pre-empt guilty 
pleas by engaging in informal negotiation disempower defendants, and create potential 
opportunities for misuse. Although these barristers may seek to improve the defendant’s 
overall sentence based on paternalistic motives, removing defendant choice exposes 
them to other dangers. It is reiterated here that seeking a negotiated plea outside the 
defendant’s instructions is not the same as guilty plea culture, as described by 
McConville et al. The current research found no evidence of any such culture amongst 
the members of the Bar interviewed. These interviewees rejected suggestions that early 
negotiations were entered into for anything other than to promote the defendant’s best 
interests. Early reduction or dropping of charges was aimed to produce the best possible 
outcome for the defendant. 
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3. Assessing English plea bargaining 
 
In common law jurisdictions, plea bargaining has been widely criticised by academics 
addressing the issue from a socio-legal perspective, while at the same time embraced by 
legal practitioners. This section will sketch out the main objections to plea bargaining, 
and consider the justifications of barristers who engage in the practice. This explanation 
arises out of economic or consequentialist conceptions of the law and is described 
below. Together with each criticism the responses of the interviewees will be discussed. 
As will be seen, those interviewed were highly result focused, and few mentioned any of 
the concerns raised in the literature. This chapter does not necessarily seek to defend 
plea bargaining as such, rather it seeks to partially explain the motives behind barristers’ 
behaviour and to argue for a more nuanced understanding of that behaviour. It is argued 
that the debate over plea bargaining in English courts has often confused plea bargaining 
itself with the potential for manipulation by dishonest or unscrupulous lawyers.  
 
a. Agency costs 
 
That a plea is voluntarily and made on an informed basis is highly dependent on the 
defence barrister. The defence barrister, with expert understanding of the trial process 
and sentence, should be in a position to more effectively evaluate the risks posed to the 
defendant and advise on the best course of action. If the defence barrister is a perfect 
agent of the accused the relationship has benefits for the accused- he or she is given 
accurate advice in accordance with a precise knowledge of the law and facts. On this 
basis the defendant is equipped to make a well informed choice about plea to any 
particular charge. In a world where the barrister’s and defendant’s interests were 
perfectly aligned, this might be a fair summary of their relationship, however, the 
literature on the conduct of the Bar in criminal cases concludes that they are not. The 
critics therefore allege in economic terms that there are significant agency costs in the 
defendant-barrister relationship. If true this would pose significant difficulties for plea 
bargaining and the advice process generally.  
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This criticism that plea bargaining can be and is misused for unscrupulous reasons is 
perhaps the leading objection to the system according to McConville et al. Defendants 
are highly dependent on their legal advisors to provide an accurate description of the 
risks and outcomes dependant on plea.383According to McConville et al’s conception of 
the role of the Bar in Crown Court cases, barristers regularly undermine the confidence 
of the defendant in their case through a combination of psychological techniques 
including defeatism, adopting the prosecution case as the true account, fear and 
manipulating the defendant’s trust in them.384 Barristers are said to purposefully 
manipulate defendants so that they plead guilty in the face of overwhelming pressure. 
Through this manipulation, defence barristers are able to ‘extract’ guilty pleas to lower 
offences, even though the defendant may be innocent or, more pertinently, have an 
entirely arguable defence.385 Plea bargaining therefore represents a huge potential for 
miscarriages of justice. 
 
The current research does not seek to minimise the potential for misuse in plea 
bargaining. If barristers, conforming to a guilty plea culture at the Bar or manipulating 
cases for financial gain, altered their advice and misrepresented risks to defendants, the 
consequence might be that defendants who should (by virtue of the evidence and 
sentence) contest their case at trial would not. However, as previously argued, the 
literature has not identified a current and continuing misuse of plea bargaining, and, on 
the basis of the present research, barristers themselves do not believe that there is 
widespread abuse of plea bargaining. It is worth reiterating the main arguments 
presented in this thesis. Firstly, the studies of the behaviour of the Bar in England in 
Wales in criminal cases are out-dated. Negotiated Justice, the only piece of research 
where the authors concentrated on studying the Bar, is over 30 years old. The 
membership of the Bar and its underlying culture has therefore had ample time to 
change and requires reappraisal. Furthermore, the structure of the criminal justice system 
has been radically changed by successive governments. The second main work on the 
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behaviour of the Bar, Standing Accused, is also out of date and does not necessarily 
reflect current practices because of the same reasons. Secondly, Standing Accused may 
have misinterpreted the behaviour of those barristers observed in conference with 
clients. A limitation of that research was that the barristers were not interviewed as to 
why they gave particular advice or adopted the advising strategies detailed. While it is 
recognised that the present research relies on barristers’ interpretations of their own 
behaviour and is subject to their own favourable biases, there is sufficient evidence in 
the data, primarily presented in Chapter 4, to suggest that a more complex decision-
making process is taking place about what advice to give and how that advice should be 
given. This includes the decision to seek a bargained plea on behalf of the defendant. As 
detailed, this decision is often made on the basis of an assessment of evidence and 
potential sentence. In these circumstances the barrister does not misuse plea bargaining, 
but seeks the best possible outcome for the defendant. As will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the question of what is “the best possible outcome” is sometimes a 
vexed one, and barristers may often make decisions that take into account a range of 
competing incentives, including ethical, cultural and financial considerations.   
 
That said, the current form of plea bargaining in English courts creates a potential for 
misuse that should not be overlooked. Although K2 was very insistent that from a 
prosecutor’s point of view, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines should be followed in 
accepting guilty pleas, the fact that none of the other prosecuting barristers interviewed 
mentioned them is telling. The descriptions of plea bargaining given by interviewees of 
deals in the robing room or over the phone, while not necessarily unethical, lack public 
oversight. Judges may refuse to accept a basis of plea and order a Newton hearing386, but 
the extent to which judges scrutinise bargained pleas for fairness is unknown. Only A3 
mentioned a judge going behind a fact bargain, but that was, as in Beswick, an example 
of the prosecution accepting a basis that did not meet the seriousness of the offending. 
Although a judge could not be privy to the conference between defendant and barrister, 
he or she could assess the case on the basis of the disclosure and investigate apparently 
odd agreements thoroughly. However, the current environment of court targets and 
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government initiatives aimed at increasing the guilty plea rate make it unlikely for 
judges to be encouraged to do so.387 Furthermore, in adversarial systems it is not the 
judge’s role to seek the truth.  
 
It is also suggested that ethical rules on plea bargaining need to be implemented and 
taught at the vocational stage of training for the Bar. Defence barristers are currently 
without any official guidance on what constitutes the correct way of seeking a bargain or 
conveying that to the accused. The decision to seek a plea bargain should originate from 
discussions between counsel and the accused rather than a pre-emptive measure by the 
defence barrister. Only once it has been agreed with the defendant that on the basis of 
the prosecution evidence and his or her account that a plea to a lesser charge might be 
appropriate should a plea bargain be sought. Informal plea bargaining disempowers 
defendants who have not yet given proper consideration to their position, and entails a 
risk to defendant autonomy. Reducing defendant autonomy increases the prospect of 
using plea bargaining for reasons other than the defendant’s interests. 
 
This chapter does not deal with agency costs directly but discusses other important 
arguments related to plea bargaining. Agency costs relating to guilty plea culture have 
already been dealt with in Chapter 4. As was well rehearsed in that chapter, barristers are 
accused of being part of a courtroom culture that promotes guilty pleas at the expense of 
good advice. The current research disputes both these claims, and argues that the reality 
of what and why advice is given is far more complicated. In the previous chapter it was 
demonstrated that the interviewees believed that they gave advice which was in the best 
interests of the defendant and did so on the basis of a careful consideration of evidence 
and sentence. To the extent that the interviewees were able to relate accurately and 
impartially their own experiences, there does not appear to be a guilty plea culture that 
conforms to McConville et al’s description. Financial incentives represent another 
potential source of agency costs. Again these are not discussed in this chapter but are 
dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. The issues discussed below are therefore not classically 
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agency problems as they arise out of plea bargaining itself rather than as a feature of the 
defendant-barrister relationship, however, the possibility of agency costs should always 
be considered. As will be seen in Chapter 6, while financial incentives may not be 
completely determinative of what advice a barrister gives, these incentives do distort 
advice to some extent and can create agency costs. 
 
This chapter will now deal with each of the leading objections to plea bargaining. They 
are presented in the heading to each sub-section and discussed beneath. 
 
b. The risk to innocent defendants 
 
Plea bargaining has been heavily criticised because of the perceived effect on innocent 
defendants. Barristers, it is argued, place innocent defendants in an impossible position 
of having to choose between going to trial and being convicted on a more serious 
charge, and pleading guilty to a less serious offence where the potential sentence is 
lower. Innocent defendants are unable to withstand the pressure created by the 
differential in sentencing and thus plead guilty in order to escape the more severe 
punishment. A brief illustration typifies the critics’ argument on how plea bargaining 
acts upon an innocent defendant to plead guilty. A defence barrister representing a 
defendant charged under section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 may 
seek a reduction of charge from the prosecutor to section 20 of the same Act in return for 
a guilty plea. The difference to the defendant is made plain: he or she avoids the risks of 
being convicted of an offence where life imprisonment or, probably more importantly, 
indeterminate imprisonment for the public protection (IPP) is available388, and is instead 
sentenced for an offence where the judge is limited to a sentence of imprisonment of no 
more than 5 years.389 Not only will the defendant avoid the IPP sentencing laws, but they 
will also gain credit for their guilty plea, reducing their sentence further.390 The 
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defendant is therefore faced with pleading guilty to an offence where they may receive, 
with credit, a maximum of 40 months, or risk a trial and conviction with an 
indeterminate sentence imposed. Furthermore, although not convicted of the more 
serious offence, a defendant may still be convicted by the jury under section 20 as a 
lesser included offence or because the prosecutor puts section 20 on the indictment as an 
alternative charge.391 In that case, the defendant could still be convicted under section 
20, but lose credit for a guilty plea. In the face of the differential in sentences, the 
innocent defendant’s resolve to contest his or her case crumbles. The inducement to 
plead, it is argued, is so great that even those who are not guilty change their plea.392 
 
The classic argument against plea bargaining therefore poses the defendant’s free choice 
as being vitiated by the pressure of the sentence differential.393 However, this 
oversimplifies the nature of choice and the meaning of innocence. Just because a 
decision is unpalatable does not necessarily mean that it is coerced and involuntary.394 
Scott and Stuntz in their analysis of American plea bargaining conceive the issue as akin 
to contract. In their analysis defendants are informed, voluntary participants who bargain 
with the prosecutor for a reduced sentence. In doing so, both prosecutor and defendant 
trade risk- the risk of acquittal or conviction respectively- for a more certain outcome 
with benefits for both.395 The defendant no longer faces a charge with a longer sentence, 
and, because of an agreed basis of plea, has limited the factual basis upon which he or 
she can be sentenced. Equally, the prosecuting barrister no longer faces the reciprocal 
prospect of losing the case, and can save the tax payer the cost of a potentially expensive 
trial. This provides a social value in that prosecutors can obtain a larger return from 
criminal convictions, while defendants reduce the risk of maximum sanctions.396 The 
choice to plead guilty, however, is not rendered involuntary by the bargain. Rather, in 
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pleading guilty the defendant and his or her barrister are properly assessing the risk of 
conviction against the benefits of pleading guilty, and that assessment is a calculation 
based on evidence and potential sentence. As discussed previously in Chapter 4, there 
are no innocent defendants as such- those who are innocent are those whom the trial 
process determines to be not guilty. If the defendant and his or her barrister do not think 
that jury will acquit on the basis of the evidence (or do not believe the likelihood is 
sufficiently high), and the penalty is sufficiently high, then a defendant acts rationally in 
pleading guilty. This chapter will now consider the two elements that make up the 
choice on plea in more detail. Firstly, the evidentiary element of the decision will be 
considered, followed by the potential sentence faced by the defendant. These two 
elements can be thought of as risk and outcome respectively. It should be stressed that 
the mathematical representations used here are not necessarily illustrative of defendant 
and barrister thinking. As indicated already, barristers rarely convert their assessment of 
cases into mathematical probability. Numbers and percentages are used here as a method 
of easy comparison; barristers (and probably defendants too) do articulate risk, however, 
linguistic formulations of “very likely” or “possible” or “more likely than not” are 
cumbersome and imprecise. The present research prefers using percentages as a way of 
showing how individuals might compare risk and outcome for the sake of clarity, even 
though in reality they are expressed as words or feelings. 
 
i. Evidence 
 
The barristers participating in this research were asked whether they believed that an 
offer of a lesser offence placed unfair pressure on a defendant to such an extent that an 
innocent defendant might plead guilty. Overwhelmingly the interviewees rejected the 
idea that innocent defendants plead as a result of plea bargaining. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the view of defending barristers about the strength and weakness of 
cases is dependent on the papers and what the defendant tells them about what 
happened. To the interviewees there were no guilty, or not guilty defendants, only those 
facing a case along a spectrum of strong to weak. Sanders and Young have argued that 
the recommendations by the Auld Review in favour of sentencing discounts were 
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‘adopted on the self-serving assumption that one can increase pressure on the guilty to 
plead guilty without increasing pressure on the innocent to do the same.’397 This 
however repeats the mistake of confusing de facto innocent defendants with those who 
would be likely to be found not guilty at trial. Defending barristers are blind to de facto 
innocence or guilt in their advice-giving role. In pursuing a negotiated plea, these 
barristers felt they were getting the best deal for the defendant who looked, on the basis 
of the papers and their account, to stand a strong chance of conviction, at least on a 
lesser charge. Barristers therefore felt it was right to approach a prosecutor over a 
reduction in charge, if they felt that the defendant had a reasonable chance of acquittal 
on the offence charged, but a poor defence to a lesser offence. In such circumstances, the 
barristers interviewed believed that an agreement to reduce the charge was a logical and 
sensible outcome to the case and the pressure created by such a deal was, in these terms, 
perfectly reasonable. As G1 explained about the pressures faced by a defendant: 
 
…in the sense that anybody who is facing a criminal charge would be 
encouraged to plead guilty to an offence to generate a lesser sentence, yes it’s 
pressure of a kind. Whether it is unfair or undue pressure depends how it is 
placed. If the reality is that there is a strong case against him [on the lesser 
charge] then it may be a pressure of a kind, but not an unfair one or one that is 
likely to lead to an unfair result. 
 
The pressure on defendants, at least according to these interviewees, was created by the 
strength of the case against them; an innocent defendant in their view was one who 
would have a good defence to the charges. If an offer from the prosecution were to 
occur, the defendant’s resolution to go to trial would be supported by the advice given 
by barrister and solicitor.  
 
Equally, prosecution barristers felt that the pressures created by charge bargains were 
entirely legitimate. N2 summed up the position of the prosecutor in charging the 
defendant:  
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I’ll tell you why [charging a defendant with section 18 and offering section 20] 
doesn’t cause me any difficulty as a prosecutor. Because if a jury, having heard 
all the facts are satisfied that they are sure that he intended to cause much harm 
then so be it. So be it…If everything has been done properly and in accordance 
with the law properly directed by the judge, who are we to say that that 
prosecutor was wrong in laying a section 18 and laid the charge to high? How did 
I lay the charge too high, if the jury had just found him guilty of it? 
 
This summation of the prosecutor’s position by N2 seems entirely justifiable. If to the 
defendant and her barrister the charge of section 18 seems to have a real possibility of 
success, it is right for the defendant to give a guilty plea to section 20 serious 
consideration. The literature has commonly accused the police and prosecutors of 
overcharging offences to unfairly create a sentence differential that places pressure on 
the accused to plead.398 This claim seems overstated in the context of a proper 
consideration of the evidence. A prosecutor may try and bluff a defendant to plead guilty 
to a lower charge by maintaining the higher charge on the indictment, however, the basis 
of the prosecution case is known by the defence as a consequence of disclosure laws.399 
If the defence barrister is confident that the case is overcharged then a plea will be 
accepted to the lower offence (when the prosecutor realises her bluff has been called) or 
the defendant will go to trial and have some confidence of acquittal. If the defendant 
pleads to the lower charge in the face of the higher charge, he or she does so out of an 
acknowledgement of the risk of being convicted. By the standards the system sets for 
itself to determine guilt, the charge is not ‘too high’. Although this creates pressure on 
the defendant to plead, the pressure comes from the likelihood of conviction in a trial. Of 
course, if the defence barrister expects a guilty plea and is part of a guilty plea culture, 
then the unrealistic charging of cases does pose a threat to those defendants who should 
contest their guilt. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the interview evidence 
indicates that barristers are committed to making a proper assessment of the chances of 
acquittal and conveying that risk to the defendant. 
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There seems therefore little reason for barristers to try to protect from a charge bargain 
defendants who have a poor chance of acquittal but, nevertheless, protest their 
innocence. It may be that some of these defendants would be acquitted, however, as 
Frank Easterbrook has in the American context argued persuasively, where a system of 
guilt determination is imperfect and the conviction of innocent persons possible, such 
defendants should be allowed plead guilty: 
  
Sometimes the evidence may point to guilt despite the defendant’s factual 
innocence. It would do defendants no favor from preventing them from striking 
the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances.400  
  
If plea negotiation allows an innocent defendant to plead to a lesser offence, barristers 
are perhaps right to advise in favour of a guilty plea, especially when, according to their 
experience, a particular defendant is likely to be convicted. Unfortunately, the choice is 
not between factually innocent defendants pleading guilty and the same defendants 
securing acquittals at trial.401 As E1 explained: 
 
…that may well be true what you’re telling me, but I’m not here to decide the 
truth, I’m here to tell you that the evidence is this. And, if that evidence goes 
before a jury and they hear it, they are likely, they are more than likely to find 
[you guilty] and you’ve got to decide. 
 
Evidence is therefore a risk indicator to both defendant and his or her barrister. It is 
accepted here that this risk has the potential to be misstated by unscrupulous or 
inexperienced barristers, however, that is an argument relating to regulation of plea 
bargaining rather than bargaining itself.  
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ii. Sentence 
 
In deciding whether to accept a bargained plea, the defendant and their barrister must 
also consider sentence. As explained, evidence relates to risk of conviction while 
sentence is the outcome for the defendant. By combining risk and outcome, the barrister 
may advise the defendant about the different possible expected results from various 
pleas. The differential of sentence between pleas can therefore have a significant effect 
on the defendant’s plea. M1 discussed the type of pressure facing a defendant, who must 
come to a difficult decision, even though the defence barrister believes that there is a 
chance of acquittal on three rape charges: 
 
…where a defendant is facing, if he has a trial on the example I’ve given of the 
rape of a six-year-old… there were three rapes on the indictment, several alleged 
incidences of rape…And he’s…offered a plea to sexual assaults and they would 
effectively not have a trial on the rapes. I think it’s a very difficult to advise the 
defendant. I mean obviously your advice will be, if he didn’t do it, he can’t 
accept that he did it…but I think you are under a duty to say, look, I can’t 
guarantee you that if you have a trial on everything that you will be acquitted on 
the rapes, which I think are quite weak. You are effectively in a position where 
you are saying to the client, look, you’ve got to make the decision, I hear what 
you say, that you didn’t do any of these things, but you’ve got to consider 
whether you want to take the risk of having a trial on everything and going down 
on everything, but ultimately it’s up to you, you’ve got to decide. 
 
In the case where a defendant confronts the choice of three counts of rape or three 
counts of sexual assault, not only does the defendant face a moderate sentence 
differential402, but by accepting a negotiated plea the defendant avoids the social stigma 
of being called a rapist. It is self-evident that such negotiations may expose some 
factually innocent defendants to a pressure to plead guilty they cannot withstand. 
However, the barrister is placed in a similar situation as they are when advising a 
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defendant on evidence. An innocent defendant who pleads guilty to sexual assault 
instead of going to trial on “weak” rape charges is arguably making the correct decision 
that should be supported by the barrister. The defendant by pleading guilty to sexual 
assault limits the sentence they potentially face, and avoids the real risk of conviction on 
a rape charge. In other words by pleading guilty, on average, the defendant may face a 
lesser sentence than going to trial, even though potentially innocent. An individual 
defendant may object to being advised in such a manner as they are unconcerned by 
average outcomes- they are concerned with the outcome in their particular case rather 
than the spread of convictions and acquittals over many cases. For the barrister, 
however, this approach is perfectly justifiable and necessary. In properly advising a 
defendant they cannot evaluate the risk of conviction and sentence on the basis that this 
case might be produce an out of the ordinary result. 
 
The problem for innocent defendants therefore does not lie in the barrister’s advice or 
even the defence barrister’s seeking of a plea bargain. Provided that a barrister is 
competent in assessing the risk of conviction on the papers, fully explores the 
defendant’s account, and can accurately predict sentence, the barrister is providing the 
defendant with a proper analysis of the risks he or she is taking. Rather, the problem is 
the reliability of the trial process itself. If the factually innocent defendant cannot rely on 
the trial to find him or her not guilty of the offence, it is better for that defendant to be 
able to plead to a lesser offence and receive a reduced sentence. As Scott and Stuntz 
argue in favour of bargained pleas in American courts:  
 
…The defendant is much better off with the offer than without it: a murder 
defendant who has a fifty percent chance of winning at trial wants a regime that 
allows the prosecutor to offer a ten year sentence with plea.403 
 
The same is true of an English defendant facing a GBH charge, albeit with a different 
sentencing system. If the section 20 charge represents a greater than 50% reduction in 
sentence, a guilty plea benefits the defendant, and his interests are served in pleading 
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guilty rather than going to trial.404  B1 gave an example of the importance of advice on 
plea in relation to a group of defendants who were not told about the advantages of 
pleading to a reduced charge: 
 
I know from a recent case at the Bailey, in the court next door to the one I was in, 
where I heard very good plea had been offered to a section 18 instead of 
attempted murder. And I do know that at least one of the barristers in a five 
handed case did not go and see their client in the cell and advise them…that they 
should seriously think about pleading guilty to section 18.…and they all fought it 
and they all went down and they all got 18 years…They would have got maybe 
10 years on GBH. 
 
In that circumstance, if the defendants’ chances of conviction were greater than 55%, 
then their barristers should have advised in favour of a guilty plea.405 While a difficult 
choice to make, from the defendants’ perspective they should have been given the option 
of pleading to the lesser offence. By pleading to a lesser offence, they trade the risk of 
high sentences with a much reduced term of imprisonment. The barrister is therefore 
acting in the defendant’s best interests if they seek a bargain believing that a guilty plea 
and sentence outweigh the risks of trial and conviction. If the barrister did not seek or 
convey to the defendant a negotiated lesser charge (as in B1’s example), the defendant 
faces a trial or guilty plea on the more serious charge only. In those circumstances, the 
defendant is exposed to the risk of conviction on the more serious charge, and forgoes 
the mediated course of risk and sentence through negotiation. As Easterbrook succinctly 
states the argument: 
 
Persons at risk of unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low) punishment in 
a plea bargain to the risk of conviction and high punishment after trial. Forcing 
these persons to trial against their wishes does them great injury-it is bad enough 
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to be unjustly convicted, and worse yet to be unjustly convicted and receive a 
sentence higher than one could have obtained.406 
 
A defendant whose barrister fails to seek a bargain faces a trial, potential conviction and 
a potentially much more severe sentence. If the defendant lacks confidence in the court 
to find him not guilty of the more serious charge, and the differential in sentence is large 
enough, it is perhaps right that he and his barrister seek a bargained plea. Arguably, the 
literature written by socio-legal scholars places too great an emphasis on the risk to de 
facto innocent defendants of accepting a plea bargain but ignores the very real risk of the 
same defendants’ conviction after a trial. In the example given by M1, it is one thing for 
an innocent defendant to plead guilty to sexual assault, but quite another for them to be 
found guilty of rape. 
 
Some of those interviewed repeatedly criticised members of the Bar who put forward an 
image of the fearless advocate who fights everything and is unwilling to negotiate. Such 
barristers may appeal to clients, solicitors and indeed members of the public as ‘knights 
of justice’, however, in the opinion of some of those interviewed, these barristers often 
acted to the detriment of the defendant. According to the analysis above, this assessment 
is justified. A barrister who advises a trial in all circumstances acts against the interest of 
the defendant in any case where a plea to a lesser offence would be advisable. Barristers 
who fight cases regardless of the evidence against the accused do their defendant clients 
a disservice. Although they may occasionally win high profile cases, the average 
sentence given to the defendants whom they represent may be higher.  
 
c. A 50% rule? 
 
As discussed above, barristers and defendants may make sensible assessments of the 
probability of conviction and sentence when coming to a decision over plea. In many 
cases this reflects relatively small differentials in sentence which are traded for the risk 
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of conviction on the higher charge. As in the example given by B1, the defendant trades 
say a 60% chance of conviction on the higher charge at 18 years for a 10 year sentence 
on guilty plea. Here the defendant gains by reducing the average sentence he or she can 
expect to be given. The question remains, however, as to what extent a prosecutor 
should be allowed to bargain with a defendant. In ad absurdum cases, any person could 
be accused of a crime and be persuaded into pleading guilty to a lesser offence by virtue 
of the large sentencing differential. Another example will assist in understanding this 
difficulty. Defendant (D) is charged on the indictment with one count of murder. In the 
jurisdiction within which D is charged, the sentence after trial and conviction is 100 
years imprisonment. The chances of D’s conviction, however, are extremely low indeed. 
In fact in conference with D’s barrister, the weakness of the evidence is so apparent that 
the barrister assesses the risk of conviction at 1%. On approaching the prosecutor with a 
proposal to dismiss the charge altogether, the prosecutor proposes an alternative: the 
prosecution will drop the murder charge only if D pleads guilty to a charge of assault 
carrying a sentence of 6 months. In calculating the average sentence faced by D, the 
defence barrister realises that D’s average sentence on the murder charge at trial would 
be 1 year. On the basis of this calculation, the defence barrister recommends to D that 
she plead guilty to the assault charge and receive the 6 months imprisonment instead. In 
the face of the sentence differential D accepts the advice given and enters a guilty plea to 
the assault. 
 
The example given here is obviously outside the normal range of possibility of cases in 
England and Wales, however, other less extraordinary examples which nevertheless 
carry a wide disparity of sentence between charges can be imagined. If a system of 
criminal justice is to accept a practice of plea bargaining at certain levels, but not to any 
extent possible, it must set out what range of behaviour is acceptable. While there is 
some guidance in English law to prosecuting authorities, the extent to which plea 
bargaining can take place has not been properly articulated by the government and the 
courts.   
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In McKinnon v. United States of America407 the House of Lords concluded that the 
extent of discount offered by the American prosecuting authorities to the defendant in 
return for not contesting his extradition and a guilty plea did not create sufficient 
pressure to amount to unlawful pressure. In that case the defendant had been offered 3-4 
years imprisonment on a guilty plea, whereas at trial he could expect to receive 8-10 
years. In the judgment given by Lord Brown, the House of Lords recognised that a 
discount that was ‘very substantially more generous’ might be sufficient to ‘constitute 
unlawful pressure such as to vitiate the process’ of extradition.408 How large a discount 
would need to be to vitiate the process was, however, not discussed. 
 
The House of Lords in determining the level of acceptable discount between charges 
could have had direct reference to the guidance given to Crown Prosecutors on whether 
to proceed with a prosecution. The test provided there represents a fair assessment of 
when society believes that a prosecution is worth the cost to the tax payer of a trial, and 
that there is sufficient reason to charge the defendant with the alleged offence. Under the 
test, a prosecutor should only proceed with a prosecution if there is a ‘realistic prospect 
of conviction’.409 The High Court has recently rejected ‘a bookmaker’s approach’ to the 
test, preferring prosecutors to adopt a less predictive approach and to ask whether on 
balance, the evidence is sufficient to merit a conviction.410 The court suggests that in 
some types of cases, such as “date rape”, convictions are harder to obtain, and therefore 
a looser approach to the test can be adopted than one of mathematical rigidity. This 
approach can be criticised as it implies that a lower evidentiary burden must be 
overcome in the prosecutor’s view in certain types of cases. However, even without a 
consistent application of the test across all types of cases, the realistic prospect of 
conviction test probably represents a linguistic approximation of at least a 50% chance 
of conviction in the prosecutor’s assessment in the majority of cases.411 Therefore any 
charge bargain that represents a greater than 50% reduction in sentence could be said, 
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prima facie, to fall outside acceptable limits of a bargained plea. In offering a bargained 
plea to a charge with a greater than 50% discount the prosecutor might imply that he or 
she does not have sufficient confidence in a conviction on the higher charge for it to be 
indicted at all. A greater than 50% reduction in the sentence undermines the evidentiary 
test- the point below which society (in the guise of the CPS charging standards) has 
determined that prosecutions should not proceed. An example may assist in 
understanding the logic behind this argument. Again D is charged with an offence. In 
this case she is charged with section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act. 
According to the sentencing authorities, D faces 96 months (8 years) imprisonment on 
conviction. However, the prosecution evidence against D is relatively weak, with the 
prospect of a conviction at around 40%. D’s barrister therefore approaches the 
prosecution barrister with a view to reducing the charge to section 47 of the same Act 
together with a favourable basis of plea to D, while dropping the section 18 charge from 
the indictment completely. On this basis and on a plea of guilty to a charge of section 47, 
D can expect to be sentenced to 24 months imprisonment- a 75% discount on the 
original charge. The prosecution barrister agrees, but insists that if D fails to take up the 
offer of the section 47, he will continue to trial with the section 18. On the basis of 
average sentences, D’s barrister calculates that the defendant will receive an average 
sentence of just over 38 months after a trial.412 Pleading to the offered section 47 charge 
is obviously the rational choice for D in this situation, but the prosecution barrister has 
possibly made this offer because the chances of conviction on the section 18 charge are 
low- too low to satisfy the realistic prospect of conviction test. The prosecution barrister 
knows however that the offer is likely to be accepted given the different average 
sentencing outcomes. If the prospect of success on the section 18 were higher, for 
example 80%, there would be few reasons for the prosecution barrister to offer a plea to 
the charge of section 47 (subject to the efficiency arguments explained below).  
 
On the basis of consistency, the starting place for bargained pleas in English courts 
could be suggest to be no greater than a reduction of 50%. The House of Lords in 
McKinnon, however, appeared to suggest that the acceptable discounted sentence for a 
                                                 
412
 D’s probability of conviction is 40%, therefore the average sentence is 0.4 x 96 months, or 38.4 
months. 
 157
bargained plea is greater than 50%. The defendant in McKinnon was offered a bargained 
plea that was around 50%, but in the judgment of Lord Brown, a discount would have to 
be ‘very substantially more generous’ before it was considered unlawful. The effect of 
the House of Lords decision is to allow prosecutors to negotiate cases when the prospect 
of conviction is less than 50% which may undermine the real prospect of conviction test, 
and circumvents the charging standards. As Baldwin’s research has shown, prosecutors 
can be reluctant to review charges against the test, especially when the offence is of 
greater seriousness.413  
 
Of course, a prosecutor could offer a lesser charge with a larger than 50% discount, even 
when he or she assesses the chance of conviction as greater than 50%, however, there 
are significant incentives for prosecuting barristers not to undercharge cases in this 
manner. A prosecuting barrister who regularly offered lower charges to defendants who 
had higher chances of conviction would lose the respect of judges, their peers, and most 
importantly the Crown Prosecution Service. The CPS has strong incentives to pursue the 
highest charges available against defendants, and might sensibly decline to instruct 
barristers known as “a soft touch”. A prosecuting barrister may offer a charge bargain to 
protect a witness from undergoing the ordeal giving evidence against the defendant, 
however, in most cases prosecutors has little to gain by making offers that do not reflect 
the good chances of conviction on a higher charge.  
 
That said, there may be efficiency or witness related reasons for why a prosecutor is 
willing to offer a defendant a bargained plea, even when the chances of conviction are 
relatively high. Large discounts may now be offered under the Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2005 section 73 for co-operation with the police in conducting their 
investigations. In P and Blackburn414 the Court of Appeal held that the reduction given 
to the defendant under this section would normally be somewhere between one half and 
two thirds of the expected sentence, but no more than three-quarters. This suggests that 
the courts are willing to forgo punishing the defendant to the normal extent with a 
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greater than 50% discount, if he or she can provide useful information in the prosecution 
of another. Furthermore, the government’s proposals under ‘The Introduction of a Plea 
Negotiation Framework for Fraud Cases in England and Wales: a Consultation’ argue 
that pre-charge negotiations should include an agreed, non-binding, specific sentence or 
sentencing range.415 Although the proposals are not specific on this point, this may 
include a discount that is far greater than 50%. As the proposals indicate as their aim to 
‘avoid a contested trial, at the earliest possible stage’416 it is likely that this means that 
current charges and the accompanying sentences are often laid too high to encourage an 
early guilty plea. Flowing from this aim, it might be concluded that plea discounts 
offered in pursuit of ‘potentially large savings to the public purse’417 are given precisely 
for efficiency reasons. The danger remains however, that the realistic prospect of 
conviction test on a higher, threatened charge, is not applied properly and not reviewed 
by the court. These negotiations will take place pre-charge, and thus only subject to any 
kind of scrutiny well after negotiations have been concluded. 
 
d. The innocence problem and risk-aversion. 
 
It has been argued that a significant problem posed by plea bargaining is the attitude of 
the factually innocent defendant towards trial and the possibility of conviction. It is said 
that de facto innocent defendants are more risk-averse than guilty defendants and are 
more likely to accept an offer of a reduced charge in a similar situation when in fact they 
should go to trial on the merits of their case.418 Accordingly, plea bargaining acts against 
the interests of the de facto innocent who have better chances of acquittal, but who 
nevertheless choose to plead guilty. Furthermore, de facto innocent defendants are 
pooled with de facto guilty defendants, but because each cannot disclose what he or she 
truly thought and knows about the alleged crime- in other words, the actual nature of his 
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or her guilt or their “private information”- the prosecutor cannot properly evaluate the 
chances of acquittal or conviction and decide whether to press ahead with the trial, drop 
certain charges, or dismiss the case entirely.419 De facto guilty defendants will regularly 
try to mimic de facto innocent defendants by concocting alibis or explanations which are 
broadly similar to those claims made by de facto innocent or less culpable defendants.  
Prosecutors must treat each claim with similar scepticism, and will offer a defendant 
with a lower chance of conviction the same deal as a defendant whose chances of 
conviction are higher.420 Without this information, the prosecutor cannot offer varying 
pleas on the basis of the information received from defendants which would accurately 
reflect the costs to the prosecutor of going to trial against the risks of acquittal.421 De 
facto innocent defendants are therefore treated as de facto guilty defendants, and because 
of risk aversion are more likely to accept an offer made, even though their risk of 
conviction is the same or reduced. Scott and Stuntz have framed this difficulty as the 
‘innocence problem’. 
 
This results in inefficiency in the system, distorting the plea offers made so that the 
bargains offered by the prosecution are disproportionately more serious in terms of 
charge and the accepted basis of plea than they would be if they reflected the accurate 
information that the defendant with a lower chance of conviction had given.422  Scott and 
Stuntz argue that there are few solutions to this failure by the criminal justice system to 
take into account the defendant’s private information about the alleged offence. While it 
is probable that innocent defendants or less culpable defendants can distinguish 
themselves on the basis of the evidence, and by giving a credible, consistent account, 
making use of the defendant’s private information is extremely difficult given the 
absence of a reliable pre-trial method of screening the defendant’s account of the 
offence. It is difficult to think of any system where there is a reliable way of testing the 
credibility of the defendant’s pre-trial claims. By definition, the more effective, but 
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costly means of screening defendants is the trial itself.    
 
The information deficit regarding the defendant’s private information is perhaps less 
problematic when considering the efficiency of the system with respect to the pleas 
offered to English defendants.423 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and the law in England and Wales do not provide the same protection to the defendant 
against self-incrimination. Although Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights does not explicitly mention the right of the defendant of freedom from self-
incrimination, the European Court of Human Rights, as well as English courts, have 
recognised that the privilege is contained within the presumption of innocence and 
concepts of fairness within Article 6.424 However, that right is not absolute, and the 
British government has provided statutory exceptions to the right which have been held 
to be compatible with the Convention.425  
 
In the case of a criminal defendant in English procedural law, the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply in several areas. Under the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 the jury may ‘draw such inferences…that 
appear proper’ from: the defendant’s failure to mention a fact relied upon in their 
defence when questioned by the police, and could reasonably have been expected to 
mention; the failure of the defendant to give evidence or answer a question when asked 
in court; the failure of the defendant to account for objects, substances or marks on their 
person when arrested; and, the failure of the defendant to account for their presence at a 
particular place. Furthermore, in order to avoid ‘appropriate’ comments by the judge to 
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the jury, or the jury drawing adverse inferences from their failure to do so, a defendant 
must set out in a defence case statement the nature of their defence, the matters of the 
prosecution case that he or she takes issue with and why, set out the particular matters of 
fact upon which she or he will seek to rely upon and the details of any alibi, including 
the names and addresses of witness whom they will call in support.426 In the recent case 
of S and L the Court of Appeal was extremely critical of the defence for failing to 
disclose the exact details of the defence of necessity on which they wished to rely.427 By 
contrast the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution has 
prevented the judge or prosecutor from commenting on the accused’s silence in the 
trial.428 In fact there is a positive duty place on the prosecuting body to remind the jury 
not to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to testify.429 Moreover, the 
post-arrest silence of the accused in the police station after being given a Miranda430 
warning cannot be used against him or her as this would violate the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.431 This limits the disclosure of the defence to the 
prosecution and makes it difficult for the prosecutor to assess whether the case against 
the defendant is particularly strong or weak.432 
 
The law in England and Wales on the other hand means that a defendant who considers 
pleading not guilty and going to trial must put forward to the prosecution a consistent, 
affirmative defence at an early stage, which is then continually updated as the defence 
become aware of the exact nature of the case against the defendant. The fact that the 
defendant must disclose his or her defence at a pre-trial stage allows both prosecution 
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and defence lawyers to project forward to trial the realistic probability of conviction with 
improved accuracy. A lying defendant whose account is pinned down before trial can be 
more readily shown to be false by the prosecution.433 It is highly unlikely that the 
defendant will change their defence without a good explanation, or else they will suffer 
the harm to their defence that the adverse inference provisions create. Therefore, the 
defence contained within the interview at the police station and the defence case 
statement are good indicators of the defence at trial. This, in many respects, reduces the 
information deficit as posed by Scott and Stuntz. The disclosure regime of English 
courts assists negotiation by allowing prosecutors to know the defence case before trial. 
Defendants with a low chance of conviction can more readily signal the veracity of their 
account as the one presented at the pre-trial stage is the one most likely to be advanced 
at trial. An unlikely account gives a higher chance of conviction and a reduced 
willingness of the prosecutor to reduce charges.  
 
Scott and Stuntz believe that defence lawyers do not assist the accurate disclosure of the 
defendant’s private information as prosecutors can no more trust the defence lawyer’s 
assertion of the “true” facts as, although the defence lawyer themselves may not lie to 
the prosecutor, the defendant could have lied to their own counsel.434 This is probably 
often the case. Guilty defendants will try to imitate an innocent defendant by producing 
a version of the facts which is entirely or partially false but which mimics an innocent 
defendant’s account. However, to the defence and prosecution barrister themselves, 
whether the defendant is lying or not is irrelevant. What concerns the barristers of both 
sides is the credibility of the defendant’s account and how that may conclude in front of 
a jury given the other evidence and witnesses. Therefore, the innocence problem, the 
inability to test the veracity of information given by de facto innocent defendants, is 
unimportant to the prosecution and defence barristers at a pre-trial stage. Of central 
concern is: given this defendant’s account and the evidence against them, what is the 
probability of conviction and potential sentence? There seems little else a defence 
barrister could do to assist defendant who may or may not be factually innocent other 
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than carefully analyse the case against the defendant and the defendant’s account so that 
the chances of conviction and acquittal are clear. A de facto innocent defendant who 
wishes to plead cannot be readily helped to reassess the situation as the defence barrister 
simply cannot know the facts. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that barristers 
are only looking at the case from the point of view of the evidence and ‘don’t know the 
factors that may influence somebody.’435 
 
It would seem for this reason, beyond advising defendants about the strength of the case 
against them, and the sentencing options available to the judge, few of the interviewees 
described trying to protect defendants from the pressures created by an offer to plead to 
a lesser offence. The view held by I1, was typical: 
 
When defending…again, I’m confident that…most defendants have the 
wherewithal to know what they’re doing and to make their own decisions about 
whether they are guilty of this particular offence. And you’re just putting your, 
finding out all the options to them and putting them on the table and saying, “are 
you interested in this? Again, entirely your decision.” 
 
In the view of the majority of those interviewed, it was their role to present the 
defendant with the options and allow them to make their own choice. As discussed, 
however, this may encourage risk-averse defendants to plead to offences they might be 
better contesting. This does not mean that all bargained pleas result in injustice, where 
risk-averse innocent defendants plead guilty. Most bargained for pleas may reflect 
culpability and the realistic chances of conviction of the defendant. As has been 
discussed, English law promotes an early, consistent disclosure of the defence to be 
relied upon, which in many cases may be of benefit to de facto innocent defendants. The 
inability of barristers to assess why a defendant pleads guilty, however, does pose some 
difficulties for plea bargaining in general, and reinforces the need for barristers to fully 
apprise defendants of the merit of their case and give adequate time for the defendant to 
consider their plea.  
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e. Plea bargaining undermines rights that the defendant should not be 
able to derogate from  
 
In response to consequentialist and economic justifications in defence of plea 
bargaining, critics of the practice have attempted to reposition the problem in relation to 
rights.436 Consequentialist theories that promote plea bargaining are said to override 
rights in pursuit of other values.437 These authors have claimed that plea bargaining 
undermines the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the right to a full and public hearing. These rights are at the core of western conceptions 
of criminal justice, however, access to these rights is currently dependent on the 
defendant being produced in a full trial hearing. Plea bargaining by its nature takes place 
before these rights are properly realised in front of a jury in an adversarial trial. 
Defendants who do exercise their right to put the prosecution to proof are penalised by 
heavier sentences.438 By implication, it would therefore appear that critics would prefer 
more trials and less bargaining to occur.  
 
However, the answer advanced of putting more defendants through trials by scrapping or 
reducing the scope of bargaining is extremely problematic. Removing choice and 
incentives from the defendant within the present system of trial could potentially result 
in more de facto innocent defendants being given longer sentences. Stephen Schulhofer 
has argued that promoting these rights is of more important social value than the 
inconvenience to the individual defendant of requiring her to stand trial.439 This 
argument seems at odds with the right of the innocent not to be punished when the 
overall sentencing of the innocent is considered in aggregate.440Although some de facto 
innocent defendants might be acquitted who would otherwise have pleaded guilty, the 
total of de facto innocent defendants serving longer sentences could increase. As was 
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discussed above, some de facto innocent defendants are advised to plead guilty as there 
is a strong prospect of their conviction. There seems little purpose in giving defendants 
more rights but yet punishing the innocent on a larger scale.  
 
Other arguments which promote trials ignore the real problem of resources. Ashworth 
and Redmayne believe that the discount should be reduced to 10% and to allow 
defendants to contest their guilt at no significant cost in terms of sentence.441 Similarly, 
guilty defendants are said to be unjustly rewarded for pleading guilty and both discount 
and bargaining should be scrapped. However, this does not take into account the 
increased cost to the system of removing incentives to plead and the effect that might 
have on the overall accuracy of trials. Darbyshire disputes the fact that removing system 
incentives would result in an increase in trials442, but then goes on to argue that innocent 
individuals plead guilty as a result of the same incentives. This is evidently self-
contradictory and in any case probably incorrect.443 Furthermore, there seems little 
reason why guilty defendants should react to sentencing incentives in a dramatically 
different way to innocent defendants.444 Both de facto innocent defendants and guilty 
defendants almost certainly plead guilty on the basis of the incentives offered to them. 
While the current research does not pass judgment on the fact-finding ability of the 
current jury trial, it is presumed that its ability to do so is constrained by the resources at 
its disposal.445 With resources constant, more defendants going through the trial system 
could degrade its performance.446 Trials could be curtailed with evidence insufficiently 
examined. In such circumstances more innocent defendants could be convicted (or more 
guilty defendants acquitted, or both). In any society there is a correlation between the 
resources expended on the system of trials and fact-finding, and the risk of convicting 
the innocent. One answer might be therefore to spend more money on trials (including 
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increasing the resources of prosecution and defence) to improve their ability to separate 
de facto and guilty defendants. However, this would increase the tax burden and 
associated problems. 
 
Stephen Schulhofer has suggested that jury trials could be replaced with bench trials 
(trials with a panel of judges rather than a jury) as they are less expensive.447 Such trials 
would allow all defendants to put the prosecution to proof at an acceptable cost. While 
bench trials may be cheaper per case, the effectiveness of judges to make accurate 
findings of guilt is open to doubt. Critics such as Darbyshire dismiss the problem that 
although bench trials might give more defendants access to trials and therefore access to 
certain rights, they undermine the protections given to the defendant by a jury.448 
Different systems of trial may keep resources constant and remove the need for plea 
bargaining, however any system must be assessed on its resource to truth-finding 
abilities.449 Removing bargaining altogether may improve overall access to trials and 
accompanying rights, but it is the innocent who may be harmed in the process as the 
effectiveness of trials is degraded.   
 
f.  Negotiation over charge undermines due process.  
 
By removing the defendant from the trial process and into negotiation, critics maintain 
that the barrister fails to thoroughly test the fairness of the procedures used to arrest, 
detain, question and bring the defendant to trial.450 Instead, it is said, the advocate 
concentrates on the charge itself and resolving the case at a pre-trial stage. Due process 
at the trial stage has systemic value in that it requires all levels of criminal investigation 
and prosecution to comply in order to gain convictions and prevents the misuse of state 
prosecutorial power by either the police or other investigatory bodies. In a pre-trial 
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settlement setting, due process principles are not strictly enforced and miscarriages of 
justice increase. 
 
The critics’ allegation, if true, would require defence barristers to fail to spot procedural 
weakness or irregularities in the prosecution and instead to be focused on resolving the 
case through bargaining. This implies that either defence barristers do not fully apprise 
themselves of cases or, if they do spot irregularities, are unwilling to take forward legal 
issues for the judge to decide. As has already been discussed in Chapter 4, contrary to 
the description given by McConville et al, the interview data revealed that these 
barristers were highly alert to potential problems with the prosecution case and 
thoroughly analysed the evidence against the accused. Many described times when they 
had stood-up for the defendant on “technical” points and taken up legal issues if they felt 
there was a reasonable chance of succeeding. In this sense, according to the data from 
the current research, the interviewees were interested in upholding due process values, 
especially if they felt that the defendant would be acquitted on that basis. Issues such as 
abuse of process or excluding evidence under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 were, according to the interviewees, brought into open 
court if the defending barrister felt they were meritorious. There is no evidence in any of 
the literature, besides generalised allegations of laziness or a commitment to guilty plea 
culture, that defending barristers regularly fail to take legal points if possible.  
 
Although in cases where a plea bargain occurs the arrest and questioning of the suspect 
are not scrutinised in detail in a public hearing, it is unlikely that a trial itself would 
reveal any further irregularity by chance. Even though police officers are routinely 
cross-examined in trials, they are rarely questioned at length about whether the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, for example, has been complied with unless there are 
apparent concerns raised by disclosure or the defendant themselves. While police 
officers might be more wary of behaving improperly if subject to cross-examination in 
all cases, the courts have stated that abuse of process cases are not to be used to punish 
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investigatory bodies or discipline the police.451 Generalised misbehaviour by the police 
does not therefore lead to a failure of prosecution unless it would be impossible to give 
the accused a fair trial, or it would amount to a manipulation of process and offend the 
court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the 
circumstances.452 When the procedural law does not strictly enforce exclusionary 
principles it is improbable that more trials would reinvigorate due process throughout 
the criminal justice system. Any argument likely to succeed under the exclusionary rules 
may well be picked up by a barrister at a pre-trial stage. 
 
g. Plea bargains represent a poor deal for society 
 
As well as agency costs for defendants, agency costs exist for society in general too. 
Prosecutors represent the interests of the public in taking cases to court and therefore 
should not bargain over pleas at a lower level than that desired by the society on whose 
behalf they act. Judging what constitutes society’s interests is difficult and the law and 
guidance to prosecutors provides a confused basis for judging what that might be. It is 
suggested that the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) represents society’s interests as 
he or she is appointed by the Attorney-General, the government’s legal advisor. The 
guidelines produced by the DPP might give a good idea about how society would like 
prosecutions to proceed. According to the Code for Crown Prosecutors, issued by the 
DPP, there is a Full Code Test to apply to all prospective prosecutions.453 Prosecutors 
should take forward cases where ‘there is enough evidence to provide a “realistic 
prospect of conviction”’ (the realistic prospect of conviction test) and if the prosecution 
is ‘in the public interest’ (the public interest test). However, these tests are combined 
with other authoritative guidelines on the acceptance of pleas. As will be explained these 
considerations mix-up a desire to see offending punished and victims consulted, with the 
probability of the success of conviction.  
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As well as the Full Code test, prosecutors must comply with other guidelines relating to 
accepting guilty pleas from defendants when appropriate. For prosecutions in the Crown 
Court there are three sets of guidelines that apply.454 The first is part of the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors, which outlines the circumstances in which a plea may be accepted 
to a less serious offence.455 In accepting guilty pleas a Crown Prosecutor should: 
 
…only accept the defendant's plea if they think the court is able to pass a 
sentence that matches the seriousness of the offending, particularly where there 
are aggravating features. Crown Prosecutors must never accept a guilty plea just 
because it is convenient.456 
 
As Ashworth and Redmayne point out, this guidance is somewhat difficult to apply in 
practice.457 Sentences are rarely given at the maxima provided in the statute, therefore a 
Crown Prosecutor must be satisfied that the seriousness of the offending is met by mid-
range sentence on the lesser charge. This can be problematic where the sentencing 
available cannot take into account of the most serious reading of the facts. 
 
Furthermore, this guidance recognises seriousness of the offending only, not the 
likelihood of conviction as in the realistic prospect of conviction test. This creates a 
conflict between the test and matching the charge to the alleged, albeit unsubstantiated, 
seriousness of offending. Prosecutors may generally wish to offer a lower charge to a 
defendant because of the difficulty in proving a higher charge, for example where it is 
the defendant’s word against a single witness. For example, on a rape charge it may be 
possible to prove the defendant’s contact with the victim through forensic science, but 
not necessarily contact amounting to rape itself. Although the prosecutor wishes to offer 
the defendant a plea to sexual assault, this clearly does not meet the alleged ‘seriousness 
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of offending’. The precise reason why the prosecutor wishes to accept a plea to a lesser 
offence is because it is convenient to do so- he or she does not have confidence in a 
conviction on the more serious charge.458 Rarely will the lesser charge meet the 
seriousness of the offending as alleged, unless the CPS overcharged the indictment 
originally, or the allegation is so vague as to take into account a range of criminal 
conduct. 
 
The idea of matching plea with the seriousness of offending is reiterated in the Attorney-
General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas.459 There the formally agreed factual 
basis of plea, normally drawn up by the defence advocate in writing, must: 
 
…not be agreed on a misleading or untrue set of facts and must take proper 
account of the victim’s interests. An illogical or insupportable basis of plea will 
inevitably result in the imposition of an inappropriate sentence and is capable of 
damaging public confidence in the criminal justice system.460 
 
This represents the same tension of taking a plea to a lesser offence. Ensuring the court 
receives a logical and supportable, or true basis is practically impossible, if what the 
victim or police evidence alleges amounts to a more serious offence than that which the 
defendant is pleading guilty to. A basis of plea cannot include admissions that amount to 
a higher offence (as this is illogical) but at the same time will not reflect the original 
prosecution case, and must involve compromises. A judge may refuse to sentence on an 
‘unrealistic’ basis of plea, but at the cost of a full trial or a Newton hearing.461 In some 
cases this has resulted in appeals where the sentencing judge has been unwilling to 
challenge the basis, but gone beyond the facts as admitted by the defence.462 All 
bargained bases of pleas involve a degradation of the original seriousness of offending. 
The question is therefore not whether this should be allowed to take place, but to what 
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extent. Any guidelines on bargaining should be reformulated to take account of this fact. 
Unfortunately, the government seems committed to these opposing goals of giving full 
account and satisfaction to the victim and the ‘seriousness of offending’, and allowing 
bargaining to take place for the sake of efficiency. The proposals contained within ‘The 
Introduction of a Plea Negotiation Framework for Fraud Cases in England and Wales: a 
Consultation’ reiterate that same phrasing for introducing negotiations in fraud cases at a 
pre-charge stage.463 
 
It is difficulty to say on the basis of the current research whether prosecutors accept 
pleas to offences that are too low according to these confusing standards. Some 
interviewees did however provide a comparative perspective of the work of the Bar with 
that of the Crown Prosecution Service. Under amendments introduced by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, section 28 and Schedule 2, the Crown Prosecution Service is now 
responsible for charging defendants at the police station. Furthermore, the CPS has 
recently undergone an expansion of in-house advocates to conduct Crown Court 
prosecutions, rather than briefing independent counsel. As a result, some of the 
interviewees believed that cases were now routinely undercharged and accused CPS 
Higher Court Advocates (HCAs) of ‘strangling cases at birth’464 and of ‘situations where 
[HCAs] were giving in to senior barristers on the basis of pleas that were just 
ridiculous.’465 The suggestion is that the Bar employs a wider definition of the 
reasonable prospect of conviction test, and more stringent standards to the acceptable 
basis of plea. The CPS advocates were accused of being too soft on defendants so that 
cases collapsed too readily. It might be reasoned on the basis of this limited evidence 
that the CPS has undermined prosecutions and are settling cases at too low a level. 
However, more evidence is required before definitive conclusion can be drawn. 
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h. Third party effects 
 
This chapter has focused on the effects of plea bargaining on the defendant and the 
potential motivations of barristers who engage in the practice. It should be 
acknowledged for the sake of completeness that plea bargaining can have negative 
effects for third parties outside of the prosecution and defence. Firstly, the curtailment of 
the trial process may reduce the scope for an assessment in every case of the quality of 
the investigation of crime, and could hide the level of effectiveness of the work of the 
police. This relates not to conviction or acquittal but rather a public airing of the 
methods and abilities of police officers in carrying out their investigation. In a trial these 
methods are brought to scrutiny and can be seen by the judiciary and the public. If a 
prosecution fails through want of effective policing, subsequent public and political 
pressure may bring about positive effects on the competency of the police and their 
organisation. Similar arguments in favour of trials can be made for assessing the work of 
prosecuting bodies, such as the CPS, and defence lawyers themselves. When a case is 
resolved with a bargained plea, no public scrutiny of these processes is possible. 
Secondly, those who are victims of crime arguably have a real interest in the prosecution 
and the public recognition of what happened to them. Trials allow victims to confront 
the perpetrator, the defendant, and explain what happened to them; plea bargains do not. 
Although victim impact statements are now available at sentencing466, and victims 
should be consulted before accepting guilty pleas according to the Attorney General 
Guidelines467, they may feel left out and disregarded by the bargaining process. Even 
though the adversarial trial system is poorly suited to addressing the consequences of 
offending on victims (the effect on the victim of an offence is not relevant evidence at 
the trial stage), allowing a victim to give evidence is potentially an important role of the 
trial.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to show that the arguments around how and why plea bargains 
are entered into by barristers are not necessarily a consequence of a guilty plea culture. 
Often barristers on assessing the available evidence against the defendant in combination 
with the defendant’s account, decide that a lower charge is more appropriate to the facts 
of the case. The charge or basis agreed with the prosecution, while labelled charge or 
fact bargaining, is a practical decision. In these circumstances, the bargain represents the 
advisor’s assessment of the defendant’s culpability in the light of the evidence. In other 
bargains, barristers try to make a prediction based on the strength of the prospective 
cases about the chances of acquittal on the higher charge against the benefits of a lower 
sentence on a plea of guilty. In these cases the defence barrister is trying to optimise the 
outcome for defendant who may deny the charges, but has a weaker case and a higher 
chance of conviction. 
 
Difficulties are created because of the ways in which bargains are presented to 
defendants. As was discussed, there appear to be two different ways in which plea 
bargains are produced. The first method in common use at the Bar seems to be a 
discussion and agreement between defence counsel and defendant on how best the case 
might proceed. In this approach, the defendant’s decision-making remains central to how 
his or her case is run and is a result of a collaborative meeting between them and their 
lawyers. The second method of bargaining, however, is fundamentally different. Under 
this approach, informal discussions between prosecutor and defence barrister as to what 
pleas might be appropriate are initiated before the defendant is consulted; in some cases, 
before the defence barrister has met the defendant at all. The concern outlined above, is 
that this undermines defendant autonomy as decisions about his or her case are pre-
empted by their representative. This in turn creates opportunities for misuse by the 
defence barrister as the role of the defendant in the choice on plea is diminished. As yet, 
no formal ethical guidance is provided to defence barristers on how they should 
approach plea bargaining and they are reliant on observed negotiation in pupillage or 
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early practice. 
 
The role of plea bargaining in English law must be carefully considered as it allows 
many cases to be determined without a trial. Although critics claim that excessive 
pressure is placed on defendants by barristers, there is a failure in the literature to 
consider whether plea bargains are actually in the interests of the defendant in terms of 
optimal outcome. Plea bargaining as a facet of adversarial justice is often considered as a 
tool used by manipulative lawyers, but its potential for misuse should be considered 
separately to the effects of plea bargaining by itself. Doing so allows each of the 
arguments surrounding negotiation to be considered in turn and provides a more 
thorough investigation of why barristers bargain over plea. The empirical research 
findings from this research suggest that barristers often make decisions on the 
appropriate plea based on the projected risks of conviction and sentence.  
 
In order to understand the factors that affect barristers’ advice it is important to 
distinguish between those defendants who are likely to be acquitted, and de facto 
innocent defendants. It is not possible for defending barristers and prosecutors to 
identify the latter and their focus must inevitably be on the former. While it is desirable 
that de facto innocent defendants be protected from conviction, the trial does not and 
cannot represent a fail-safe mechanism. In these circumstances those factually innocent 
defendants who are likely to be convicted are likely to be best served by a negotiated 
plea. It is, of course, a matter of concern if some de facto innocent defendants may be 
particularly risk averse and so more likely to accept a poorer bargain. However, this is 
possibly a reduced problem given the level of defence disclosure under English law. As 
defendants must set up an affirmative defence early in the process, prosecutors, police 
and defence lawyers can more readily test pre-trial claims of innocence. Barristers are 
not in a position to protect risk-averse defendants from accepting poor bargains, other 
than to give the defendant sufficient time and advice on their position before a decision 
is made.  
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Any reduction in charge is not acceptable. As was illustrated, charges can be reduced to 
such an extent that anyone accused of an offence would plead guilty on the basis of 
probable outcomes. Huge discounts may encourage even those with a low chance of 
conviction to plead guilty to offences. In that analysis it was argued that the House of 
Lords in McKinnon failed to understand the important relationship between the 
probability of conviction and charging standards. As a general rule a 50% reduction is 
the largest discount that should be offered. Larger discounts might indicate that 
prosecutors do not have sufficient faith in the prosecution to meet the realistic prospect 
of success test. While larger discounts may be justified in return for the defendant’s co-
operation or to save the cost of an expensive trial, or to spare victims the ordeal of trial, 
these negotiations must be monitored by the court to ensure that the initial charge meets 
the charging standards. 
 
It has also been argued that enforcing “the right to a trial” for a greater number of 
defendants might harm de facto innocent defendants in the long run, and that discounted 
sentences might, in fact, reduce the aggregate sentence served by all de facto innocent 
defendants. As was pointed out above, discounts and bargains do encourage pleas, 
without which the number of trials would increase. Unless the courts use their resources 
more effectively or resources are increased, the increased numbers of trials within the 
present system may reduce its accuracy and convict greater numbers of de facto innocent 
defendants. Any alterations to the current system of plea bargaining may have profound 
consequences for defendants - it is not simply a question of scrapping plea bargaining 
with a concomitant rise in acquittals for factually innocent defendants. Although due 
process is not given full exposure during negotiation, the interview evidence suggests 
that barristers do take legal points where a successful argument might affect the 
continued prosecution of the accused. 
 
Finally, this chapter has put forward the argument that the current guidance on when and 
how bargains are entered into is exceedingly poor. The guidance given to barristers 
pursues contradictory aims - of ensuring charges reflect the ‘seriousness of offending’ 
while trying to encourage bargaining to take place. The guidelines should be redrafted to 
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reflect the probability of conviction on the various charges available. 
 177
Chapter 6: Fees and advice 
 
Critics of the criminal bar and criminal lawyers have alleged that barristers advise on “a 
fees basis”, manipulating and dominating defendant decision-making on the basis of 
financial self-interest.468 Barristers are said to seek to maximise their incomes by 
advising defendants to plead in a manner that resolves the case at a point when the 
opportunity cost of not taking up another case becomes greater than continuing the 
representation of the present defendant. This research does not necessarily disagree with 
this analysis. However, certain important caveats are placed in the way of this reasoning 
as a complete explanation of barristers’ behaviour. Firstly, before assessing barristers’ 
incentives, the climate and flows of work and income into the Bar must be considered. 
With an understanding of barristers’ working environment in terms of pay and 
conditions, any analysis of the incentives created by fee will be enriched. Secondly, this 
research will examine the theoretical and empirical research on economic incentives for 
lawyers in general and barristers in particular. Recent changes in fees for legal aid cases 
have important implications for how lawyers work generally and how they approach 
cases.  
 
This chapter will examine whether lawyers are susceptible to financial incentives, and if 
they are, explore how those incentives in the form of legal aid payments express 
themselves in their behaviour in relation to advice on pleas. Much of the literature agrees 
that financial incentives in aggregate play an important part in determining how cases 
are resolved, however, it is unclear how this manifests itself on an individual case level. 
This chapter will discuss the emerging idea of ethical indeterminacy and argue that 
while barristers’ behaviour is inevitably affected by financial incentives, it does not 
necessarily manifest itself in overt manipulation of defendants’ pleas.469 Ethical 
indeterminacy argues that lawyers do not overtly manipulate cases to maximise fees in 
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determining their strategy on a case, but rather take decisions in their own financial 
interest where the defendant’s “best-interests” are plausibly served by selecting that 
choice of action. As will be discussed, decision-making that is in the best interests of the 
defendant, including what advice to give on plea, is not always inherently obvious and 
two practitioners, unaware of the financial incentives, might genuinely disagree as to the 
best choice of action. Furthermore, this chapter will attempt to show that financial 
incentives are not the only incentives that bear upon the advice given to defendants. By 
including an analysis of the data from interviews with barristers, this chapter will 
explore how barristers themselves assess the financial incentives that drive their 
behaviour. As will be seen, although financial incentives remain important, other factors 
can counter these, by acting as a disincentive to barristers who seek to resolve cases on a 
solely financial basis. It will be shown that a wider more contextualised view needs to be 
taken of barrister behaviour, and that acting for short term financial gain may be highly 
prejudicial to a barrister’s long term career. Lastly, the Advocate Graduated Fee Scheme 
will be modelled, with particular focus on how different case outcomes are remunerated. 
Critics of the criminal bar have generally not properly analysed the financial incentives 
put in place by the Graduated Fee Scheme and misstated the financial incentives for 
barristers in criminal cases, suggesting that barristers are better off “cracking” Crown 
Court cases close to trial.470 This research shows that that fees and incentives are 
complicated, dependent on the number of cases in which the barrister is briefed and 
trials can be more lucrative to barristers.  
 
1. The current climate at the Bar 
 
It is well known that the legal aid Bar471  is undergoing a dramatic period of change in 
both its size and function. Newspapers regularly report dissatisfaction amongst members 
of the Bar with pay rates as well as disputes with the government over initiatives to 
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reduce legal aid expenditure in England and Wales.472 Before considering the financial 
incentives that may affect barristers’ decision-making on how they advise on plea, it is 
necessary to understand the context in which members of the Bar are working. Only 
with a thorough understanding of the current climate at the Bar in relation to pay and 
conditions can an informed judgement be made about barrister decision-making on a 
case-by-case basis. Interviewees were therefore asked questions about their current pay 
rates and their workload. Questions in this area were particularly open and intended for 
barristers to raise any concerns or points that they felt to be relevant to the subject. Three 
particular areas were raised by interviewees: the low rates of pay for prosecution work 
and the reformed pay scales for defence work under the Carter Reforms; the use of 
Higher Court Advocates; and pay under the Very High Cost Case (VHCC) pay scheme. 
These areas were discussed in most interviews prior to discussing whether financial 
incentives had an effect on case outcome. The relationship with solicitors is also vital to 
a barristers work, but is explored more thoroughly in the next chapter. Solicitors have 
experienced a dramatic change in how their fees are calculated and play a role in 
understanding the environment in which barristers advise. Where relevant these changes 
are examined. 
 
a. Prosecution and defence work for trials up to and including 40 days 
 
Since April 2007, barristers undertaking defence work in the Crown Court have been 
paid according to an enhanced pay scale under the Advocate Graduated Fee Scheme 
(AGFS) created by the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. This pay rise 
was broadly welcomed by the Bar and the scheme was supported by the Bar Council.473 
The details of the AGFS and its background are discussed more thoroughly below, 
however, it is sufficient to say here that new pay scheme amounted to an on average 
16% pay rise for defending barristers.474 In contrast the pay rates for prosecution work 
                                                 
472
 See n.478 below 
473
 The General Council of The Bar, ‘The General Council of the Bar’s response to the joint DCA and 
LSC Consultation Paper: Legal Aid: a Sustainable Future’ (October 2006) 
474
 See observations: Ibid. para. 12. Junior barristers received a greater pay rise than Queen’s Counsel 
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have remained static under the Crown Prosecution Service Graduated Fee Scheme since 
2005.475 These fees, based on the original Graduated Fee Scheme introduced for 
barristers in 1997476, are much lower than the fees paid under the AGFS meaning that 
barristers instructed to prosecute a case can be paid between a third and half as much 
their defending counterpart.477 This discrepancy in pay means that those barristers who 
conduct prosecution work have not seen the equivalent pay rises for defence work and 
contributed to the generally low morale at the criminal bar.478 The government has 
recently proposed that defence barristers have their pay cut to be equal with that of 
prosecuting barristers.479 This would effectively remove the pay increases given under 
the AGFS, and has provoked consternation from members of the Bar.480 
 
b. Very High Cost Cases  
 
Very High Cost Cases (VHCC) are not subject to the statutory pay scheme of the 
AGFS.481 These cases have been targeted for savings because although they represent 
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only a fractionally small number of defendants in the criminal justice system, the cost of 
VHCCs represented 10% of the £1.2 billion legal aid expenditure in 2007.482 Fees for 
cases that are classified as VHCC are subject to contractual arrangements between the 
Legal Services Commission (LSC) and members of an advocates panel- pre-approved 
advocates who may undertake VHCC work.483 Under the design of the VHCC scheme, 
advocates listed on the panel can be selected for VHCC cases and instructed by 
solicitors who are members of an approved solicitor panel. During the ‘planning stage’ 
for a VHCC, schedules of tasks are identified by the defence team together with the 
LSC, with various categories of work listed and hours agreed upon in three month 
blocks.484 Hourly pay rates for advocates are listed in the scheme, with those of greater 
seniority being paid increased amounts.485 Advocates are also paid per day or half day in 
court.  
 
In this way, the government has tried to keep spending on complex cases under control, 
however, the VHCC scheme has been greeted by the Bar with dismay. Labelling the pay 
rates as ‘derisory’, the former Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, Peter Lodder 
QC, argued that the actual amount received by barristers after tax and deductions would 
only be around half the £91 per hour given to QCs and £70 given to juniors for 
preparation.486 This, together with other concerns over the operation of the scheme, 
resulted in a boycott by barristers, with few advocates signing the contract.487 At various 
stages, the refusal of barristers to work under the scheme has created severe difficulties 
in finding representation for defendants.488 This pressure has been eased with an interim 
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pay rise being introduced in November 2008489, and negotiations over a new scheme are 
being conducted by a Working Group involving the Bar Council, Law Society, Ministry 
of Justice and Legal Services Commission. The interim scheme also makes it easier for 
non-panel advocates to be instructed if no panel advocates with the requisite experience 
can be found. In December 2008 the LSC published new proposals for VHCC, with the 
aim that they be consulted upon and implemented by July 2009.490 However, no 
agreement has been reached and the interim scheme has been extended for another 12 
months.491  
 
c. Higher Court Advocates  
 
As well as controversy over pay, the once traditionally exclusive domain of the Bar in 
the Crown Court has been opened to solicitors. Under the Courts and Legal Services Act 
1990, solicitors have been able to gain higher rights of audience and conduct the 
prosecution or defence of cases in the Crown Court. While the impact of these 
provisions was initially muted492, the CPS has recently begun to employ both barristers 
and Higher Court Advocates (HCAs) to conduct Crown Court prosecutions in-house on 
a large scale. Ostensibly a cost-saving device, by March 2008 945 in-house advocates 
were employed by the CPS, dealing with 6,083 cases listed for trial in the year 2007-
08.493 The CPS has estimated that it saved £17.1 million in 2007-8 through employing 
in-house advocates instead of using members of the self-employed Bar.494 It is the goal 
of the CPS management to ‘transform the CPS into a service that routinely conducts its 
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own high quality advocacy in all courts, and across the full range of cases’ by 2011495, 
with each CPS area set an ‘HCA generated counsel fee savings target’ to be achieved by 
instructing fewer self-employed barristers and keeping more case work in-house.496 The 
use of in-house advocates directly reduces the amount of prosecution work available to 
the self-employed Bar and the income available to barristers. According to senior 
members of the Bar, the problem has been reportedly exacerbated by the use of in-house 
advocates by defence solicitors who, as well as handling their own cases, improperly 
look to generate higher fees by representing defendants in hearings for which they do 
not have the requisite advocacy experience.497 They argue further that where counsel 
would normally be instructed, solicitors have kept cases in-house until a not guilty plea 
has been entered, leading to poor and disjointed representation. Because advocacy in the 
Crown Court is paid on a fixed fee basis, barristers’ pay is reduced by solicitors 
representing defendants in the PCMH or one-off hearings despite the barrister doing all 
the preparatory work for the case to trial. The argument between the Law Society and 
Bar Council over the quality of HCAs seems to have grown in intensity in recent months 
after the Inns of Court President wrote and then withdrew a letter to resident and 
presiding judges seeking evidence about the quality of work done by HCAs.498 The Bar 
Council has also set up a working group on Higher Court Advocates in order to 
represent their concerns about the quality of advocacy and unfair competition. 
According to a report by the Chairman of the Bar, Desmond Browne QC, the common 
practice of referral fees paid by solicitor-advocates to solicitors’ firms represents unfair 
competition as solicitors use independent advocates to top up their income on cases in 
the Crown Court.499 Under the Code of Conduct, barristers are not allowed to share their 
advocacy fee with solicitors, and would be disbarred for doing so. Solicitor-advocates 
are not subject to a ban on referral fees and can therefore undercut barristers by making 
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themselves more attractive to solicitors’ firms.500 The Bar Council is currently 
considering whether to ask for the PCMH form to be amended so that a defendant is 
informed of his or her right to choose to be represented by a barrister, and whether the 
client care letter from solicitors should be amended so that defendants understand that 
they can be represented by a barrister if they wish.  
 
Although there are no studies which quantify the extent to which barristers have been 
affected by HCAs, the CPS figures, the minutes of Bar Council Meetings, together with 
expression of disquiet in the media501, strongly suggests that members of the criminal 
Bar have faced substantial falls in work load and income, particularly at the junior end. 
 
d. The Crown Court Litigators’ Graduated Fee Scheme 
 
As part of understanding the background to barristers’ incentives, the incentives of their 
instructing solicitors should be mentioned. Because barristers undertake work in the 
Crown Court under the instruction of solicitors, the preference of solicitors for trials or 
guilty pleas as determined by their financial incentives is important. The relationship 
with solicitors is explored in detail in the next chapter, as is the pay scheme under which 
they are currently paid. It is sufficient to say here that under the Litigators’ Graduated 
Fee Scheme, introduced by the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) (Amendment) 
Order 2007, a strong preference for trials has been created.  
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e. Interviewees’ comments 
 
Against this environment of uncertainty over pay and diminishing available case work, 
the responses of the interviewees who participated in this research may be evaluated. 
Interviewees appeared to be extremely frank about how they felt about pay rates and 
most were happy to talk at length about their fees. While all interviewees were negative 
about the future of the Bar, and were generally ‘very seriously concerned about what’s 
happening within the profession’502, there was a noticeable split in the optimism of the 
interviewees about their own future and earning potential. More senior members of bar 
when asked about workload said that they were ‘very, very busy’503, or had ‘fairly 
tightly packed’504 diaries. However, junior members in London seemed extremely 
worried about their workload and current earnings. The assessment of the Carter 
Reforms to the defence graduated fee scheme was generally positive with many 
interviewees remarking that pay rates were now fairer than they used to be, however 
there appeared to be additional worries about the distribution of work and the use of 
Higher Court Advocates (HCAs) in Crown Court cases. Those interviewed were able to 
describe the effect on the junior end of the Bar of the employment and use of in-house 
advocates by the Crown Prosecution Service. E1 and E2, of the same chambers, both 
admitted to problems with money and workload. E2 explained: 
 
 I can’t pay my tax bill this year, and I’ve had some really slim months…Hours 
and hours of work, and then my 70 quid or whatever, of which as we all know 
£15 goes to the rent for here. My clerks take 10% so that’s, that’s 15 plus 7, is 
22, plus my train fare to get there is say 30, so maybe I earned 35, 40 quid for the 
day. And it’s just, that’s poxy.  
 
E1 was equally concerned about the sufficiency of work around: 
 
 I must admit I don’t have a great workload. Not like many senior tenants who are 
snowed under with back to back Crown Court trials by any stretch of the 
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imagination. 
 
These concerns reflected the reduction in available work prosecuting less serious 
offences. I1 explained the effect of Higher Court Advocates on those of 5 years call or 
less: 
  
 I1: Yes. I’ve seen a significant reduction in work. Certainly a significant 
reduction in the lower quality work. They [HCAs] are taking on the stuff that 
would fill in between better trials. And a significant reduction in administrative 
hearings that I would do. For example, if I had a trial going on over a period of 
several days in the past I would often have other mentions and PDHs or PCMHs 
to do as well which would add to the income… 
 
 JB: In the same court? 
 
 I1: In the same court, in the same courtroom. But, now they are covered by the 
in-house advocates and we’re not getting that kind of extra bonus work…it 
particularly affects the most junior people because they are not getting the junior 
trials. What I say is that, say I have a trial that might finish, go for a week and a 
day, I would then often have a three-day trial, a very small trial, to fill in that 
extra gap. There aren’t as many small trials because the CPS are not briefing out 
to counsel on the minor stuff. 
 
 JB: And do you think that is going to affect you personally very much or do you 
think you’ll be able to work round it? 
 
 I1: I think, I hope that I’m just about senior enough to, for it not to cripple me. I 
think if I was much more junior it’s a disaster. 
 
Such fears were not confined to London. N2, a barrister on the Midlands Circuit 
reported a dramatic fall in prosecution work: 
 
 JB: Have you found your prosecution work has gone down recently because of 
the HCAs? 
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 N2: Horrendously. 
 
 JB: Really? 
 
 N2: I intend later today to have a meeting with my head clerk to discuss the fact 
that I haven’t had a trial brief, a PCMH brief from CPS Derby for about four 
weeks now. Bearing in mind that, say before Christmas, before and after 
Christmas of ‘07 I was probably getting one, possibly more, two briefs in a week. 
So I’m worried. 
 
HCAs came in for particularly vehement criticism, particularly those working in the 
CPS. Many more junior barristers commented that low level criminal prosecution work 
was both poorly paid and reduced in volume. Cases were ‘strangled at birth’505 by HCAs 
who settled cases too easily or only ‘farmed out’ prosecutions to counsel once a case had 
passed the PCMH stage. Defence solicitors were also reported to be conducting cases up 
to and including the PCMH, only handing cases over to counsel once the preliminary 
hearings had been completed. Interviewees repeated the same fears as those more widely 
reported by the Bar Council. They were particularly concerned about solicitors being 
paid from their fixed fee for doing preparatory hearings. As N2 regarded such solicitors: 
 
 I think it’s nothing short of a disgrace that the actual fee can just be pinched by a 
solicitor advocate, you know. There are things on the bottom of my shoe that 
have more professional pride, acumen and ability than some of these HCAs 
playing barrister in the Crown Court. 
 
Interviewees at the junior end of the Bar argued that this not only deprived them of 
income but made case preparation very difficult. Furthermore, interviewees commented 
that HCAs did not have the incentives to deal with cases properly as they did not have 
the strong community pressures created by the Bar.506 As salaried lawyers, HCAs could 
afford to make mistakes and not suffer the ignominy of having to face the robing room 
and their head of chambers after making serious errors in the handling of a case. It is 
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impossible for this researcher to make an objective assessment of the quality of the work 
of HCAs and how confused an issue of quality may become with barristers’ fear of loss 
of work, however, as noted above senior members of the Bar and members of the 
judiciary have commented that the quality of HCAs’ work is commonly poor. In some 
cases these comments appear to have been extraordinarily critical and made in open 
court.507  
 
These reports depict a fall in morale at the criminal bar and strongly suggest that 
incomes at the junior end are reduced. There are no accurate figures on the earnings of 
barristers available as samples often include barristers across all ranges of year of call, 
and fail to distinguish those in full time criminal work from those who have mixed 
practices.508 It is against this reported backdrop of rising fees but falling case load at the 
junior end of the Bar that incentives to barristers should be measured. 
 
2. Economics based descriptions of lawyer behaviour 
 
a. Supplier induced demand 
 
The work of lawyers has been the subject of study on both a theoretical and empirical 
basis by economists applying utility theory to lawyer advice and decision-making. The 
amount of literature on lawyers and fees in the United Kingdom has increased 
dramatically over the past 10 years in response to the perceived crisis in legal aid 
funding.509 A number of economists have identified two problems in the relationship 
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between the government, lawyer, and defendant under the thesis of supplier induced 
demand.510 Supplier induced demand describes a multiple agency problem where the 
lawyer acts as agent on behalf of both government (in supplying a legal service which 
they pay for) and the defendant (where the lawyer acts and advises on behalf of the 
defendant). Firstly, if the government pays lawyers ex post facto, the government relies 
on them to determine the level of work done creating a “moral hazard”. Acting as 
rational economic actors, with no stake in cost of the service provided, lawyers can 
continue to inflate their supply of legal services beyond socially desired levels. 
Secondly, a conflict of interest between the defendant and lawyer may be created where 
particular courses of action are in the lawyer’s interest but run counter to that of the 
defendant. This would normally occur where one choice is more financially 
remunerative for the lawyer than another, but not necessarily in the defendant’s interests. 
Because the defendant relies on the lawyer’s expertise for assessment and direction of 
the case there is “asymmetry of information” and they can be persuaded to take 
decisions against their own interest. Some theorists have challenged this view, arguing 
that more recent governmental changes to criminal justice itself has created significant 
demand, and that a focus on supply induced demand disregards other ‘system incentives’ 
to increase the supply of legal services.511 
 
Successive governments have largely chosen to view the supplier induced demand thesis 
as proof that lawyers exploit both the system and their clients for financial gain, ignoring 
the more tempered view of the literature as a whole. Recent reforms of legal aid, such as 
the recommendations made by Lord Carter have concentrated on addressing the first 
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problem of supplier induced demand with respect to government spending, rather than 
the second agency problem in relation to defendants.512 The answer to ever increasing 
legal aid expenditure has been to cap the legal aid budget and introduced fixed fee 
schemes that are a set payment for a particular type of case or work. Rather than relying 
on hours or volumes of work done on a case, lawyers are remunerated the same amount 
regardless of effort expended case-by-case. The argument behind introducing fixed fees 
was that lawyers would lose money on more complicated cases where they were 
required to expend more work, but gain on other, more simple cases where less effort 
was required- the so called “swings and roundabouts” effect.  The effect of the 
introduction of fixed fees has also been the subject of research and is of particular 
interest in studying barrister behaviour. As noted, barristers, through the AGFS are paid 
on an ex ante, fixed fee basis, as are their solicitor clients in the Crown Court. These 
reforms may have successfully brought government spending on legal aid under control, 
however, as discussed below, in focusing on supplier induced demand in provision of 
legal services to the government, reforms may have exacerbated the lawyer/defendant 
agency problem.  
 
b. Supplier induced demand control- fixed fees in practice  
 
All legally aided criminal defence work in England and Wales, and summary courts in 
Scotland is now paid on a fixed fee or standard fee basis.513 The effect of fixed fee 
schemes has been the subject of empirical studies, which have examined the 
lawyer/defendant agency problem.  
 
The introduction of standard fees in 1993 for solicitors work in the magistrates’ court 
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has been researched by Fenn et al.514 Standard fees changed the way in which solicitors 
were paid so that whereas previously solicitors presented an itemised bill for payment 
based on piece rates at the end of the case, the system of standard fees paid a 
prospectively fixed payment for a large part of their work on the case, while retaining 
piece rates for a selection of inputs.515 Fenn et al discovered that solicitors:  
 
…reacted to the withdrawal of a fee for service arrangement on some inputs by, 
on average, reducing the supply of these inputs, whereas for those inputs which 
continued to be reimbursed retrospectively solicitors either did not significantly 
change their supply…or substituted more of the input for others that had been 
reduced…516  
 
In other words, those activities which were covered by the core standard fee were 
reduced by solicitors, whereas non-core ‘inputs’, extra activities remunerated separately, 
were increased. This minimisation of effort on a case under a fixed-payment regime has 
been called the ‘fixed price effect’ and has been supported by the study of the 
introduction of fixed fees for cases in summary proceedings in Scotland by Stephen et 
al.517 Stephen et al discovered a ‘reduced professional input’ into cases by solicitors with 
fewer cases reaching the trial stage.518 They also found a corresponding increase in case 
load by solicitors who took on more legally aided work (the ‘volume effect’). As 
solicitors reduced the amount of work they were putting into cases, they freed time and 
resources to take on more cases.519 In another article, Tata and Stephen explained that 
the theory that solicitors would adjust the amount of work necessary according to the 
difficulty of the case, making money in some and loosing money in others was not 
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occurring in practice. Their close analysis of solicitor behaviour found that:  
 
…the system of fixed payments seems to have led to a reduction in client contact 
and a decline in the overall levels of preparation and case investigation.520 
 
Solicitors were not investing the extra time needed in more complex cases and were in 
fact reducing the level of service covered by the fixed fee and increasing case volume. 
Therefore the quality of representation is likely to be reduced where extra professional 
inputs are required to prepare the case for trial under a fix fee regime. Tata and Stephen 
also found that the point at which the majority of cases concluded shifted to later in the 
process, towards a more profitable point for solicitors under the fix fee scheme. This 
strongly implies not only a change in the timing of advice given to defendants, but also 
the content of the advice. While the number of trials reduced slightly, earlier guilty pleas 
also reduced, with increases in later guilty pleading at a point where solicitors could 
expect much greater payment.521  
 
The clear conclusion from these studies is that following the introduction of fixed fees 
criminal defence lawyers respond in an economically rational manner to changes to their 
financial incentives.522 According to this body of research, the timing and content of 
advice given to a defendant can be dependent on the fee that their lawyer receives. In 
particular, lawyers will attempt to maximise their fees while reducing inputs into 
individual cases if they are not paid specifically for them (as under fixed fee regimes) 
and resolve cases at more financially remunerative stages. Lawyers will only supply 
legal services up to a minimum level in order to satisfy minimum standards. While fixed 
payment schemes:  
 
…substantially reduce the agency problem between the lawyer and the funder, 
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they exacerbate the agency problem between lawyer and accused. By, essentially, 
paying a fixed fee for each case or block of cases there is an incentive for the 
lawyer to reduce effort on individual cases to the minimum necessary to satisfy 
any externally set quality standard.523 
 
These findings therefore have important implications for the advice giving process by 
barristers, and highlight the potentially serious agency problems between the barrister 
and defendant.524 These findings have particular significance for plea bargaining and 
whether a barrister properly advises a defendant of the risks and benefits of particular 
courses of action. Barristers are paid on the basis of fixed fees under the AGFS and 
probably respond to financial incentives in a similar manner to solicitors in both England 
and Wales and Scotland. By drawing an analogy with solicitors it might be predicted 
that barristers too reduce inputs covered by the fix fee and advise defendants to pursue 
courses of action which are more financial lucrative. However, some of those who 
conducted the study of English and Scottish lawyers reject the notion that lawyers make 
decisions that are signally against their clients’ interests. Tata, amongst others, has 
described the concept of ethical indeterminacy as a way of explaining lawyer behaviour 
in relation to financial incentives.   
 
3. Ethical indeterminacy 
  
If then, the financial interest of the lawyer diverges from that of the defendant, is the 
lawyer likely to act in a manner detrimental to that of his client’s interest? If the 
economic analysis of lawyers’ incentives is correct, the conclusion might be that lawyers 
will pursue financial gain at the cost of the defendant’s best interests, if they do not 
coincide in the same course of action. The difficulty with this reasoning lies in the terms 
‘best interests’ and it is the idea of ethical indeterminacy which is now explored. Tata 
has argued persuasively that many decisions made by lawyers in relation to cases, 
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including advice on plea, are not necessarily clear-cut judgements where the client’s best 
interests can be clearly discerned.525 As Tata points out, much of the criticism of 
defending lawyer behaviour: 
  
 …relies on an implicit conception of quality. To evaluate the conduct of defence 
lawyers requires some answer to the question of what else the lawyer could have 
done and ought to have done in order to meet the client's best interests.526  
 
However, the construction of cases is an indeterminate and shifting task. What amounts 
to the defendant’s best interests in a constantly changing set of perspectives relies on the 
lawyer’s legal expertise, understanding of the case, and the time at which the decision is 
to be made. As Tata explains: 
  
…it may be practically impossible to state any definitive advantage or 
disadvantage to pleading guilty at any particular point in the process since such a 
decision is contingent on an almost infinite assortment of variables- variables 
which are themselves elusive and indeterminate…I do not mean to suggest that it 
is impossible in the abstract to arrive  at the `best interests' of clients but, rather, 
that because lawyers are the daily custodians of legal knowledge, practical 
experience, and the keepers and masons of individual case ‘facts’, the search to 
define and fix a pure conception of best interests (and thus ‘need’) which is free 
of and ‘uncontaminated’ by other influences (not least the lawyer) may be 
empirically unrealizable. 
 
This ambiguity of the best interests of the defendant creates ethical indeterminacy in 
choosing between different courses of action, where a lawyer may select one action over 
another because, out of one reason of many, the result will be financially favourable. 
Ethical indeterminacy rejects the idea that ‘dedicated and professional people, such as 
defence solicitors, abandon basic values for simple financial gain.’527 Goriely et al, who 
studied the introduction of public defenders in Scotland suggested that while financial 
incentives create changes in lawyers’ advice, these changes occurred in areas where it 
would be difficult to label one choice of action “best”. Modifications in behaviour: 
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…will be greatest in areas of ‘ethical indeterminacy’: where there is a choice 
between two courses of action, both of which have advantages and disadvantages 
and where ethical practitioners genuinely differ about which is the better. In 
making difficult and evenly balanced judgements, greater weight is placed on the 
advantages that flow from a course of action that is in one's own interests. Less 
weight is placed on those that flow from actions that run contrary to one's 
interests.  
 
Furthermore, one should not expect the relationship between payment and 
behaviour to be simple or direct. Solicitors rely on various forms of social capital 
to be able to practice- most obviously a client base and credibility with the 
courts, [prosecution] service and colleagues. They would be loath to jeopardise 
either clients or credibility. [. . .] One might also expect that the relationship 
between financial incentive and behaviour would be mediated through values.528 
 
Lawyers do not abandon ethical codes and consciously act against the defendant’s 
interest, rather changes in financial incentives create subtle changes in lawyer working 
behaviour, where more finely poised decisions may be decided in favour of both the 
lawyer’s financial interests and a potentially beneficial position for the defendant. 
Financial considerations ‘mesh’ with other considerations when advising a defendant in 
a choice between two decisions with no starkly obvious preference: 
 
 …it can be regarded as a realistic option in many cases, where the accused is 
unsure how to plead, to advise the accused to maintain a plea of not guilty until 
the day of trial…the multiplicity of ways of conceiving of the client's best 
interests allows a plea of guilty at the intermediate diet [stage] to be equally 
`ethical' as a plea on the morning of the day of trial.529  
 
In this example, on the one hand, a defendant may benefit from an early plea and a 
discount to his or sentence. However, the benefits of postponing a plea may include the 
collapse of the prosecution case on the day of trial as witnesses fail to show up at court, 
resulting in a complete acquittal. In the intricacies of a criminal trial, a lawyer may 
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receive information that the prosecution witnesses are highly reluctant to testify. If there 
is financial incentive for the lawyer to prefer a cracked trial, they may favour advising 
postponing the plea to see what the witness do. Furthermore, a delayed plea might 
encourage an offer of a lesser charge from the prosecution as the trial approaches.530 In 
this way, where ambiguity and indeterminacy surrounds the decision, the net effect of 
financial incentives is to turn lawyers’ advice in favour of more remunerative courses of 
action, however, the lawyer’s advice may still constitute a “proper” choice.  
 
More overt forms of manipulation for financial gain are restrained by other drivers, and 
meshed together to form the advice itself. Peter Tague has detailed other incentives that 
may drive a barrister’s approach to advice. Tague identified three areas where a barrister 
might act self-interestedly: reputation (to attract briefs), avoid sanction and maximise 
remuneration.531 Although Tague’s analysis of fees is no longer applicable to defence 
barristers532, his arguments relating to reputation and sanction are still pertinent. These 
incentives come primarily from the instructing solicitor and are dealt with in more detail 
in the next chapter, however, they are discussed briefly here in relation to financial 
incentives. Firstly, in attracting briefs a barrister must build a reputation as a good 
advocate rather than a good negotiator. Tague argues that solicitors want barristers with 
adversarial prowess. A good trial advocate ensures a good result for their client either in 
the courtroom or by convincing a prosecutor to accept a lesser plea who will know that 
the defence barrister will exploit weaknesses in their case at trial.533 Secondly, a barrister 
wishes to avoid sanction. Although theoretically open to sanction by being sued in a 
negligence claim534, or having the conviction overturned in the Court of Appeal (with 
their behaviour explored and criticised), or being sanctioned by the Bar Standards 
Board, barristers in Tague’s research were more concerned about upsetting solicitors 
who might then withhold future briefs.535 Barristers could not behave with impunity, as 
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those observed in Negotiated Justice, as solicitors would suffer damage to their own 
reputation in instructing bullying or manipulative counsel. A barrister who did behave in 
such a manner would soon lose briefs and possibly be embarrassed by a solicitor’s 
complaint to their head of chambers. There are therefore significant incentives for 
barristers not to overtly manipulate defendants into pleading guilty. Indeed one might 
argue that a barrister protects his or her financial interest by responding to the other two 
incentives.  
 
Tague’s analysis relies heavily on the incentives created by the barrister’s reputation 
amongst his or her instructing solicitors. It is argued here however, that a broader view 
of incentives should be taken. As the interviewees disclosed, considerations such as the 
opinion of the judge and colleagues at the local Bar are also important, as well as a 
commitment to professional standards. These are combined with matter of fact reasons 
such as what decision might result in a lower sentence for the defendant, or how the 
defendant might avoid conviction on a higher charge. This chapter will now discuss how 
interviewees viewed the incentives created by fees. As will be seen, they did not believe 
that direct manipulation of cases for fees was generally either possible or desirable. 
 
4. Interviewees’ views on their incentives 
 
a. Fee awareness and clerks 
 
After discussing with interviewees the general climate at the Bar in relation to pay, they 
were asked more direct questions about the incentives that the fees structure provided. 
Perhaps surprisingly, many of those interviewed confessed to not understanding the way 
in which they were paid. Only L2 professed to having somewhat of an expertise in fees, 
recognising that most barristers did not know the ‘ins and outs’ of the AGFS: 
  
 …this can sound like I’m blowing my own trumpet, but I’m actually the 
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exception to the rule. And lots of people approach me because I actually do take 
an interest in [fees] and I’ve liaised with the court taxing officer on various 
things, and I ring him on various things to try and resolve them because I’ve 
taken an interest. Most counsel, I don’t think, have a bloody clue.  
 
Other barristers commented that they were unsure as to how exactly the AGFS worked 
and had a ‘sketchy, confused’536 overview of how fees depend on different case 
outcomes: 
 
JB:…Do you know the difference in fee you would receive in a case that 
resolved at PCMH, one of the thirds, a cracked trial and the trial itself? Do you 
know the difference in the fee you would receive? 
 
 I2: No. PCMH I think it’s a plea fee, is it? 
 
 JB: Under Carter. 
 
 I2: I don’t know what the difference is. You get more for a cracked trial I know 
than a plea, otherwise I don’t know how much more. 
 
This may of course simply reflect the sample of barristers who volunteered to be 
interviewed, however, it may demonstrate a naivety at the Bar about fees and case 
outcomes. Tague observed that from his interview sample many had not bothered to 
analyse the GFS closely enough to work out the financial outcomes of different choices 
over plea.537 A general lack of awareness of how cases were paid would mitigate the 
effect of financial incentives and make other drivers, such as reputation and sanction, 
more important in decision-making. It may also highlight the importance of the 
barrister’s clerk in case outcome.538 Many interviewees described leaving the matter of 
fee to their more knowledgeable clerk who dealt with the distribution of briefs and was 
the primary point of contact for solicitors. Although not explored with the interviewees, 
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the role of the clerk may be relevant to how cases are dealt with. Clerks have previously 
been described as having the power to accelerate or curtail a barrister’s career, and as 
perceiving their ‘governors’ as economic units to be hired out on a profitable basis.539 
Clerks are often paid on a percentage basis from the brief fee and therefore have a direct 
interest in when cases are resolved. It may be that they manipulate the distribution of 
cases within chambers in order to maximise their income, or at least manipulate the 
barristers in chambers in order to satisfy solicitors who brief chambers on a regular 
basis. Clerks in their role as powerful practice managers, are the first point of contact 
with solicitors and court listing officers, and have a greater role in determining when 
cases are resolved than previously accounted for. They are in a position to withhold 
work from those barristers who do not deal with cases in a way that satisfies them or 
instructing solicitors, arrange the diaries of the barristers in chambers, and any barrister 
who fails live up to expectations on a regular basis might find themselves out of briefs. 
Exactly how clerks might manage barristers in relation to fees is not described in detail 
here, however, a greater understanding of fees by clerks, their direct remuneration, plus 
their relatively powerful position within chambers places them in a unique position to 
control barrister behaviour with regard to case outcomes. 
 
b. Constraining factors 
 
Although some barristers acknowledged that different pay rates could inevitably have an 
effect on advice, all of the interviewees highlighted other important considerations that 
made pursuing a purely financially motivated course extremely difficult. The 
interviewees revealed a complex working world where not only pay rates played a role 
in case decision-making. Relationships between them, other counsel, judges, solicitors 
and defendants played a crucial role in how barristers approached their work. N2 gave a 
clear order of those whose respect he had to gain and maintain in developing a good 
Crown Court practice: 
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 Three people if you are to have a good practice, three people that have to respect 
you and like you and regard you as a good operator. Judge, opponents, you 
know, the Bar, your colleagues and the person sat behind you. The importance of 
those three is in this order: the person sat behind you comes first, then your 
opponent, then the judge in that order. You with me? And people who are doing 
things like that to make money, they are going to lose the respect of the person 
behind them so they won’t get any briefs.   
 
According to N2, a barrister motivated solely by case-by-case financial considerations 
would have an extremely short career as briefs ran-out and solicitors no longer instructed 
them, and would not climb the career ladder as they lost the respect of their colleagues 
and judges. This view was supported by K2 who felt that far too many third party 
constraints worked on a barrister and made financially motivated decisions difficult to 
get away with even in the short term. 
 
 K2: I really don’t think that most of the time defendants, barristers are advising 
out of self-interest to the barrister… the other thing to remember about all this is 
that there are a lot of people involved in the case, not only on the defence team. 
You’ve got the solicitor, the client, maybe the client’s family, their friends, and 
then on the prosecution team you’ve got the officer in the case, the CPS lawyer, 
the barrister, you’ve got a victim and of course, you know, they have some but 
not a lot of impact now, but they have to be considered, so no decision is ever 
made by one person alone. And many defendants will say, “I’ll think about what 
you’ve said miss, but I want to go and talk to my missus about it.” There are all 
sorts of checks and balances built in throughout the system. And then ultimately 
there’s the judge. The judge can’t get into the arena, he can’t say to the 
prosecutor you shouldn’t have accepted that plea, I’m not going to allow it, we 
will have a trial on the murder, but he can make his views very well known to 
either side. He can say to the defence “have you considered the strength of the 
case”, etc, etc. So there is the judge too, so there are a lot of people involved 
here…It will be quite hard to manipulate the system…and no barrister wants to 
get a reputation of being in any way dishonest or sharp or self interested. 
 
 JB: A good way to lose work? 
 
 K2: And reputation with the judges and your colleagues. 
 
Previous analysis has perhaps not given proper emphasis to other important actors in 
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what advice is given. Defendants are not isolated from other parties, alone with the 
defence barrister who dictates to them the necessary plea. As discussed in the next 
chapter, solicitors are interested parties in what decision is made540 as are, in some cases, 
the defendant’s family members, and the judge. It should also be remembered that the 
prosecuting counsel also acts according to their own incentives in determining how a 
case might be resolved that may not match with those of the defending barrister. Under 
the current schemes of pay, prosecuting counsel do not have the same financial and 
practical interests in negotiating charge bargains as they may have previously.541 
Prosecuting barristers are paid under a different Graduate Fee Scheme and are instructed 
by the CPS who have different interests from defence solicitors in how cases are 
resolved.542 While a defence barrister might wish to resolve a case with a bargained plea 
to a lesser charge, prosecuting counsel may believe that his or her interests are served by 
running the case to trial in order to maximise their reputation with the CPS or increase 
their own fee. In this sense the defence barrister does not have free rein over when and 
what plea is entered and is restricted by their opposite counsel in making a plea more 
favourable to the defendant.  
 
c. Reduced fixed price and volume effects 
 
Other factors suggest that barristers might not be subject to fixed price or volume effects 
to the same extent as that observed in studies of solicitors. As barristers are paid 
according to a fixed fee one might assume that they increase volumes of work and 
reduce inputs that are not accounted for in the fixed fee. This is, however, not 
necessarily the case with the majority of barristers. To discuss the fixed price effect a 
good example might be that of unused material. Unused material is evidence disclosed 
to the defence that ‘might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for 
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the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused.’543 Barristers 
under the AGFS are not paid for looking at unused material and therefore have no 
financial incentive to read it. However, barristers’ work is placed in a far more public 
setting than the work of solicitors. Barristers must continually attend court and provide 
advocacy in front of a judge and jury. This places a strong incentive on them to prepare 
properly for hearings. As M1 commented on his work: ‘we have to stay up preparing 
cases, you know, sometimes into the early hours of the morning in order to satisfy 
judges, preparing skeleton arguments, doing this that and the other.’ Moreover, 
barristers, as discussed above, probably desire to build a reputation as a good advocate 
amongst their peers and instructing solicitors. A competent prosecutor or solicitor would 
soon realise that a barrister they instructed or were against was not reading the unused 
properly, and he or she would risk losing their respect. It is therefore in a barrister’s 
interests to examine the unused to promote a professional image and build their career.  
 
Furthermore, barristers are not subject to the volume effect to the same extent. Firstly, as 
a self-employed practitioner, with no legally qualified support staff, a barrister cannot 
take on more employees and use economies of scale to increase the profitability of their 
case load. Barristers can only practically take on a limited number of cases and are 
confined by their own personal ability to work. A barrister cannot respond to a fixed fee 
regime by increasing capacity. Solicitors’ firms are not subject to such constraints and 
can expand to increase work load and case turn over as was observed in the Scottish 
studies. Secondly, the volume effect is also limited by the quantities of work available to 
barristers. Although barristers might be able to turn cases over more quickly in response 
to a fixed fee regime, they have a limited source of cases- their instructing solicitors. 
Solicitors can increase their police station presence to increase the number of cases they 
have coming in to their practice and have greater opportunities to source defendants. 
Barristers on the other hand are confined to what their solicitors can provide and cannot 
contact defendants directly.544 The opportunities for them to increase case load in 
response to fixed fees is very restricted. It is therefore argued that the volume effect of a 
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fixed fee regime on barristers is small when compared to their solicitor counterparts. 
 
d. Limited evidence of fee manipulation 
 
Some barristers interviewed believed that a minority of members of the Bar might make 
financial inclined decisions when defendants could be advised to “string the case out” a 
little longer. In that situation, a number of barristers gave examples of fellow counsel 
withholding advice on plea until later on, after PCMH, towards trial when they might 
pick up a cracked trial fee instead of the smaller “plea fee”. L1 described barristers 
withholding advice at PCMH to enhance their fee: 
 
 I think some cases crack later than they should because counsel want a cracked 
trial fee. No question about it, I’m sure that’s right.  
 
Such behaviour was admonished by the interviewees who felt that advising defendants 
to withhold their plea diminished the credit given by the sentencing judge. Any 
expressed belief that other counsel withheld advice was generally based on unconfirmed 
suspicion. Others reported one or two confirmed instances of fee manipulation taking 
place over a number of years in practice. These were very particular, out-of-the-ordinary 
instances where counsel either co-defending or opposite them as defence barrister gave 
oddly late advice, or asked the judge to preserve credit artificially: 
 
 One thing that did strike me as unusual is quite recently where somebody said, 
“can you please preserve my client’s credit? He can’t plead guilty today because 
of various things that need to be considered, but there’s a real likelihood that he 
will be pleading. Please preserve his credit.” But, I think other people read that 
as, “please don’t make my client plead today and get me a smaller cheque, please 
keep his credit preserved, but get me a bit bigger cheque when he does plead.”545 
 
That a defendant was eventually advised to plead to an offence at a later stage was not 
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however a defendant being given the wrong advice; rather the advice was too late in 
order for the barrister to increase his or her fee. This practice was emphasised, if it 
happened at all, as something that was very much a minority practice by a few ‘bad 
apples’ who soon got known for being ‘dodgy operators’.  
 
The majority of London barristers interviewed felt that more overt manipulation of fees 
was something confined to provincial court centres, and was not a feature of London 
courts. The practice profile of some of these barristers gave credence to their views as 
they worked at both London and provincial court centres, and had opportunity to 
compare the behaviour of counsel. H1 believed that Norwich Crown Court, in particular, 
had a justified reputation as a court where cases were routinely manipulated to maximise 
fees. This was not necessarily to defendants’ disadvantage as he believed that the judges 
and list officers were complicit in the practice: 
 
…there was a practice, and judges went along with this, of always pleading not 
guilty at the plea and case management hearing, asking the judge to preserve full 
credit for two  weeks, the judge would tip the wink and say, “yeah”. You’d then 
have the case listed after two weeks to plead guilty. You then get a cracked trial 
rather than plea which is obviously much more, the client has not lost any credit 
because the judge has gone along with it and you’ve got more money out of it. 
Now, I know that slightly changed under Carter, but it still goes on. 
 
H1 stressed that this was a very rare occurrence, but was much more likely to happen at 
a small, provincial court than at one of the London area Crown Court centres.  
 
Among other London barristers interviewed, Nottingham Crown Court seemed to have 
taken on a mythical quality for corrupt barristers and judges manipulating cases for 
unscrupulous ends. Although Nottingham was regularly mentioned as a place where fees 
were manipulated by barristers, few had personal experience of the court itself. An often 
repeated account was that of “double listing” whereby a barrister would receive two 
briefs for trial on the same day, ask to be listed in both cases, but crack one case and run 
the other as a trial, thus increasing their fees. 
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Barristers interviewed at Nottingham Crown Court categorically denied that any such 
practices were possible, and the current research found no evidence to support the 
rumours amongst those interviewees in London. There was also an unsubstantiated 
rumour amongst interviewees from the Midlands Circuit that a previous judge during the 
early 1990s had encouraged an overt practice of placing pressure on defendants to plead. 
That judge had been since removed and changes implemented. When asked in the 
Leicester Crown Court robing room about “double listing”, a group of barristers agreed 
that to do so would be very difficult, and could so potentially backfire as to be 
disastrous. Firstly, they argued that they would be have to involve the list officer’s co-
operation, who would likely place his or her job in jeopardy if either judge discovered 
that they were assisting a barrister to be listed in two trials at the same time. Secondly, 
they argued that if either solicitor found out about the double listing they would 
withhold further briefs. Double listing was therefore neither possible nor desirable. 
 
It is perhaps reasonable to label these accounts of off circuit misbehaviour as mostly 
apocryphal. Those who repeated the stories regarding Nottingham Crown Court did not 
do so on recent personal experience and were vague anecdotes that they had heard from 
a friend, recounting the experience of another third party, in some cases from years ago. 
What seems more likely is that there are regional differences in the way in which cases 
are approached, however, those approaches are not necessarily determined by financial 
considerations. Some of the reasons for differences between the circuits are discussed in 
Chapter 8.   
 
e. Incorporating ethical indeterminacy  
 
The evidence provided by the data potentially supports the notion of ethical 
indeterminacy. As predicted by ethical indeterminacy, barristers, in general, do not 
overtly manipulate defendants over plea for financial gain, but rather mesh fee 
considerations with other incentives. The majority of those interviewed argued that 
 206
manipulating fees in individual cases might ruin a career in the long term. Although such 
barristers did exist, they were a small minority of practitioners who were known 
amongst the local bar and judges for being poor at their jobs and untrustworthy. Any 
barrister who wished to have a long and successful career would find overt manipulation 
of defendants to maximise fees extraordinarily difficult, practically speaking 
(convincing all parties concerned to take a guilty plea as a correct course), and suffer the 
longer term harm that being perceived as “sharp” would do to their reputation. In fact, in 
order to look after their career prospects, barristers felt that they had to appear to be 
utterly scrupulous while at work. This was not because of the ethical code of conduct, 
but rather expectations of their behaviour by others, especially the solicitor, judge and 
other barristers, prevented them from resolving cases to maximise fees.  
 
That is not to say that fees do not play a significant role in what advice is given to the 
defendant. The literature on English and Scottish solicitors provides a compelling reason 
to believe that fees have an important effect on at what point cases are concluded and 
how cases are handled. Many of those interviewed agreed that fees might play some role 
in advice, however, that role could be said to be diminished to those indeterminate 
decisions where the defendant’s “best interests” are not readily discerned. On aggregate, 
these financially favoured decisions are more regularly taken and produce an overall 
effect of preferred courses of action based on fees. It is therefore important to determine 
what decisions are favoured by the current fee scheme. This chapter will now analyse 
the Advocates’ Graduated Fee Scheme to determine what they might be. 
 
5. Modelling barristers’ pay 
 
a. Background  
 
Before creating a model for barrister’s pay, it is necessary to understand the scheme 
under which barristers are paid. Most cases proceeding through the Crown Court are 
subject to government funded legal representation. Under the Access to Justice Act 
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1999, section 14 and schedule 3, a defendant who would ‘be likely to lose his liberty or 
livelihood or suffer serious damage to his reputation’546 is granted representation in the 
courts. For practical purposes that means almost all defendants in the Crown Court are 
provided with legal representation by a barrister or higher court advocate paid for by the 
government as a matter of course.547 If a defendant is provided with legal representation, 
his or her advocate is paid according to the Advocates’ Graduated Fee Scheme (AGFS) 
under the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007.548 The structure of defence 
barristers’ pay was altered by the government in April 2007 following the release of 
Lord Carter of Coles’ review of legal aid procurement549, the following joint 
consultation carried out by the Department of Constitutional Affairs and Legal Services 
Commission550 and subsequent Command Paper presented to Parliament.551 Advocates 
in the Crown Court have been paid according to the Graduate Fee Scheme since 1997; a 
form of ex ante fee payment, the Graduated Fee Scheme paid advocates according to a 
standard basic fee which covered much of the work carried out in conducting the case 
with various additional payments (known as ‘bolt on payments’) made for extra work 
carried out by the advocate. In respect of barrister’s pay for defending cases the Carter 
Review recommended that ‘base payments’, the basic fee paid to barristers for a case, 
should be increased.552 However, the Review also recommended that most of the bolt on 
payments for work such as attending PCMH, conferences with the defendant, interim 
court hearings, etc, should be incorporated into the basic fee.553 The basic fee was to 
incorporate the first two days of trial, and uplift payments were only to be given in 
                                                 
546
 Access to Justice Act 1999, Schedule 3, part 5. 
547
 Means tested legal aid has been introduced to magistrates’ court representation by the Access to Justice 
Act 1999, Schedule 3, para. 3B as amended by the Criminal Defence Act 2006. Defendants with higher 
incomes or capital assets are expected to cover some or all of the costs of their representation. The Legal 
Service Commission and Ministry of Justice are currently consulting as to whether means testing should 
be introduced to the Crown Court: Legal Services Commission and Ministry of Justice, ‘Crown Court 
Means Testing’ Consultation Paper (CP27/08, 2008). 
548
 SI 2007/1174. The AGFS applies to all trials lasting between 1 and 40 days and details the payments to 
be made in respect of cracked trials and where a guilty plea is entered. For longer, more complicated 
cases, the Very High Cost Case scheme discussed above applies. 
549
 The Carter Review (n.508). 
550
 Department of Constitutional Affairs and Legal Services Commission, ‘Legal Aid: a sustainable future’ 
(CP 13/06, 2006) 
551
 Department of Constitutional Affairs and Legal Services Commission ‘Legal Aid: The Way Ahead’ 
(Cm 6993, 2006). 
552
 The Carter Review (n.549) 76-77. 
553
 Ibid. 
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longer trials or where pages of prosecution evidence or witnesses were above stated 
limits.554 These recommendations did not radically alter the way in which barristers were 
paid, but extended the principles of ex ante fees for Crown Court advocacy that had 
already been introduced in the original Graduated Fee Scheme in 1997. In keeping with 
the general ethos of the Carter Review, the purpose of paying advocacy in this way was 
so that the budget for legal aid could be more easily predicted and kept under control. 
The proposed AGFS is set out at Annex 4.5 to the review and is not remarkably different 
from the legislation put forward in the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. 
The increase in basic fees amounts to an average of a 16% pay rise for barristers 
instructed to defend555, but depends on when cases are concluded. Compared with the 
previous GFS, there is a reduced difference between the fee for a cracked trial and a 
trial. Notably, other than a brief point that ‘payment is front-loaded to reward early 
preparation and resolution of cases’, no precise explanation is given in the Carter 
Review, the Consultation Paper or Command Paper for why cases are to be remunerated 
at certain rates nor why the gap between fees for cracked trials in the final stages and 
trials has been closed.556 
 
b. The current AGFS 
 
i. Trial fees 
 
The basic principle behind graduated fees is that the advocate receives a fixed, ex ante 
fee which does not vary according to the amount of hours or work done by the advocate 
in preparing the case. Under the AGFS, cases are categorised according to offence type, 
A to J.557 Offences of a similar type and seriousness are placed together in order to 
reflect the comparable work load, difficulty and experience required to conduct the case. 
                                                 
554
 Some ancillary payments remain. 
555
 General Council of the Bar (n.474). 
556
 Peter Tague also notes this missing explanation from the government’s reports: Tague (n.530) footnote 
57. 
557
 Schedule 1, part 6, Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. Class K offences are now listed 
under class F and G. 
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For example Class A is entitled ‘Homicide and other grave offences’ and includes 
murder, manslaughter and infanticide.558 Barristers instructed in any particular case 
receive a basic fee with extra payments (uplifts) for extra days spent in trial beyond the 
second day, pages of evidence exceeding fifty pages, and each prosecution witness 
exceeding the first ten.  
 
The calculation of fee for each case is done according to a simple formula: 
 
G = B + (d x D) + (e x E) + (w x W) 
 
“G” is the amount of the graduated fee. “B” is the basic fee specified. “d” is the number 
of days or parts of a day on which the advocate attends at court by which the trial 
exceeds 2 days but does not exceed 40 days. “D” is the fee payable in respect of daily 
attendance at court for the number of days by which the trial exceeds two days but does 
not exceed 40 days. “e” is the number of pages of prosecution evidence excluding the 
first 50, up to a maximum of 10,000. “E” is the evidence uplift appropriate to the 
offence. “w” is the number of prosecution witnesses excluding the first ten. “W” is the 
witness uplift appropriate to the offence. The basic fee and each of the uplifts are 
specified according to the category of offence and category of trial advocate (Queen’s 
Counsel receive more than junior barristers). An example of the calculation in practice 
may assist understanding how fees are calculated. According to the tables under 
Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007, Part 2, section 5, a burglary is a class 
E offence, with a basic fee for a junior alone of £755. The advocate receives an uplift of 
£377 for each day of attendance over 2 days; an evidence uplift of £1.13 per page over 
fifty pages; and a witness uplift of £5.66 per prosecution witness over ten witnesses. 
Therefore the fee given to a barrister in a 2 day domestic burglary (Class E) trial with 70 
pages of prosecution evidence and 4 witnesses would be calculated as follows: 
 
                                                 
558
 Ibid. 
 210
£755 + (0 x £377) + (20 x £1.13) + (0 x £5.66) = £777.60. 
 
The barrister in this case receives a basic fee, an uplift of £22.60 for the extra 20 pages 
of evidence, but no extra payments for days in court or witness as the numbers in this 
case do not exceed the stated limits. The barrister under the AGFS receives no extra 
payments because he or she attends the plea and case management hearing, or had a pre-
trial conference with the defendant. All these fees are included in the basic fee.  
 
ii. Cracked trial and guilty plea fees 
 
The AGFS also deals with cases that conclude before a trial.559 Commonly, these cases 
are where the defendant either pleads guilty at the plea and case management hearing 
(PCMH) or because the case becomes a cracked trial.560 As with the fee structure for 
trials, a barrister representing a defendant who pleads guilty at PCMH or in a case that 
later cracks receives a basic fee according to the category of offence. This basic fee is 
increased by the pages of prosecution evidence in an uplift payment. Furthermore, the 
AGFS splits the time between the date where the trial date is set and the date for trial 
into thirds (called first third, second third and third third). If a defendant pleads guilty at 
PCMH, a barrister’s basic fee and evidence uplift remains the same as a case that later 
cracks within the first third before trial. However, as the case enters the second third and 
the third third before trial the basic fee and evidence uplift is increased. Other than a 
difference in evidence uplift for prosecution evidence over 1,000 pages, there is no 
difference in the fee received between second third and third third.561  
                                                 
559
 Schedule 1, part 3, Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. 
560
 A cracked trial is defined under Schedule 1, part 1 of the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 
2007 as a case that has been listed for trial (normally at a plea and case management hearing), but the case 
does not proceed to trial either because of the entry of a guilty plea by the defendant or the prosecution 
offers no evidence in the case. 
561
 The evidence uplift is capped at 10,000 pages. Uplifts for all categories of offences are higher for the 
first 250 pages. This is reduced to about a quarter for 250-1,000 pages and then increased again for the 
next 1001-10,000 pages. In the second third this is about a 30% of the fee paid per page of the first 250 
pages. In the third third the uplift for pages 1,001 to 10,000 is the same as the first 250 pages. There seems 
little reason why these payments are structured this way. 
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Another example will serve as a helpful illustration. Using the same domestic burglary 
case as before, a barrister representing a defendant who pleads guilty at the PCMH 
receives £472 basic fee, plus £0.41 per page of prosecution evidence.562 The barrister 
would therefore receive £500.70 for a guilty plea entered at that stage (basic fee of £472 
plus £28.70 evidence uplift). If this case had a trial date set at PCMH 90 days hence, the 
case would enter the second third at 30 days, and the third third at 60 days. If the case 
were to crack at 35 days the barrister would receive a basic fee of £660, plus an uplift of 
£1.75 per page of prosecution evidence, or £782.50 (£660 plus £122.50 evidence 
uplift).563 This amount would not change after 60 days as extra third third payments only 
affect cases with over 1,000 pages of prosecution evidence. It is worth noting that in a 
domestic burglary with a two day trial and the same number of witnesses and pages of 
prosecution evidence, the barrister would be paid more for a cracked trial than for 
conducting the defence at a trial itself. As will be shown, the Carter reforms to GFS have 
created greater incentives for the late cracking of cases.  
 
iii. Assessment of the pay structure under AGFS 
 
The structure of the AGFS under Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007 is 
highly inconsistent in rewarding effort and incentivising outcomes. Firstly, the cracked 
trial second or third third basic fee is not uniformly proportionate to that of the trial fee. 
For example, for Class C offences, entitled ‘Lesser offences involving violence or 
damage, and less serious drugs offences’, junior barristers are paid a basic fee for a 
cracked trial which is 73% of that of the trial fee 564  whereas for a Class E offence, 
“Burglary, etc”, junior barristers are paid a basic fee for a cracked trial which is 87% of 
that of the cracked trial fee.565 This might be understandable if more intense preparation 
were required for certain types of cases (entailing greater compensation for the 
                                                 
562
 Schedule 1, part 3, table A, Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. 
563
 Ibid. 
564
 £755 instead of £1,038. 
565
 £660 instead of £755. 
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barrister’s efforts), however the basic cracked trial fee in fraud cases of over £100,000 
are remunerated at 85% of the trial fee.566 Fraud cases are notoriously difficult to defend 
because of the complexity of the financial dealings that such cases involve. Equally, 
cracked homicide trials are paid at 78% of the trial rate.567 As with fraud, defending a 
murder case requires a massive amount pre-trial of preparation that might be reasonably 
compensated as a proportion of the trial fee. There seems little reason why cracked 
burglary trials are compensated proportionately better than either fraud or murder. 
 
Secondly, no reason is given in the Review for why the uplifts for evidence in cracked 
trials are treated differently according to case type, whereas in trials all evidence is paid 
the same. If the differentials in cracked cases are paid because different levels of 
experience and effort are required for the various categories of cases, then a similar 
distinction should be made at trial. That they are not creates a problem for how case 
outcomes are incentivised leading to situations where a cracked trial fee can be higher 
than the trial fee.  
 
Thirdly, the Carter Review fails to account for why the uplift for pages of evidence in 
trials does not begin until the 51st page, whereas in cracked trials all pages of evidence 
are paid. The result, described below in detail, creates some situations where a second or 
final third crack pays better than the trial. This is objectionable on two grounds. Firstly, 
a trial inevitable involves more work for the advocate, therefore on a principled basis 
they should receive a greater fee. Secondly, such a pay scheme creates perverse 
incentives for the barrister who will favour a late cracked trial rather than a trial. This 
both endangers defendants who should be advised that a trial is in their interest, and 
prefers a result that the government should wish to avoid: the late cracking of cases. Late 
resolution of cases before trial is continually blamed as an expense that the courts and 
the tax-payer can ill-afford.568 Although government policy papers have blamed lack of 
                                                 
566
 Class K. £1,887 instead of £1,604 
567
 Class A. £1,981 instead of £2,547 
568
 The Audit Commission in 2002 estimated that £80 million were wasted each year through 
adjournments, delayed and cracked trials in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court: Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General, ‘Justice for All’ (Cm 5563, 2002) 51. 
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preparation as the cause of ineffective trials569, cracked trials accounted for 41.6% of 
cases listed for trial in 2007.570 Of all cracked trials, 80.3% cracked due to a defence 
related decision.571 The severity of this problem is made worse by the fact that for some 
categories of case the uplift for all pages of evidence in cracked trials is paid at a higher 
rate than the £1.13 paid to junior barristers for all pages of evidence for all categories of 
offence. The issue of prosecution page uplifts can be best explored through the lens of 
the financially motivated barrister. 
 
c. The (busy) barrister motivated exclusively by money 
 
In the model used here, our defence barrister is presumed to be motivated entirely by 
money and advises his clients according to that interest. This barrister cares nothing for 
his reputation amongst members of his chambers, judges, solicitors or defendants, nor 
does he fear sanction through a complaint to the Bar Standards Board. His aim is solely 
to extract the highest possible financial gain out of the cases in which he is instructed. 
This barrister is also adept at manipulating defendants into doing exactly as he wishes, 
convincing them to change plea whenever he advises it. In this model all defendants take 
his advice and follow it.  
 
To begin with, the basic example of Category E offences can be studied and the 
outcomes of different ways of dealing with cases can be modelled.572 Category E 
offences are paid the least out of any of the 11 categories of offences573 and covers all 
types of burglary under section 9 of the Theft Act 1968, as well as the offence of going 
equipped contrary to section 25 of the same Act. Defendants charged with this type of 
offence are typically represented by more junior members of the Bar in the first five to 
                                                 
569
 Ibid. 
570
 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2007’ (Cm 7467, 2008) Table 6.13.  
571
 Ibid. Table 6.11. A defence related decision is either the defendant enters a late guilty plea or the 
defendant pleads guilty to an alternative accepted by the prosecution. 
572
 Although the lowest paid, other categories of offences are similarly relatively remunerated as between 
trials and cracked trial fees. 
573
 Schedule 2, part 2, section 5, and part 3, table A Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007. 
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ten years of their careers. In this model, our barrister is instructed in a two day burglary 
trial to begin on Monday of the coming week. On Sunday evening the financial 
motivated barrister considers his options as how best to resolve the case. He will know 
from the tables in the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007 on cracked trials 
and trial fees that the basic fee for a Category E offence is £660 and £755 respectively; a 
difference of £95. If it is initially assumed that there is no evidence in the case and no 
witnesses, and that the barrister values £95 more than a free day574 then the trial is 
marginally favoured by the barrister. If however, the evidence uplift is introduced, the 
incentives quickly change. As no uplift is given for the first 50 pages of evidence at trial, 
the fee for trial remains the same (£755) until 51 pages of prosecution evidence. 
However, the first 250 pages under the cracked trial fee tables are remunerated at £1.75 
per page. Therefore, the cracked trial fee quickly increases with evidence, while the trial 
fee remains the same. After 50 pages the trial fee does begin to increase because of the 
evidence uplift, but only at £1.13 a page. This is somewhat lower than the payment 
given for the cracked trial evidence uplift, and the trial fee is overtaken by the cracked 
trial fee at 63 pages of evidence.575 Between 63 pages of evidence and 625 pages of 
evidence it is more financially rewarding for the barrister to crack the trial and go home 
on the Monday. The greatest difference is at 250 pages of evidence, where the barrister 
receives £116.50 more for a cracked trial than for a trial.576 In the model, witnesses are 
not particularly important. The barrister will only receive an extra £5.66 for every extra 
witness after the first 10 and, given the nature and complexity of Category E cases of 
between 1 and 625 pages of evidence, it is unlikely that the witness uplift will be 
regularly used. It is therefore plainly in the barrister’s financial interest to crack cases 
within this range. Above 625 pages of evidence, a trial is favoured by the barrister, and 
the defendant will be encouraged to maintain a not guilty plea.577 Figure 6-1 shows the 
fee that can be earned at different page counts between a cracked trial in the final third 
                                                 
574
 Even if the case cracks, the barrister will need to attend Monday at court dealing with the guilty plea. 
575
 Trial fee of £769.69 (basic fee of £755, plus evidence uplift of £14.69) versus a cracked trial fee of 
£770.25 (basic fee of £660 plus £110.25 evidence uplift), a difference of £0.56. 
576
 The difference in fee begins to reduce after 250 pages because the evidence uplift for cracked trials is 
reduced from £1.75 per page to £0.82. 
577
 The evidence uplifts above 1,000 pages remain £1.13 a page for a trial and £0.82 for a crack trial in the 
third third: Category E Offences, Schedule 1, part 2, section 5, and part 3, table A, Criminal Defence 
Service (Funding) Order 2007. The incentive towards trial therefore increases as evidence pages increase, 
augmented by inevitable day uplifts and witness uplifts as the evidence grows. 
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and a two day trial. 
 
Figure 6-1 Fee for 1-2 day trials and cracked trial fee (category E offence) 
 
 
This presumes of course that the barrister’s alternative to a trial is to crack the trial and 
then not do any work the next day. In fact our barrister may know that his chambers is a 
busy set, and that briefs are regularly returned late in the day as counsel instructed are 
unable to complete all of the cases they are instructed in. Our defence barrister then 
considers cracking the case on Monday, in easy expectation of a returned brief coming 
into his pigeon hole on Tuesday, Wednesday, or perhaps everyday of the rest of the 
week. Two possibilities present themselves for our barrister to consider. Firstly, what 
would his financial reward be for cracking two cases; the one at hand and the one he 
may fairly rely upon? Secondly, what would his financial reward be for cracking the 
immediate case and then running the next brief as a trial?  
 
If the financial benefit of cracking two cases is compared with that of a trial, the barrister 
is given a stark choice in preference of cracking both cases. Continuing with the 
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example of Category E offences, because the difference between a cracked trial and a 
trial itself is never particularly large, two cracked trials are usually significantly more 
lucrative than one trial alone. The trial uplifts do little to reduce the incentive of 
choosing two cracked trials of the same class rather than a trial, indeed, two cracked 
trials always result in a higher income for barristers than two or three day trials under the 
AGFS.578 Because the evidence uplift for cracked trials is now double i.e. £3.50 per page 
(rather than £1.75) for the first 250 pages, and £1.64 for every other page thereafter, the 
trial evidence uplift rate of £1.13 is always outmatched, and the fee for trial will never 
meet or exceed the fee for two cracked trials. In combination with the difference in basic 
fee, the evidence uplift in cracked trials makes even four or five day trials unattractive if 
a similar case can be cracked in the same time period. Four day trials only yield greater 
financial reward when the evidence page count remains below 56 pages (an unlikely 
scenario).579 Five day trials are also more attractive at lower levels of prosecution 
evidence, but still at only relatively low levels of evidence with two cracked trials 
becoming more lucrative after 214 pages of prosecution evidence per case. Figure 6-2 
shows the projected fees for two cracked trials against the fees for one to two, three, four 
and five day trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
578
 The fee for a two day trial equals £755. The fee for a three day trial equals £1,132 (£755 basic fee plus 
£377 uplift). The fee for two cracked trials equals £1,320 (£660 basic fee x 2). 
579
 This is an average number of pages between the two cracked cases. Therefore the four day trial may 
have a higher number of pages than the second “returned brief” case. Provided that the average page count 
between the two cases is above 56, the barrister earns more money by cracking both cases. 
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Figure 6-2 Fees for 1-2, 3, 4, and 5 day trials and two cracked trials (category E offence) 
 
A trial becomes an increasingly unfavourable choice as time continues because the 
barrister can pick up several cracked trials, rather than just two. Two simple cracked 
trials of an average of 30 pages of prosecution evidence each earn the barrister 
£1,425.580 Together with the cracked trial fee for the five day trial of say, £1,010581, the 
barrister stands to earn £2,435. When compared to the five day trial fee of £2,055582 
there is a clear preference for the cracked trials. It should be remember that a barrister 
must take time out of his or her schedule to prepare a five day trial and the time 
available for picking up other trials is greater than the court time alone. 
 
The benefits of cracking the immediate case and running the other as a trial are even 
more financially lucrative for short trials. A barrister is always better to crack a one day 
trial if he can pick up another one to two day trial the following day. At a minimum he 
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 A basic fee of £660 + £52.50 (30 pages of evidence x £1.75) x 2. 
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 This is a cracked trial fee for a case with 200 pages of prosecution evidence: A basic fee of £660 + 
£350 (200 x £1.75). 
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 A basic fee of £755 + £1,131(day uplift of £377 x 3) + £169.50 (200 pages of evidence x £1.13). 
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will earn £1416.75583 compared to £755.584 A three day trial would always be cracked, if 
a one to two day trial were available,585 as would a four day trial if the page count 
exceeded 61 pages or remained below 632 pages. A five day trial would never be 
cracked in preference of running a one to two day trial. Figure 6-3 shows the projected 
fees for one to two, three, four and five day trials as against the fee for cracking the same 
trials and running a one to two day trial with less than 50 pages of prosecution evidence. 
 
Figure 6-3 Fees for 1-2, 3, 4, 5 day trials and the same cases as cracked trials plus a 2 day trial 
(category E offence)  
 
Many of these calculations presume that the barrister is busy and can pick up cases quite 
easily. However, even if the barrister has a quiet practice, he will prefer his clerks to take 
on two clashing cases offered by instructing solicitors, confident that he can convince 
one of the defendants to plead guilty. This will be particularly tempting if the barrister 
knows the case against one of the defendants is overwhelming, but realises he can wait 
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 Basic cracked trial fee of £660 + £1.75 (1 page of prosecution evidence) + £755 basic fee for 1-2 day 
trial. 
584
 This presumes that the first trial would last longer than one day. If the trial takes one day only, running 
both cases as a trial is more rewarding. 
585
 The barrister would earn at least £1,416.75, as compared to £1,132 (£755 basic fee plus £377 day 
uplift). Once evidence is factored in the cracked trial rate climbs at a higher rate owing to the greater 
evidence uplift. 
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until nearer the trial to express these problems and convince the defendant to plead 
guilty.  
 
d.  Applying the model to barristers in practice 
 
Picking up more than two trials in a week might not be an extraordinary situation for 
some barristers, but some junior members, such as E1, E2, and I1 interviewed in 
London, described their work flows as limited and that they did not have the numbers of 
cases necessary to crack cases on the expectation of “something turning up”.586 
According to the model of the AGFS presented here, cracking cases would make no 
sense from a financial point-of-view and one might expect their practice to be dominated 
by trials. However, the model does suggest that barristers in popular chambers with 
many cases have a strong incentive to crack longer trials and fill in the time made 
available with 1-2 day trials or other cracked trials. There is no research to suggest what 
occurs in practice, but this analysis proposes that the AGFS has made work load more 
important in the financial incentives given to barristers than under previous schemes. 
Under Tague’s model of the older Graduate Fee Scheme, trials were generally more 
lucrative to barristers, even when there were sufficient briefs available for a barrister to 
crack.587 By making cracked trial fees significantly better paid, the Carter Reforms have 
strongly incentivised late cracking of trials in chambers when there are “spare” briefs 
available. This may eventually manifest itself as a regional difference. As will be seen in 
Chapter 8, there appears to be greater competition in London and the South East 
compared with the Midlands for criminal work amongst members of the Bar.588 The 
current research suggests that the AGFS may exacerbate the regional difference in 
cracked trial rates, by encouraging those in areas with more work to crack cases closer to 
trial, and in areas where work is reduced to promote trials.  
 
                                                 
586
 There is some limited evidence that barristers’ clerks hold on to cases to insure against one of their 
members having a case that cracks, but this is currently unsubstantiated as a clear description of current 
practices: P. Rock, The Social World of an English Crown Court (Clarendon, London 1993) 272. 
587
 Tague (n.530) 12-17. 
588
 Chapter 8:2.b.i. 
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That is not to argue that barristers overtly manipulate cases for fees, rather, applying 
ethical indeterminacy, a barrister is more likely to delay the advice on a plea of guilty 
where a high crack fee is available. As previously noted, there may be good reasons for 
delaying advice, such as a possibility that a witness might not turn up, because the 
prosecution might drop charges, or because the prosecution evidence is slightly weaker 
than it might be. The financial incentive acts to increase the likelihood that these courses 
with indeterminate benefits are taken more regularly with the consequent outcome that 
cracked trials become more common place.      
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The government reforms that have sought to bring legal aid spending under control may 
have been successful in combating the problem of supplier-induced demand, but they 
have ignored the agency problem created between barrister and defendant. While fixed 
fee schemes do allow governments to cap legal aid budgets, there is sufficient empirical 
evidence to suggest that lawyers reduce inputs on cases, increase the volume of cases, 
and resolve cases at more financially lucrative points, changing the content and timing 
of advice. The decision by individual lawyers to respond to financial incentives is not, 
however, necessarily an attempt to overtly manipulate defendants. According to a model 
of ethical indeterminacy lawyers respond to financial incentives in the context of other 
rewards and incentives. The choice between two decisions is often not immediately a 
choice of one best course over the other, and many decisions are indeterminate in their 
benefits to the defendant. Financial incentives are also meshed with other drivers that 
affect lawyer behaviour. The claim that lawyers respond to these incentives by 
manipulating defendants in the short term in order to increase fees ignores longer term 
drivers that act on lawyer decision-making. The current research has tried to establish 
the extent to which this may occur in the practice of criminal barristers. From the 
interview data it can be concluded that barristers themselves do not believe that wide 
scale manipulation for fees is taking place. The observations of their own practice can be 
supported by an analysis of other drivers that act upon their behaviour. Barristers are 
constrained and ignore the benefits of short term manipulation by responding to a range 
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of incentives including the demands of instructing solicitors, their colleagues and judges. 
Although some barristers may advise defendants in order to maximise fees in the short 
term, they are soon labelled as untrustworthy by the rest of the community. From the 
interview data it is clear that barristers themselves recognise that there are long term 
costs in such a strategy. 
 
To the extent that barristers are affected by financial incentives and take indeterminate 
decisions that are more financially lucrative, the current system of pay favours the late 
cracking of cases listed for trial, if there is sufficient work available. As the model of the 
AGFS has shown, cracking cases when there are other cases to be taken tends to 
generate higher fees. In areas where barristers have high case turnovers there may be an 
increase in cracked trials in response. Where case loads are reduced, however, the 
current climate of competition from Higher Court Advocates for work suggests that 
prosecution and defence barristers will seek more trials to maximise their dwindling 
fees, particularly at the junior end. Despite a pay rise for individual cases, the interview 
data details that junior barristers are facing a decline in criminal case work loads. 
However, further research would be required to quantify the exact level of reduction and 
the ways in which barristers’ working behaviour changes in response to this drop.   
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Chapter 7: The relationship with solicitors 
 
In any criminal case before the Crown Court in England and Wales a self-employed 
barrister may not be directly instructed by a defendant to act as an advocate on his or her 
behalf.589 Accordingly a barrister must receive instructions from a solicitor (the 
professional client) before undertaking the defendant’s case. Self-employed barristers in 
the Crown Court are therefore completely reliant on their relationships with solicitors to 
maintain their workload. In developing a thesis on the drivers behind barristers’ advice 
on plea in the Crown Court this crucial professional relationship must be explored. In 
doing so this research has examined several sources, including the interview data and the 
scheme under which solicitors are paid. The current literature on the relationship 
between solicitors and barristers will also be discussed. As will be seen, the literature 
raises several important research questions that this chapter attempts to answer through 
data collected from interviews with both barristers and solicitors. The data collected 
from interviews will be presented here as a partial explanation of how the 
barrister/solicitor relationship affects the advice given on plea. The complexity of the 
relationship described will be enhanced by a discussion of the incentives of defence 
solicitors, particularly in respect of financial incentives given to solicitors as well as 
reputation and sanction.  
 
1. Current conceptions of the solicitor-barrister relationship 
 
In McConville and Baldwin’s account in Negotiated Justice, barristers repeatedly 
behaved with a disregard for the views of the defendant.590 These barristers acted in this 
manner with apparent impunity; the barristers observed were repeatedly instructed by 
the same solicitors despite acting in a manner that defendants found distressing and 
objectionable. McConville and Baldwin did not investigate in Negotiated Justice why 
solicitors may have been content to allow barristers to treat defendants in this way.  
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 ‘Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales’ (8th edn, Bar Standards Board  2004) Rule 401(a). 
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 J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice (Martin Robertson, London 1977) 46. 
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However, McConville et al argued that solicitors in England and Wales had developed a 
culture where guilty pleas are the norm and that defendants’ guilt is presumed.591 The 
inference seems to be that solicitors are unconcerned by what happens to their clients 
once the case has been briefed to a barrister.  
 
If this description of solicitors was accurate, the tendency for barristers to manipulate 
defendants into pleading guilty is consistent with a general defence ethos of extracting 
guilty pleas in almost all circumstances. According to this view, barristers might be 
expected to convince a defendant to plead guilty as part of the process by which criminal 
defendants are managed. While this is logically consistent, there are several difficulties 
according to the present research with the guilty plea culture theory. Firstly, as already 
explained in Chapter 4, many barristers themselves do not believe that they, or their 
colleagues, manipulate defendants to plead guilty. Although some barristers agreed that 
it was their job to persuade defendants to plead in a particular way, this was generally 
out of a paternalistic concern that defendants make a choice that would result in a lower 
sentence. These barristers did not see themselves as operating within a pervasive guilty 
plea culture, rather they were reacting to the evidence and circumstances of particular 
cases. The majority of barristers interviewed felt that it was not part of their job to 
convince a defendant to plead one way or the other but rather to inform them as to their 
options and the implications of their choices. If a guilty plea culture was dominant 
amongst defence solicitors, barristers who advised in a facilitative style or, conceivably, 
a persuasive style, would be expected to clash with their instructing solicitors’ 
expectations. In the interview data there was little evidence to suggest that such 
disagreements occur regularly.  
 
A barrister who might wish to manipulate a defendant as early in the process as is 
alleged, confounding a defendant’s expectations of what plea is to be entered 
immediately prior to PCMH or the trial itself592, requires a high degree of collusion with 
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the solicitor in order to do so. A barrister who wanted a defendant to change their plea at 
short notice must be confident that the solicitor in the case would be content with such 
an abrupt volte-face by the defendant. While it is accepted that if a guilty plea culture 
predominates Crown Court litigation such behaviour might be accepted, this ignores 
other important incentives for the solicitor, such as building a reputation in the 
community amongst potential defendant clients. Defendants are free to choose who 
represents them as their solicitor which creates market conditions and competition 
between solicitor firms. It is suggested that guilty plea culture fails to properly describe 
the complexity of decision-making, and in fact, the solicitor-barrister relationship places 
large barriers in the way of either barrister or solicitor manipulating a defendant for 
unscrupulous ends.  
 
Furthermore, the guilty plea culture model does not take into account the financial 
incentives given to solicitors. If solicitors are as susceptible to altering their handling of 
cases because of the litigation fee structure (as studies have suggested in the magistrates’ 
court593), then fees might be expected to be extremely important in informing how they 
approach their relationship with barristers in the Crown Court. As will be shown, 
solicitors may strongly prefer trials to guilty pleas or cracked trials because of the fee 
structure. Solicitors whose approach to cases was determined by a guilty plea culture 
would be inconsistent with the fee incentives provided.    
 
2. Subsequent incentives 
 
The description of solicitors in McConville et al in Standing Accused and that of 
barristers in Negotiated Justice depicts solicitors as highly passive actors in the solicitor-
defendant-barrister relationship. As noted by Peter Tague, those barristers observed in 
Negotiated Justice appear to behave with striking disregard as to the possible loss of 
work when irritated solicitors withheld future briefs due to the mistreatment of their 
                                                 
593
 P. Fenn, A. Gray and N. Rickman, ‘Standard fees for legal aid: an empirical analysis of incentives and 
contracts’ (2007) 59 Oxford Economic Papers 662. 
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clients.594 The methods employed by barristers in Standing Accused also suggested that 
barristers were unconcerned by solicitors who might question sudden changes in plea 
and failures to develop cases beyond PCMH. Taken together, Negotiated Justice and 
Standing Accused create the impression of uninvolved solicitors, who defer to counsel’s 
judgment in determining the course of Crown Court cases. As McConville et al say of 
the disinterested role of the solicitor in the Crown Court: 
 
 The absence of solicitors from case conferences with counsel and from pre-trial 
discussions between counsel and defendants, where many crucial decisions are 
taken, leaves barristers with a free hand in deciding how cases should be dealt 
with and what pleas should be entered.595 
 
Solicitors are described as disengaged from the running of cases, delegating work to 
unqualified, inexperienced staff, who have little ability to uphold the rights of the 
defendant.596 However, the incentives and context within which solicitors work, 
particularly in the form of fees, have changed radically since the Standing Accused 
study. These changes should have reinvigorated solicitor interest in Crown Court case 
outcomes. 
 
The present research has not investigated the practices of defence solicitors beyond their 
relationship with barristers, nor is it intended that this chapter offer a detailed discussion 
of the practice of defence solicitors in England and Wales, however, some conclusions 
can be drawn on the basis of the interviews and an analysis of solicitors’ incentives. 
 
Following Tague’s reasoning that barristers wish to be known as good advocates (rather 
than as bullies or good negotiators) in order to attract briefs from solicitors, solicitors too 
wish to be known for instructing counsel who provide good advocacy. To an extent, 
unquantified by this research, solicitors should be subject to market pressures that 
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include a reputation for properly explaining issues and not making the defendant feel 
pressured into decisions, together with access to advocates who provide the same. 
Defendants have been found to be mostly unable to assess the quality of the substantive 
advice given to them by their lawyers, however, defendants can assess matters relating 
to how lawyers deal with them and guide them through the criminal justice process.597 
Although defendants in the English speaking world have been found to be highly passive 
in decision-making in their own cases, further studies have revealed that clients are able 
to make assessments about their lawyers using criteria such as support, honesty, and 
communication. Goriely et al found in Scotland that defendants accepted that they were 
not in a position to assess the quality of the legal advice they had received or the 
command of the law demonstrated by their solicitor, but did feel able to assess their 
lawyer in relation to client process issues.598 Defendants assessed solicitors on the basis 
of ‘listening to them; believing them; being able to explain the process; being accessible; 
“standing up for” them, etc.’599 Given that defendants can and do make assessments of 
their lawyers, it is perhaps correct to assume that solicitors have a reputation among 
defendants for the quality of client care on the basis of these factors, which includes 
their selection of counsel who must also exhibit these characteristics. Solicitors who do 
not provide counsel who also display these favourable, client assessed characteristics are 
likely to have a poor reputation and lose business as a result.  
 
Solicitors therefore have a strong incentive not to brief barristers who behave as those 
observed in Negotiated Justice or Standing Accused. Although the “manipulation” of the 
defendant appeared to be far more subtle in Standing Accused than Negotiated Justice, 
barristers were described as inaccessible and dismissive of defendants, while embracing 
the prosecution account of the case.600 However, this interpretation ignores the incentive 
to barristers not to act in a manner which would upset the client and therefore the 
solicitor. As Tague points out, a barrister who acts as those described by McConville et 
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al should lose future briefs from the solicitor and potentially damage his or her career.601 
The interview evidence supported this contention. S2, a senior partner of a large 
Midlands firm explained, building a reputation for fighting cases and instructing counsel 
who would do so was important: 
 
JB: Are these barristers [those with a reputation for poor advocacy or cracking 
cases easily] those who you would instruct? 
 
S2: No, because as we’ve said…we want a reputation for being able to hang 
tough on things and defend things to the max…to the max where necessary, but 
even where it’s not necessary, as well as they need to be defended. You want to 
have that reputation rather than being thought as part of that shite system.     
 
Solicitors who wished to advance their career in terms of the seriousness of the cases 
that they handled and grow their firms to take on more case work needed to develop a 
reputation for appropriately instructing counsel. Although S2 did not expand in detail on 
the meaning of defending matters ‘as they needed to be defended’, there was a clear 
implication that any realistic chance of acquittal should be competently and vigorously 
pursued.  
 
This was recognised by barrister interviewees who understood that solicitors wanted to 
build a reputation for standing up for clients rather than advising them in a way that 
served the purposes of the lawyers themselves: 
 
 …I think you get a reputation very quickly if you are someone who [manipulated 
defendants]. They’re running a business like anyone else, they want to attract 
clients who are charged with serious offences, because that improves their 
reputation and obviously they don’t want to defend ABHs all their life. Solicitors 
want to do bank robberies and murders, and that sort of thing.602 
 
Because solicitors may avoid counsel who are poor advocates, a subsequent incentive 
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for barristers to provide good representation, at least in the defendant’s terms, is created. 
From the data collected for this research, that incentive was clearly understood by 
barristers who acted accordingly. G1 explained that solicitors would rather have a 
barrister who was inclined to fight cases: 
 
 I think the solicitors want barristers who will fight their clients’ corner. So no, I 
think that solicitors like barristers who fight cases because they perceive that you 
are not just rolling over. So no, I think generally speaking my experience is that 
solicitors like you to fight their client cases and not the other way round. 
 
Solicitors, as those in any other client orientated business, are subject to reputation 
effects among those they serve. Although many first time offenders may begin their 
relationship with their criminal defence solicitor through the police station duty 
scheme603 (and therefore do not choose their solicitor as such), having a reputation for 
defending matters ‘as well as they need to be defended’ was of primary importance to 
both solicitors interviewed. In England and Wales defendants have the right to choose 
their representative, and can shop around for a solicitor they feel will assist them best.604 
Solicitors reported having a ‘client base’ consisting of repeat offenders and those who 
sought out their services after recommendation from someone they had previously 
represented. Barristers who wished to gain briefs from these solicitors and advance their 
own careers appeared to be subject to the client orientated incentives of the solicitors 
who instruct them.605 
 
3. The solicitor-barrister relationship: a moderating influence? 
 
The barristers observed in Negotiated Justice and Standing Accused generally advised 
defendants with little reference to the desires or wishes of the solicitor. Commonly, 
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solicitors sent a clerk or other legally unqualified individual to accompany counsel to 
court and to sit in conferences with the defendant when advice was given.606 These 
solicitor representatives were described in Standing Accused as poor advocates for the 
defendant’s rights and regularly failed to question the decision-making of barristers, 
even when they appeared to ignore the defendant’s desire to contest the prosecution 
case.607 Solicitors’ representatives were regularly quiet during questioning and provided 
little assistance at all in plea decision-making. These clerks were seen as evidence by the 
authors of the induction, acceptance and then endorsement of guilty plea culture by 
defence lawyers and their employees: 
 
Moreover, presence at conferences is significant in the development of ideologies 
for clerks and articled clerks because it is here that they learn the legitimacy 
within legal culture of manipulating the client and the demands of 
routinisation.608 
 
These findings are difficult to reconcile with the evidence from this research that 
solicitors have strong incentives to maintain a reputation in the community for fighting 
cases and “standing-up for defendants.” As indicated this may have a direct effect on the 
advising style adopted by barristers. Barristers who may wish to manipulate defendants 
for either financial gain, or because of an expectation of a guilty plea, or because of the 
influence of court communities, must also take into account the attitudes and desires of 
their instructing solicitor.609 Barristers are not generally instructed in a series of one-off 
cases but rather develop relationships between several solicitor firms for the core of their 
work load. Moreover, many solicitors tend to instruct particular chambers with preferred 
barristers within the set for different types of work. For example, as B1 explained, some 
barristers are known for excellent mitigation, or handling youth clients, or offences of 
different kinds. The barrister must therefore establish and maintain relationships with 
solicitors in order to create a successful career. Because solicitors are often “set 
regulars”, the pressure to maintain good relations are not only created by the barrister’s 
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desire for a healthy career, but also by other barristers within the same chambers who 
wish to maintain a good reputation with instructing solicitors for their own benefit. A 
barrister who might wish to manipulate a defendant, leaving them feeling unhappy with 
the content and manner of the advice given, runs a clear risk of upsetting both the 
professional client and their colleagues in chambers with potentially damaging effects on 
their career. According to Tague, the threat of either losing the confidence of a solicitor 
or a complaint to their head of chambers was a very real concern for the barristers he 
interviewed regarding their advice.610 As in the present research, barristers felt that an 
attempt at trying to force a guilty plea, however subtly, would be difficult and risky.     
 
Interviewees described the plea decision as something over which they did not have 
direct control; even if barristers wished to manipulate defendants, they would find it 
extremely difficult to do so without ramifications. H1 explained that even if he and a 
prosecutor wanted to, they would find it difficult to control the situation to try and force 
a plea from the defendant, unless that decision was a reasonable outcome for all of the 
parties concerned:    
 
 H1: …So if I were to speak to barrister X and say look, let’s sort a case out on 
this basis, it’s not his decision. You know, the decision has to be passed by the 
reviewing lawyer in the CPS who is not part of our relationship anyway. 
 
 JB: And doesn’t care about that? 
 
 H1: And doesn’t care about it, no. So, I don’t think it would work. Equally, if 
you are defending you couldn’t give advice that wasn’t reviewed. The solicitor 
on the case and they ought to be involved, I would involve them in any decision-
making process, and they have a say it. So, I don’t really think [manipulation] 
happens. I don’t know if there is a perception that that happens, but certainly I’ve 
never seen it. 
 
According to H1’s conception of the various actors involved, neither the CPS lawyer nor 
the defence solicitor have anything invested in a relationship of convenience between 
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prosecution and defence counsel. Although prosecution and defence barristers might 
wish to assist each other in the resolution of cases, the solicitors involved have little to 
gain from counsel resolving a case for counsel’s financial benefit or other unscrupulous 
reason. The fact that solicitors have a moderating involvement in plea was reiterated by 
K2. As will be recalled from Chapter 6, K2 argued that barristers do not take decisions 
on what advice to give in a vacuum from other interested parties.611 The involvement of 
the defence solicitor, as well as the defendant’s family and other interested parties, 
serves to place several barriers in the way of a barrister attempting to convince a 
defendant to plead guilty. A barrister is not the sole advisor to the defendant, and the 
defendant is not isolated with the barrister in making a decision on plea. The 
involvement of other parties makes unscrupulous manipulation difficult for the barrister, 
who must take into account the reaction of these other parties into account when 
advising a defendant.  
 
That is not to argue that barristers never inappropriately pressure defendants into 
pleading guilty, and that all such instances are punished by sanction from the solicitor. 
There may be solicitors who fail to respond to the incentive to build a reputation for 
fighting cases appropriately, and there may be those who do not take an interest in the 
fate of their Crown Court cases. Equally, some barristers may be able to cover the true 
motivations behind their advice in some circumstances. Furthermore, the barrister-
solicitor relationship is not entirely determinative of how a barrister advises a defendant. 
Interviewees described being entirely happy to contradict solicitors if they felt it was 
necessary.  
 
Indeed, this research does not describe barristers as dictated to by the views of their 
instructing solicitors. However, this chapter does argue that the present literature and 
research gives insufficient weight to this important incentive that, on the basis of the 
data, plays a large role in how barristers and solicitors work and what influences their 
decision-making. Simple constructions of a guilty plea culture or depicting the legal 
profession as short term financial opportunists fails to comprehend the wider 
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implications of complex, often contradictory incentives. The effect of the solicitor-
barrister relationship as a moderating influence is not quantified here, but it is important 
to recognise its potential significance in how and on what a defendant is advised. 
 
4. Financial incentives 
 
As previously indicated in Chapter 6, financial incentives do play a large role in the 
decision-making of lawyers. However, these financial incentives tend only to be 
revealed as operative in circumstances of ethical indeterminacy. Ethical indeterminacy 
arises where there is potential for genuine disagreement between two legal professionals 
as to the best course of action in a case. In such an instance the decision taken is more 
likely to be the one that is more financially lucrative to the lawyer. The net effect of 
financial incentives is therefore only seen at a macro level when all cases are aggregated 
together, however on a case-by-case basis conscious and overt manipulation of cases on 
the basis of fees is difficult to detect.  
 
According to notions of ethical indeterminacy, financial incentives are not completely 
determinative of cases, but do play a large role in the eventual outcome, especially when 
all cases remunerated under a single funding scheme are viewed together. It is therefore 
important to analyse the financial incentives given to solicitors and how that may affect 
cases, including the impact on how solicitors may wish cases to be handled by counsel. 
As will be shown, the new Litigators’ Graduate Fee Scheme (LGFS) may encourage 
solicitors to take more work in-house and reduce the number of cases that are briefed to 
the independent bar. 
 
The scheme against which solicitors fees are calculated for Crown Court litigation has 
recently been changed following the introduction of the Criminal Defence Service 
(Funding) (Amendment) Order 2007. The changes to the fees for Crown Court litigation 
were made according to recommendations in Lord Carter of Coles’ review of legal aid 
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procurement and came into effect on 14 January 2008.612 Under the new payment 
scheme solicitors are paid according to a fixed, ex ante fee structure, similar to that used 
to calculate the fee paid to barristers under the Advocates’ Graduate Fee Scheme 
(AGFS).613 Solicitors were previously paid according to an ex post facto pay scheme, 
with fees calculated on the basis of items and units of work done.614 This meant that the 
actual effort (or at least claimed effort) was directly remunerated according to the needs 
of the case.  
 
The LGFS remunerates cases according to 11 classes of offences (A-K) with a basic 
fee.615 This basic fee is increased for trials over two days (the length of trial proxy), 
more than one defendant (the defendant uplift) and any other transfers or retrials.616 In 
the event that the pages of prosecution evidence (PPE) exceed stated limits (which 
increase according to the number of days of trial, apart from the first two days), the pay 
scheme no longer remunerates litigators for day uplifts, but provides different basic fee 
payments (called initial fees) that are increased according to the pages of prosecution 
evidence. The different pages of prosecution evidence are paid according to bands for 
which the payment decreases per page as the count rises. The scheme for guilty pleas 
and cracked trials is similar for trials, with a basic fee given in tables depending on class 
of offence and whether the trial was cracked or a guilty plea was entered at PCMH. This 
payment is increased by a defendant uplift and transfer or retrial payment if appropriate. 
As with trials, if the number of pages of prosecution evidence exceeds the stated limits 
the scheme pays a different initial fee plus a payment per page of prosecution evidence 
above the limit. The initial fee is increased in bands as the page count is increased, while 
the payment per page is reduced. Extra payments are not made to solicitors for reading 
unused material disclosed by the prosecution under the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996, section 7A or any other extra preparation. 
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As may be appreciated, the LGFS is difficult to comprehend and confusing. As S1, a 
London solicitor with many years experience of claiming fees for criminal work, 
believed about the new scheme: 
 
 It is the most appallingly complicated calculation which requires parameters for 
which you have to use a computer to do it, it’s so complex. And you can’t do it 
by hand… 
 
To assist solicitors in calculating their fee for cases the Legal Services Commission has 
provided a downloadable spreadsheet which calculates the fee automatically.617 This 
spreadsheet allows solicitors to readily see the difference in fee for a case depending on 
what plea is entered by the defendant and when.  
 
a. Trial fees 
 
This research has sought to provide a more thorough understanding of the fee structure. 
Understanding the scheme and how different cases are remunerated is essential in 
developing a view of solicitors’ incentives. This chapter looks in some detail at the 
offence band E, which is typical of the payment scheme. As already stated, for trials a 
basic fee plus a day proxy is paid to the solicitor, unless the page count exceeds a limit 
which is increased for every extra day the case is in court. After the page count limit, 
solicitors are paid a different initial fee plus an amount per page of evidence. Figure 7-1 
shows a line graph for how solicitors are paid for a category E, 1-2 day and 3 day trials. 
Once the page limit for the number of days in trial has been exceeded the fee joins the 
‘Trial where PPE exceeds cap’ line.618 
 
 
 
                                                 
617
 The spreadsheet is available at 
<http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/litigator_graduated_fee_scheme.asp>  
618
 All fee calculations are without VAT. 
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Figure 7-1 Fee for 1-2 and 3 day trials, and trials where PPE exceeds cap 
 
As can be seen, the solicitor is paid a flat rate of £386.54 for a one to two day trial and 
£1,171.84 for a three day trial.619  This covers all matters to do with the case in the 
Crown Court from first appearance to the trial itself. However, if the page count of 
prosecution evidence exceeds 40 pages an initial fee of £386.54 is paid plus an extra 
£10.4287 for every page over 40 pages.620 For three day trials if the page count exceeds 
120 pages, a different initial fee is paid of £699.40, plus £9.3950 for pages 70 to 129.621 
If the page count is 130 pages or greater, the solicitor is paid a different initial fee of 
£1263.10, plus £9.0869 per page thereafter, up to 158 pages.622 If the page count exceeds 
158 pages, the solicitor is paid another greater initial fee with a slightly smaller per page 
fee, and so on as the page count meets the stated limits. It should be noted that the 
solicitor is paid for pages within the band only. Therefore, a case with 132 pages is paid 
£1263.10 plus only two pages at £9.0869, or £18.17. The practical effect of this payment 
scheme is that once the 40 page limit has been exceeded the payment for the case 
steadily rises per extra page from the basic rate of £386.54. In figure 7-2 the same effect 
                                                 
619
 Criminal Defence Service (Funding) (Amendment) Order 2007, Schedule 2, part 2, section 6. The 
solicitor in a 3 day trial receives a basic fee of £386.54 plus a day proxy of £785.29. 
620
 Ibid. section 8. 
621
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
0
200 
400 
600 
800 
1,000 
1,200 
1,400 
1,600 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 
PPE
Fee £
Trial where PPE exceeds cap 
 1-2 day trial 
3 day trial 
 236
can be seen for a one to two, four, five and six day trial, with the basic rate slowly 
increasing once the page count limit for the trial days has been exceeded.  
 
Figure 7-2 Fees for 1-2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 day trials and trial where PPE exceeds cap 
 
 
b. Guilty plea and cracked trial fees 
 
For category E offences, guilty pleas at PCMH are paid at a basic rate of £202.41.623 
After 40 pages this increases by £3.2041 per page up to 399 pages.624 Cracked trials are 
paid a basic rate of £345.50. After 40 pages this is increased by £6.7242 per page up to 
249 pages. After 250 pages cracked trials are paid an initial fee of £1,752.59, plus 
£2.1277 per page above 250 pages. Figure 7-3 shows the projected fee depending on 
pages of prosecution evidence for both cracked trials and guilty pleas depending on 
pages of prosecution evidence.   
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Figure 7-3 Guilty plea and cracked trial fee where PPE exceeds cap 
 
 
c. The incentives 
 
When figure 7-2 and figure 7-3 are combined it is possible to see the difference in fee 
that a solicitor may receive from the three ways in which a case may be concluded. 
Figure 7-4 plots trial fees and cracked trial fees against one another up to a 20 day trial.  
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Figure 7-4 Fees for 1-2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 20 day trials, guilty pleas, cracked trial where PPE exceed cap 
and trial where PPE exceeds cap 
 
Of particular interest to solicitors is the difference between the cracked trial fee and the 
trial fee. According to S1, the majority of work done on any case is done in the period 
immediately prior to trial. In the weeks between PCMH and the date of trial, the case is 
progressively given greater attention as the date of trial approaches. Therefore, on the 
date of trial, the majority of the work that will be done by the solicitor has already been 
completed. Besides sitting behind counsel and assisting with matters that arise during the 
trial, the case during this time is predominantly a matter for the barrister.625 The extra 
payment given to the solicitor between a cracked trial and a trial represents, if anything, 
the opportunity cost of the time in court, rather than preparatory work.  
 
As a representation of the actual work carried out by the solicitor, the differing pay rates 
for a Category E offence is dependent on the pages of prosecution evidence. For shorter 
                                                 
625
 The extent to which the solicitor sits behind counsel during trials is varied depending on the complexity 
of the case and the solicitor firm. McConville et al found limited solicitor attendance at court, preferring to 
send a clerk or other unqualified staff: McConville et al (n.591) Chapter 10. The use of “outdoor clerks” 
for Crown Court clerks is widespread, but the presence of any solicitor representative at all may be 
diminishing: D. Wolchover and A. Heaton-Armstrong, ‘Outdoor clerking: the impact of LGF on defence 
trial advocacy’ [2008] Archbold News 2, 4-5 
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trials of between three and five days, when a case remains close to either side of the 
page limit for the number of days trial, the cracked trial rate is not a large amount of 
money less than the trial fee.626 The solicitors interviewed did not express concerns 
about this type difference in fee paid to them. Serious concerns were raised however by 
those cases where the page count was low, relative to the number of days in trial, or 
where the page count was very high in more complicated and serious cases. In these 
circumstances the pay structure heavily penalises a cracked trial and the solicitors 
interviewed felt that only the trial fee would be adequate compensation for the time they 
had spent on the case.  
 
Some examples may assist in understanding how the pay structure can create large 
disparities between trials and cracked trial fees. For example, if a trial would last three 
days, but has a low page count of around 40 pages, the solicitor stands to loose £830 if 
the case cracks.627 The difference in fee paid at higher page counts is even larger. 
Although rare, cases that have greater than 250 pages are either given a higher basic fee 
or a much higher per page payment. For example, this means that a 20 day trial is paid 
£6,404.77 basic fee, compared to a cracked trial rate of £2,805.80 (where the page count 
is 745 pages628); a difference of £3,598.97. Although not a huge sum in the overall turn 
over of a medium sized law firm, a number of such cases together would create a 
significant difference in the fees received over a financial year. This absolute fee 
difference becomes much larger at higher page counts or days in trial, and in more 
serious categories of offence. For example, fraudulent evasion of duty above £100,000 is 
a Category K offence.629 If the solicitors represented one defendant in a case lasting 40 
days with 4,500 pages of evidence, they would be paid £43,403.55 for a trial, and 
£30,348.43 for a cracked trial, a difference of £13,055.12. To a fee earner working on 
the case this represents a loss of just over £6,500 for each of the two months the case is 
in trial. However, the differences can be even larger. S1 described the huge fee 
                                                 
626
 See Figure 7-4. In absolute terms this represents an approximate 75% difference of around £300 for 3 
day trials, £380 for 4 day trials and £460 for 5 day trials. 
627
 This difference in absolute terms is greater for more serious categories of offences 
628
 745 pages is used in this example as it is the highest number of pages for which the basic daily fee is 
payable. A lower or higher page count would show an even greater difference. 
629
 Fradulent evasion of duty is an offence contrary to the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 
section 170(1)(b). 
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difference in one case that he was currently handling: 
 
 We did do one test [with the new fee scheme] where the fee if we went to trial 
was £50,000; major people trafficking case. But, if it cracked the fee was 
£10,000. Now, there’s a hell of a difference. 
 
Given these large absolute differences in fees in serious or long cases, it is exceedingly 
doubtful that a solicitor could make up these shortfalls in income. An average case takes 
just over 24 weeks from committal or being sent to be heard as a trial, and just over 11 
weeks from committal if the defendant enters a guilty plea.630 Such lengthy, well paid 
cases are uncommon, and the time lag between picking up a case at the police station to 
resolution is considerable. As S1 explained further: 
 
 S1: Now, if you are an advocate, it’s all right because you can start another trial 
the next day. If you’re a solicitor then you’ve just lost £40,000 worth of work. 
 
JB: Despite having done the preparation. 
 
S1: Despite having done the preparation… This particular one if it ran as a trial it 
was about 20 days, and the fee was huge, but if it cracked, I would be, because 
what I was being asked was will you authorise us to [seek a Goodyear indication] 
in this case? And I haven’t made my final decision yet because I’m not, I can’t 
afford to lose £40,000 on a case. 
 
From these calculations and comments by the interviewees, some tentative conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, although longer, more complicated cases are fewer in number than 
typical one to two day trials involving less serious crime, they represent large sums of 
money to a solicitor’s firm. Under the previous pay scheme, solicitors were paid ex post 
facto, with fees calculated on the basis of items and units of work done.631 Therefore, 
even when a case cracked, solicitors were remunerated according to the large amounts of 
                                                 
630
 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2008’ (Cm 7697, 2009) 112-13 and Table 6.21. 
631
 The most recent fee scheme prior to the introduction of the LGFS is found in The Criminal Defence 
Service (Funding) Order 2007, Schedule 2. 
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work they had put into preparing a complicated case. In these circumstances, according 
to the two solicitors interviewed, the loss of the trial fee represented a relatively small 
amount of money. However, under the LGFS a cracked trial fee may be 75% or less of 
the trial fee, representing a significant amount of money lost to the solicitor. In many 
circumstances, if the trial cracked, the solicitors interviewed argued that they would not 
be adequately compensated for that preparation already carried out. Only once the trial 
fee had been factored in would the fee accurately represent the effort that they had 
expended on individual cases. To make up these fees through other work would be 
difficult for the solicitor to readily achieve.  
 
The pay structure for these more complicated, lengthy cases may therefore incentivise 
the solicitor to prefer trials over a last-minute guilty plea. Because the majority of the 
solicitor’s work has been completed by the time the case enters trial, they may prefer a 
guaranteed payment of, as in the example above, an extra £13,000, rather than risk 
relying on their duty police station work to generate the same amount through other 
cases. As noted above, even if new cases do come through, there is a considerable time 
lag in payment being received for a case. It is therefore argued that the combined effect 
of uncertainty and large differentials in fees may create an overall solicitor preference of 
trials over cracked trials.  
 
Secondly, because the fee for Crown Court cases is now entirely contingent on outcome 
rather than time or effort expended, the choice of the defendant’s plea is highly 
significant for the solicitor. When the difference in fee paid is measured in thousands of 
pounds, a solicitor who has expended many hours in preparation of a case may be 
extremely reluctant to seek a charge bargain, Goodyear indication, or convince his or her 
client of the sense of a guilty plea in the light of new evidence. As discussed in Chapter 
5, it is not necessarily to the defendant’s advantage to go to trial each and every time, 
and a “good result” for the defendant may involve entering a plea to a lesser offence. 
Therefore, the LGFS, in some circumstances, creates significant agency problems 
between the solicitor and his or her client defendant.  
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Thirdly, although the presence of a barrister may mitigate the effect of favouring trials 
for financial reasons, solicitors in reaction to the LGFS may seek to have greater control 
over the contingent outcome, and therefore remove the self-employed barrister as an 
independent advisor. As previously noted, barristers give advice on the basis of their 
own incentives, which are not necessarily aligned with those of the solicitor. If barristers 
wish to seek a charge bargain or advise that a guilty plea is in the best interests of the 
defendant, this may bring them into direct conflict with the solicitor. A solution for a 
solicitor is either to conduct the case themselves as a higher court advocate, or to employ 
members of the Bar as in-house counsel over whom the solicitor would have greater 
control. Although there is scant evidence that this is currently happening, barristers in 
discussion at Leicester Crown Court expressed similar reservations about changes to 
solicitor fees. One of the barristers in an informal, unrecorded conversation named 
solicitor firms whom he felt would not brief counsel who sought guilty pleas after the 
fixed fee scheme was introduced. Without further qualitative data the strength of this 
conclusion is impossible to assess, however, the important implications of these fee 
changes for the defence bar warrants further investigation. 
 
5. Counteracting the agency problem: the dampening effect of a split 
profession 
 
The context within which the barrister-solicitor relationship is considered is the wider 
agency problem that this thesis seeks to analyse. An agency problem potentially occurs 
when the interests of the defendant and the representative lawyer diverge. Because the 
lawyer is the dominant partner in many client-lawyer relationships due to their expertise 
and understanding of the law, the defendant is not generally well placed to assess the 
advice given to them. A lawyer with diverging interests from the client may manipulate 
their knowledge to their own benefit. Classically, the solicitor-barrister relationship may 
be said to counteract the agency problem described in that any solicitor or barrister who 
seeks to manipulate the defendant for short term gain or other disreputable reason may 
jeopardise their long term career. Because each arm of the profession is being essentially 
“monitored” by the other, they are prevented from acting in a way that is against the 
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defendant’s interests.632 Monitoring the behaviour of an agent is often described as a 
potential solution to reducing agency costs.633 
 
However, the reality is rather more complex than this theoretical analysis implies. 
Barristers and solicitors do not necessarily monitor one another to ensure compliance 
with ethical and professional standards, but rather respond to a combination of disparate 
influences which may reduce the frequency of acting for short term financial gain or 
according to a guilty plea culture. The financial incentives which affect barristers mesh 
with other incentives, such as maintaining a good relationship with a solicitor, so that 
overt and direct manipulation of defendants for financial gain does not regularly occur. 
As Tata argues: ‘Lawyers operate with a range of influences: not only financial but also 
cultural, ideological, and organisational.’634  Barristers respond to a range of influences 
and the presence of the solicitor is a further incentive or influence on barristers and how 
they determine the advice given on plea. The interplay of these incentives is extremely 
complex and it is difficult to determine on the basis of this study to what extent an 
incentive may play a part in an individual case. For example, a solicitor who wishes to 
build a reputation for “standing up for clients” will not instruct barristers who 
manipulate their clients for financial gain or because a guilty plea is “expected”. 
Barristers will respond to this incentive and not try to manipulate defendants. Equally, 
because each of the incentives is not entirely determinative but meshed with others, 
barristers may counteract a solicitor who wished to resolve a case for financial gain. A 
solicitor may prefer a trial over a guilty plea even though the defendant should be 
advised about the merits of pleading guilty. A barrister who is not subject to the same 
financial incentives can advise the defendant of the advantages of a guilty plea. 
Although this course of action may place them in conflict with the solicitor, other 
organisational or cultural factors such as professional pride, or ethical conduct play a 
role for the barrister in advising the defendant on plea. Therefore, although not 
monitoring one another, in many circumstances the split profession acts as a 
                                                 
632
 This argument is often repeated by those who defend the split profession status quo. For example, 
‘Report of the Committee to the Bar Council’ (“The Kentridge Report”) (18 January 2002) para 2.14. 
633
 M. Bishop, Essential Economics (Profile Books, London 2004). 
634
 C. Tata, ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and “Ethical 
Indeterminacy” in Criminal Defence Work’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 489, 516. 
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counterbalance to incentives that might otherwise act against a defendant’s interests. 
Because any incentive to act in one way must be considered against the contradictory 
influences to act in another, the combination of incentives created by the split profession 
dampens the effect of a change in those incentives for one side of the profession. While 
the solicitor-barrister relationship does not solve the agency problem, it may reduce the 
costs to the defendant in receiving advice that is against his or her interest.  
 
Of course, the barrister who acts on one occasion to advise a defendant of the merits of a 
guilty plea against a solicitor’s wishes cannot do so repeatedly, particularly when the 
financial incentives for solicitors mean that trials are strongly preferred to cracked trials. 
Therefore, a barrister who persistently ignored a solicitor’s preference may find 
themselves out of work. Although this research does not include data from the barrister 
interviewees on the new fee scheme, it is predicted that the LGFS will place a further 
strain on the solicitor-barrister relationship and may cause solicitors to seek greater 
control over the resolution of cases by taking cases to trial themselves or employing in-
house counsel. This would effectively create a single layer of representation, removing 
the beneficial dampening effect of a combination of incentives to both sides of the 
profession.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter does not quantify the extent of and the manner in which the incentives 
outlined interplay with one another but argues that the effects of the solicitor-barrister 
relationship and its impact on case decision-making should be investigated further. It has 
been suggested here that solicitors respond to incentives related to client care, reputation 
and fee, and that these are passed on to barristers as subsequent incentives because of the 
fact that they might lose briefs if they were to act in a manner prejudicial to those 
interests. The incentive to maintain a good relationship with the solicitor dampens the 
effect of other incentives to barristers that may be to the detriment of the defendant, 
namely financial incentives. This chapter has examined the relatively new fixed fee 
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scheme for solicitors in the Crown Court and shown how it has created a strong 
preference for trials in longer, more complicated cases. This chapter has speculated that 
tying remuneration to outcome gives solicitors a greater interest in the outcome of cases 
and the defendant’s plea, creating a very different working environment than that 
observed in Standing Accused, where solicitors were described as disinterested in their 
Crown Court work. In turn it has been proposed that solicitors may seek to take control 
over case outcome by using their own in-house counsel, rather than briefing to the self-
employed bar. This will reduce the amount of available defence work to the self-
employed bar and reduce the mitigating effects of the split profession that may 
eventually have an inimical effect on the quality of advice given to defendants on plea. 
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Chapter 8: Regional differences 
 
In the initial planning of this research it was not anticipated that there would be 
significant regional differences between the practices of barristers. However, as early 
interviews progressed it became clear that interviewees in London held strong views that 
practices outside London Crown Court centres was markedly different. Interviewees 
gave a range of accounts regarding provincial courts on the basis of anecdotes from 
colleagues or, in some cases, direct experience. Some of the accounts given were 
dismissed in Chapter 6 as having little evidentiary basis635, however, there did appear to 
be some grounds for further investigation of potential differences between the circuits. A 
number of interviewees had direct experience of Midlands court centres and related 
cases where they considered that odd results had occurred or where their approach to a 
case was not as expected by their opposite counsel. A brief review of the judicial 
statistics suggested that these reports of differing court practices were not entirely 
apocryphal, and that there may be some substance to what the London interviewees had 
recounted. It was therefore decided to expand the geographical area of research to take 
in the Midlands Circuit.636 Interviews with five barristers were undertaken at both 
Leicester and Nottingham Crown Court and included a range of experience including a 
QC, a Recorder and a junior barrister of five years call. The aim of these interviews was 
to discover what differences existed between the circuits in terms of advising styles and 
general approaches to cases.  
 
This chapter gives an overview of those differences that manifest themselves in a higher 
cracked trial and guilty plea rate in the Midlands. It attempts to explain why those 
differences occur, proposing that the variations between the areas are at least partially 
created by organisational drivers that produce a contrasting environment in which advice 
and plea negotiation take place. It will be argued that negotiation is partially dependant 
                                                 
635
 Chapter 6:4.d. 
636
 For the purposes of administration the Bar of England and Wales is divided into six circuits: Midland, 
Northern, North Eastern, South Eastern, Wales and Chester and South Eastern. These are not to be 
confused with Her Majesty’s Court Service Regions. There are seven HMCS Regions, with London now 
treated separately to the rest of the South Eastern Region. 
 247
on information exchange between the parties involved. When there are high levels of 
information exchange, both parties can fully understand their respective positions and 
more readily come to an agreement. This exchange of information would appear to be 
assisted when the negotiation involves “repeat players”; those who negotiate with one 
another on a regular basis in the same environment. Repeat players promote the 
exchange of information between themselves based on trust and understanding, and 
develop common approaches to dealing with cases. Repeat players are more readily 
affected by organisational drivers that are reciprocally created by and pervade their 
continual interactions with one another. One-off players, on the other hand, cannot 
establish such organisational drivers or be affected by pre-existing organisational drivers 
they encounter as they have not learned the common approaches and schemes and they 
have few incentives to conform.  
 
After establishing this theoretical basis, the chapter will attempt to apply the model to 
both the Midlands and London. There is evidence to suggest that barristers working in 
the Midlands area are more likely to be repeat players than those in London due to the 
geographical layout and size of the local bar. These factors increase the contact rate 
between individuals and allow repeat players to appear. The evidence from the interview 
data points to the existence of repeat players in the Midlands, and their relative absence 
in London. These repeat players promote relationships of trust, greater freedom of 
exchange of information, and common schemes for the resolution of cases. The 
existence of repeat players and the organisation drivers they create will be used as a 
partial explanation of the statistical differences between the regions. 
 
1. Organisational drivers 
 
The influence of organisation and community on English lawyers is poorly documented 
as a sociological phenomenon. Sanders and Young allege a strong tendency amongst 
barristers to feel a greater loyalty to their court community of other barristers and judges 
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rather than the fleeting relationship with an individual defendant.637 The introduction of 
this thesis to English court rooms is borrowed from the description of American lawyers 
classically articulated by Blumburg.638 Blumburg argued that the organisational goals of 
the criminal court system was towards producing guilty pleas in as an efficient a manner 
as possible, and that these values were adopted by all actors working within the system. 
Lawyers are defined by the institutional setting and its values. These ‘pragmatic values, 
bureaucratic priorities, and administrative instruments’ create ‘a set of priorities’ that 
‘exert a higher claim than the stated ideological goals of “due process of law”’639, which 
are distorted by lawyers in pursuit of institutional purposes. According to Blumburg, 
lawyers abandon professional and ideological commitments in service of the higher 
claims of the court organisation.640 Blumburg explains that the reason for this co-option 
of the lawyer by the system is because of the necessity for the lawyer in maintaining 
healthy relationships with other “regular” members of the court community, including 
judges and prosecutors. These relationships are the sine qua non of retaining work as 
well as being able to negotiate pleas and sentences.641 In this setting the criminal client is 
a secondary figure whose presentation of doubts which challenge the organisational 
relationships are disregarded and resolved in favour of the organisation.642 Defence 
lawyers, it is alleged, stage-manage clients so that at least the appearance of help and 
good service is forthcoming to the client, however, this is entirely superficial and the 
other court actors are complicit in supporting the lawyers and providing help for their 
duplicity.643  
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 A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn OUP, London 2007) 423-24. McConville et al 
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Tague has rejected Blumburg’s thesis as an accurate description of English barristers’ 
incentives and working practices.644 According to Tague, the incentives (as discussed in 
detail in previous chapters), reputation, compensation and sanction, are not served by a 
model that places organisational relationships at its core.645 While partially agreeing 
with Tague’s analysis, this chapter will seek to show that organisational relationships do 
have an impact on the behaviour of barristers, and that the regional difference between 
the London and  Midlands Circuits reflects the true nature of those relationships. In reply 
to Tague’s question ‘might it be true that barristers have a conflicting incentive to induce 
guilty pleas to avoid being sanctioned by the judge or prosecuting barrister?’, this 
research argues that there are always organisational drivers that affect barristers’ 
behaviour, however, these factors are incorporated into the complex combination of 
drivers that affect professional judgment that have been discussed throughout this thesis. 
The fact that organisational factors play a role in advice can be seen in a comparison of 
the London and Midlands circuits and this reveals that these factors play a greater role in 
advice where the community of lawyers is smaller and actors have a greater opportunity 
to deal with one another on a day-to-day basis. These organisational drivers are created 
by and are reciprocally reinforced by repeat players, who in turn share information more 
easily with one another aiding negotiation.   
 
a. Repeat players and information exchange. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, both prosecution and defence barristers are mainly 
consequentialist in their approach to criminal cases. In Chapter 5 it was described how 
barristers assess the chances of criminal conviction and sentence and combine those 
factors when advising a defendant on plea. As was pointed out, the issue of de facto 
innocence is only given notional importance in that a barrister must consider the risks 
associated with going trial on the basis of the prosecution and defence cases, rather than 
an unsubstantiated assertion of innocence by the accused. In entering negotiations over 
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 P. Tague, ‘Barristers' selfish incentives in counselling defendants over the choice of plea’ [2007] Crim 
LR 3, 11. 
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 Ibid. 11 and accompanying text at note 37. 
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charge or fact bargain, what concerns the barristers of both sides is the credibility of the 
defendant’s account and how that may conclude in front of a jury given the other 
evidence and witnesses. Of central concern is: given this defendant’s account and the 
other evidence, what is the probability of conviction and associated sentence?  
 
The information exchange important to barristers is therefore the basis of both the 
prosecution and defence cases. As discussed in Chapter 5, the disclosure laws in 
England and Wales promote early information exchanges, particularly from the 
defendant.646 Starting at the police station the defendant is expected to given an adequate 
account of his or her case in response to police questioning. As described in Chapter 5, 
England and Wales now requires extensive disclosure by the defence at a pre-trial stage. 
In all areas of the country, therefore, instructed counsel should have similar levels of 
starting information with which to work. The effect of repeat players in the Midlands 
promotes greater information exchange built on the trust of repeated encounters, 
together with a small court community where common approaches to cases are 
developed, and those barristers who cannot be trusted or deviate from established norms 
are quickly discovered and marked out. Unfortunately, on the basis of this study alone it 
is not possible to say whether greater information exchange benefits the defendant. 
Although reducing the information deficit should make negotiation more efficient, other 
strong factors may influence community values; factors that could not be detected here 
on the basis of interviews. Firstly, the theoretical basis for this argument will be 
established by modelling repeat players, their creation of court communities and effect 
of information deficits according to the literature, before discussing the judicial statistics 
and evidence from the interview data of barristers acting as repeat players.  
 
b.  Theoretical model of repeat players 
 
A model of repeat players argues that those who have more regular contact with the 
court community are more able to reach a plea agreement than those who are ‘one-offs’ 
                                                 
646
 Chapter 5:3.d. 
 251
or those who come in to contact with the court community irregularly. Phillips and 
Ekland-Olson summarising how those abilities are created and maintained note that the 
status of repeat players is well-founded in the literature on American courts.647 Some 
commentators believe that through continual interaction, the players’ definitions of 
situations begin to converge: 
 
Through constant contact, informal relationships develop among members of the 
courthouse community. These relationships facilitate the flow of information and 
encourage the  development of common schemes for the classification of cases 
and defendants. Eventually, prosecutors and defense attorneys will evaluate 
proposals for bond, demands concerning sentences, and other situations from a 
common perspective. Processing stereotypes and shared concepts of justice bind 
together repeat-players in the courthouse community.648 
  
Repeat players by their constant interaction are responsible for the formation and 
continued coherence of the court community. Within the community of repeat players, 
relationships of trust emerge which aid the exchange of information and negotiation. By 
having a common view of cases, defence lawyers within the community understand the 
“correct” disposition of a case according to an outlook shared with prosecutors.  
 
Others argue that that participation in the court is akin to participation in a market-place. 
A defence attorney exchanges his or her commodities- those of placing demands upon 
the court time through motions and applications- in return for advantages from the 
prosecutor and judge such as access to fees, assisting in the efficient disposition of 
workloads, and pursuing career goals.649 
                                                 
647
 C.D Phillips and S. Ekland-Olson, ‘“Repeat Players” in a Criminal Court: The Fate of Their Clients 
(1982) 19 Criminology 530 
648
 Ibid. 531-32, summarising the views of M. Heumann, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1978); L. Mather, 
‘Some determinants of the method of case disposition: decision-making by public defenders in Los 
Angeles’ (1973) 8 Law and Society Review 187; A. Rosett and D.R. Cressey, Justice By Consent: Plea 
Bargains in the American Courthouse (J.B. Lippincott, Philadelphia 1976); D. Sudnow, ‘Normal crimes: 
sociological features of the penal code in a public defender office’ (1965) 12 Social Problems 255. 
649
 Phillips and Ekland-Olson (n.647) 532. This account of “repeat players” has such acceptance in the 
United States that some of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have described the 
criminal bar these terms: see the comments of Justice Antonin Scalia during oral argument in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts 557 US __(2009), reported by L. Newby, ‘Supreme Court Argument Report: 
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Whether as a result of shared values, or exchange of “commodities”, that repeat players 
exist and enjoy a special status seems to be relatively accepted in the American 
literature. However, the effect on cases and defendants remains unclear. Galanter, in his 
commentary on attorneys in the United States, has described the advantages of being a 
repeat player, albeit in the context of civil litigation, as:  
 
 [The] ability to structure the transaction; expertise, economies of scale, low start 
up costs; informal relations with institutional incumbents; bargaining credibility; 
ability to adopt optimal strategies...650 
 
According to Galanter, the position of the attorney as a repeat player is clearly beneficial 
to his or her client as they are able to take advantage of their special status. A repeat 
player understands the local “prices” of cases and can alter his or her case strategies to 
exploit his or her insight. The strategies of the repeat player are assisted by relationships 
of trust that the repeat player has established which improve his or her bargaining 
credibility.  
 
Blumberg and Sudnow believe that the effect of lawyer becoming repeat players is 
detrimental to the defendants they represent, as their values are co-opted by the court 
community.651 As discussed above, lawyers are said to abandon professional and 
ideological commitments in service of the higher claims of the court organisation. 
However, empirical studies in American courts found that the repeat players have no 
effect on final case disposition and severity of sentence.652 
                                                                                                                                                
Lawyers as “Repeat Players”' Law.com (12 November 2009)  
<http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202425955797>  
650
 M. Galanter, ‘Afterword: explaning litigation’ (1975) 9 Law and Society Review 347. 
651
 Blumburg (n.638); D. Sudnow, ‘Normal crimes: sociological features of the penal code in a public 
defender office’ (1965) 12 Social Problems 255. 
652
 P. Nardulli, The Courtroom Elite: An Organization Perspective on Criminal Justice (Ballinger, 
Cambridge MA 1978); C.D Phillips and S. Ekland-Olson, ‘“Repeat Players” in a Criminal Court: The Fate 
of Their Clients (1982) 19 Criminology 530; P. Nardulli, J. Eisenstein and R. Flemming, The Tenor of 
Justice: Criminal Courts and the Guilty Plea Process (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1988); and, a 
meta-analysis of many studies: F. Feeney and P.G. Jackson,  ‘Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, 
Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?’ (1991) 22 Rutgers LJ 361. 
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The “shared values” view rather than the “commodity exchange” view is probably a 
more accurate description of barristers’ behaviour. There is little in the data that suggests 
that barristers have the ability or the desire to manipulate cases as American lawyers 
may be able to do.653 Because of the cab rank rule barristers cannot create commodities, 
such as delaying cases and by making a case more difficult for the other side, they risk 
being penalised when the roles are reversed in the next case.654 However, the thesis of 
Blumberg, and latterly Sanders and Young in relation to English courts, that repeat 
players necessarily suffer from a co-option of their values to create an environment 
detrimental to the defendant is not necessarily accurate.655 In fact, just because a 
community of lawyers develop common approaches to cases does not mean that they are 
against the defendant’s interests.656 Although the “shared values” model may be correct, 
it does not act as a measure of whether the values within particular communities are 
“good” or “bad”. Certainly in some communities, some parts of the prevailing culture 
may act in a way so that defendants’ interests are poorly affected. However, to say that 
court communities always act to the detriment of the defendant ignores the powerful 
incentives (as outlined by Tague, and this research) that may form a part of a 
community’s standards and expectations of its members. As discussed in previous 
chapters, there are a great number of other drivers acting on barristers’ behaviour which 
combine together to create common approaches within the court community. These are 
not necessarily drivers that promote guilty pleas to the detriment of the defendant. In 
some communities common approaches may indicate that a prosecution should no 
longer be pursued due to a shared view that the prosecution evidence is insufficient to 
support a conviction, or that a prosecution is not in the public interest. A prosecutor may 
more readily drop an unsustainable charge in preference for a lesser charge which 
reflects the evidence. Part of those common approaches may be an accurate perception 
of the chances of conviction when measured against local juries, as well as ethical and 
financial considerations. The model of repeat players put forward here is one where 
                                                 
653
 See also Tague’s analysis of barristers’ inability to manipulate cases to raise the cost of the prosecution: 
Tague (n.644) 11. 
654
 Ibid. 11. 
655
 Blumburg (n.638); Sanders and Young (n.637). 
656
 Cooperation between prosecution and defence may be beneficial to the defendant: M. Lichtenstein, 
‘Public Defenders: Dimensions of Cooperation’ (1984) 9 The Justice Systems Journal 102.  
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barristers understand the appropriate way of dealing with a case and therefore act 
accordingly, able to measure that case against the internal ‘common schemes’ and 
‘classifications’ constructed by constant interaction between individual barristers. Where 
an individual case is poised within those schemes is readily reached by a flow of 
information between barristers who can then agree about where the case falls within 
their own community’s standards. In this respect, Tague’s analysis of barristers’ 
incentives is potentially limited. While Tague identifies drivers relating to reputation, 
sanction and compensation657, he does not take into account strong cultural drivers 
created by being a repeat player in a relatively small court community.658 
 
These ideas can be transposed into Scott and Stuntz’s contractual approach by 
understanding that smaller court communities with repeat players promote information 
exchange based on a common view of the case.659 Scott and Stuntz believe that lawyers 
hinder information exchange and therefore prevent successful negotiation.660 As was 
discussed in Chapter 5, the privilege against self-incrimination, asserted on behalf of the 
defendant by his or her lawyer, can prevent a de facto innocent defendant from 
differentiating himself or herself from de facto guilty defendants with an early, plausible 
and consistent account.661 While lawyers may disrupt accurate information exchange in 
all circumstances, this is less of a problem when the lawyers know and trust one another. 
Where a collaborative approach is promoted, lawyers are more likely to be frank with 
one another about the prospects of their respective cases. If there is a common, shared 
evaluation of the case against the defendant (based on accurate information), and 
therefore a common view of the prospects of conviction or acquittal, prosecution and 
defence barristers can more easily reach agreement over the appropriate charge and basis 
of plea. Conversely, in a court community where little interaction occurs between 
barristers, the effect of “common schemes” and trust is much reduced. Of course, the 
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 Tague (n.644). 
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 Tague’s sample of barristers only contained participants from London. As the present research has 
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659
 R. Scott and W. Stuntz, ‘Plea Bargaining as Contract’ (1992) 101 Yale LJ 1909.  
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 That is not to argue that the privilege against self-incrimination is always detrimental to defendants. 
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profession as a whole may share common views on what should or should not be a 
guilty plea, however, these views are within a wide band of variation, unlike those 
shared by a smaller court community. Larger communities with “one-off” players do not 
create the same relationships of trust and standards so that the rate of plea agreement is 
markedly lower. This leads to a variation in guilty plea and cracked trial rates dependant 
on the size of the local bar making up the court community and the community’s 
isolation from “one-off” players. One-off players who enter the community may find 
themselves closed off from proper negotiation and the benefits of being able to have 
open conversations over plea and charge.  
 
2. Evidence for court community and repeat players 
 
a. The Judicial Statistics 
 
i. Guilty plea rates and cracked trial rates 
 
The Judicial Statistics are a ‘comprehensive set of statistics on judicial and court activity 
in England and Wales’662 kept by the Ministry of Justice.663 The statistics detail amongst 
other things, guilty plea rates by judicial circuit, as well as cracked trial rates and court 
efficiency. Unfortunately for comparative purposes, the manner in which the statistics 
for guilty pleas are presented have been changed for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. In 
these years the guilty plea rate is given per defendant as a percentage of overall 
defendants dealt with in the Crown Court rather than recording guilty pleas as a 
percentage of overall cases dealt with in the Crown Court. Because defendants are 
occasionally tried together, they may plead in a different way making the two 
measurements different. Therefore, although comparisons can be made between London 
and the Midlands circuits within years, exact variations across the years cannot.  
                                                 
662
 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2008’ (Cm 7697, 2009) Introductory Note, 5. 
663
 Despite changing their name in 2008 to being called the Judicial and Court Statistics, these statistics 
and all previous years’ editions are called the “Judicial Statistics” here for ease of reference. 
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According to the Judicial Statistics, in the years 2002-2008 the guilty plea rate either per 
case or defendant in the Midland HMCS region has been substantially higher than that 
of London. In the latest year for which statistics are available, 2008, the guilty plea rate 
in the Midlands was 17% higher than that of London.664 Table 8-1 shows the guilty plea 
rates for London, the Midlands and England and Wales, as well as the difference 
between the circuits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
664
 Midland guilty plea rate: 76%; London guilty plea rate: 59%: Ministry of Justice (n.662) Table 6.21. 
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Table 8-1 Guilty plea rates: London and Midlands HMCS regions and England Wales 2002-08665 
Guilty plea 
statistics    
 
2002 
Total cases where 
plea was entered 
Case with guilty 
plea to all 
charges 
Guilty plea rate 
(% of cases 
disposed) 
 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
circuits 
London 13,581 6,096 45%  
Midlands 13,546 8,838 65% 
 
20% 
England and 
Wales 
70,608 40,187 57%  
2003     
London 13,595 6,168 45%  
Midlands 13,972 9,121 65% 20% 
England and 
Wales 
72,782 41,855 58%  
2004     
London 14,093 6,526 46%  
Midlands 13,639 9,914 73% 26% 
England and 
Wales 
72,428 42,182 58%  
2005     
London 13,760 6,672 48%  
Midlands 12,618 8,459 67% 18% 
England and 
Wales 
69,755 41,578 60% 
 
 
 
                                                 
665
 Table based on data presented in  Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Judicial Statistics 2002’ (Cm 
5863, 2003) Table 6.8, ‘Judicial Statistics 2003’ (Cm 6251, 2004) Table 6.8, ‘Judicial Statistics 2004’ 
(Cm 6565, 2005) Table 6.8, ‘Judicial Statistics 2005 (Revised)’ (Cm 6799, 2006) Table 6.8; Ministry of 
Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2006’ (Cm 7273, 2007) Table 6.6 and 6.20, ‘Judicial and Court 
Statistics’ (Cm 7467, 2008) Table 6.6 and 6.21, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2008’ (Cm 7697, 2009) 
Table 6.6 and 6.21.  
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Total defendants 
where plea was 
entered 
Defendants 
pleading guilty to 
all charges 
Guilty plea rate 
(% of defendants 
disposed) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
circuits 
2006 
    
London —— —— 53%  
Midlands —— —— 71% 18% 
England and 
Wales 
80,947 52,126 64%  
2007     
London —— —— 57%  
Midlands —— —— 74% 17% 
England and 
Wales 
90,943 59,162 68%  
2008     
London —— —— 59%  
Midlands —— —— 76% 17% 
England and 
Wales 
96,027 65,571 70%  
The Judicial Statistics also record an equally significant difference in the cracked trial 
rates between the circuits.666 In 2008 the cracked trial rate in the Midlands was 13% 
higher than London.667 Table 7-2 shows the cracked trial rates for the years 2002-2007 
and includes the calculated differences between the circuits. Cracked trial statistics have 
been consistently kept throughout the period shown, although for the years 2002-2005 
the total cases listed for trial for the years 2002-2005 was calculated by the researcher by 
adding the total of not guilty pleas to the total of cracked trials to produce a percentage 
of listed trials cracked. The regional cracked trial rates in 2006 and 2007 are given in the 
Judicial Statistics tables. Statistical discrepancies are caused by rounding. 
 
                                                 
666
 The cracked trial rate is those cases listed for trial that “crack” (as a result of guilty plea entered after a 
date of trial has been set, a bind over, the prosecution ending the case by offering no evidence or another 
reason) as a percentage of cases listed for trial. 
667
 Midland cracked trial rate: 44%; London cracked trial rate: 31%: Ministry of Justice (2009) (n.665) 
Table 6.13. The average difference on cracked trial rates for the years 2002-2009 on both circuits is 15%. 
The deviation from the mean for all years is within 3%. 
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Table 8-2 Cracked trial rates: London and Midlands HMCS regions 2002-08668 
Cracked trial 
statistics 
 
Total cases listed 
for trial Cracked trials 
Percentage of 
cases listed for 
trial cracked 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
circuits 
2002     
London 10,852 3,375 31%  
Midlands 8,700 4,031 46% 15% 
2003     
London 10,887 3,479 32%  
Midlands 8,853 4,026 45% 14% 
2004     
London 10,638 3,108 29%  
Midlands 7,960 3,488 44% 15% 
2005     
London 9,340 2,368 25%  
Midlands 6,716 2,586 39% 13% 
2006     
London 8,828 2,469 28%  
Midlands 5,677 2,596 46% 18% 
2007     
London 9,393 2,962 32%  
Midlands 5,177 2,352 45% 14% 
2008     
London 9,284 2,868 31%  
Midlands 4,827 2,108 44% 13% 
 
                                                 
668
 Table based on data presented in  Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Judicial Statistics 2002’ (Cm 
5863, 2003) Table 6.7 and 6.8, ‘Judicial Statistics 2003’ (Cm 6251, 2004) Table 6.7 and 6.8, ‘Judicial 
Statistics 2004’ (Cm 6565, 2005) Table 6.7 and 6.8, ‘Judicial Statistics 2005 (Revised)’ (Cm 6799, 2006) 
Table 6.7 and 6.8; Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2006’ (Cm 7273, 2007) Table 6.13, 
‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2007’ (Cm 7467, 2008) Table 6.13, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2008’ (Cm 
7697, 2009) Table 6.13. 
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According to the statistics for national trends, the large majority of cracks are caused by 
the defendant entering a late plea of guilty, or entering a guilty plea to a lesser charge.669 
On a regional basis the reasons for case cracks are also significantly different. Table 8-3 
shows the reasons for crack for the years 2002-2005.670  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
669
 These two reasons accounted for 80% of cracked trials in England and Wales in 2007: Ministry of 
Justice (n.662) Table 6.11. 
670
 Because of a change in statistical gathering, the Judicial Statistics for 2006 and 2007 do not show 
regional reasons for cracked trials. 
 261
Table 8-3 Cracked trials in London and Midlands HMCS regions, and England and Wales by 
reason for crack 2002-05671 
Cracked trials: 
reason for 
crack 
Defendant 
pleads guilty 
Prosecution 
accepts  guilty 
plea 
No evidence 
offered Bind over 
Unfit to 
plea/ 
deceased 
2002      
London 56% 10% 31% 3% 0.1% 
Midlands 59% 18% 19% 3% 0.1% 
England and 
Wales 
63% 15% 19% 3% 0.1% 
2003      
London 56% 12% 29% 2% 0.2% 
Midlands 57% 19% 20% 4% 0.1% 
England and 
Wales 
62% 17% 19% 2% 0.2% 
2004      
London 55% 14% 29% 2% 0.3% 
Midlands 60% 20% 17% 3% 0.1% 
England and 
Wales 
60% 19% 19% 2% 0.1% 
2005      
London 58% 13% 26% 2% 0.3% 
Midlands 62% 19% 17% 2% 0.1% 
England and 
Wales 
63% 18% 17% 2% 0.2% 
 
In the years shown, the two reasons “defendant pleads guilty” and “prosecution accepts 
guilty plea” account for the majority of cracks in both regions. However, as a 
percentage, both reasons why trials crack are higher in the Midlands than London and, in 
particular, significantly higher for “prosecution accepts guilty plea” in the Midlands in 
                                                 
671
 Table based on data presented in  Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Judicial Statistics 2002’ (Cm 
5863, 2003) Table 6.7, ‘Judicial Statistics 2003’ (Cm 6251, 2004) Table 6.7, ‘Judicial Statistics 2004’ 
(Cm 6565, 2005) Table 6.7, ‘Judicial Statistics 2005 (Revised)’ (Cm 6799, 2006) Table 6.7. 
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all years.672 Therefore, not only are cracked trials generally more common in the 
Midlands than in London, but when they occur it is more often the result of either a late 
guilty plea from the defendant or because the prosecution accepts a guilty plea to a lower 
offence. The plea rate and cracked trial statistics in Tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 provide 
significant circumstantial evidence for regional variations in both the use of plea 
bargaining and the advising styles of barristers.   
 
This difference in guilty plea rates is not a recent phenomenon, with statistics in the 
1980s recording even greater differences between the circuits. 673 Despite these dramatic 
differences between the judicial circuits, no thorough research has been done on the 
causes of regional variations. Previous researchers have commented on the marked 
variation, although none have conducted a formal qualitative or quantitative study to 
account for why these variations occur.674 Ole Hanson, a solicitor examining the North-
Eastern Circuit did provided a limited analysis of court room practices, giving a number 
of reasons for why differences might occur.675 The circuit administrator in Leeds told 
Hansen that he believed the variations might be down to ‘a good dollop of northern 
common sense’ and that the higher guilty plea rate reflected the ‘robustness’ of the 
bench. Hansen also found a Leeds solicitor who argued that members of local bar, as 
well as solicitors, were less inclined to fight cases. Hansen further suggested that 
because prosecuting counsel, defending counsel and judge were from the same chambers 
they were worried to not be seen to be wasting court time. Hansen’s findings, although 
lacking a formal methodology, produce an interesting insight into possible reasons for 
why circuits have different plea and cracked trial rates.  
 
  
 
                                                 
672
 The higher rate of “no evidence offered” for London strongly supports the anecdotal instances of 
organisational problems suffered by the CPS in that region in the data. 
673
 M. Zander, ‘What the annual statistics tell us about pleas and acquittals’ [1991] Crim. LR 252. In the 
three years of Zander’s sample, the average guilty plea rate difference was 32%. 
674
 Ibid. 
675
 (27 June 1986) 136 NLJ 601 
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b. The respective sizes of the HMCS regions 
 
i. Size and make up of local bar 
 
The Bar Council does not keep statistics on the respective sizes of those practising 
criminal law and no official study has sought to definitively quantify the number of 
barristers undertaking cases on a regular basis in the Crown Court.676 Even the Carter 
Review, which purported to thoroughly examine the provision of legal services, did not 
provide accurate figures for the size of the criminal bar. To some extent, keeping figures 
on how many barristers practice in criminal law would be difficult. Many members of 
the Bar have a mixed practice with the type of work undertaken varying from month to 
month. Furthermore, some solicitors now have in-house advocates who carry out work 
in the Crown Court. It is therefore impossible to say on the data available how many 
barristers, or indeed advocates, practice criminal law in a given area of the country with 
a great deal of precision. However, this research has attempted to make a very 
approximate measurement based on the Bar Directory published online by Sweet and 
Maxwell.677 The Directory lists chambers by specialism and geographical area. The 
combined search options make it possible to estimate the size of the local bar for 
comparative purposes. According to the Directory there are 17 chambers in the Midlands 
area with barristers specialising in crime. These chambers vary in size from solo-
practitioners to large sets comprising of up to 50 members. Within chambers, barristers 
have different specialities, with those focusing on defence or prosecution, a mix of both, 
or a mix of crime and civil law, or no criminal work whatsoever. Comparatively, in 
London the Directory lists 88 chambers which advertise themselves as specialising in 
criminal law. Furthermore, there are another 15 chambers listed as located in the South 
East in large provincial towns such as Oxford and Brighton. Some of these sets are 
annexes of London chambers that provide advocacy regularly on a local scale. These 
chambers also vary in size from solo-practitioners to large 50 member sets, and have the 
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 The Bar Council only attempts to quantify the size of the profession as a whole, gender and ethic 
group: <http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about/statistics/>  
677
 <http://www.legalhub.co.uk/>  
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same mix of work within chambers ranging from solely “defence sets” to those with a 
civil practice running alongside criminal work.  
 
Making a thoroughly accurate assessment about the number of cases per barrister from 
this information from the Bar Directory alone would be exceedingly difficult. The influx 
of Higher Court Advocates, solicitors taking more work in-house at different regional 
rates, barristers who have a national practice, as well as differing sizes of chambers 
means that areas cannot be isolated entirely and examined in a simple comparison of 
cases disposed of in the Crown Court per practising member of the Bar. However, what 
appears apparent, even on these rough approximations, is that London and South East 
has more barristers practising criminal law per case and therefore greater competition for 
criminal cases. The Midlands, South Eastern and London HMCS regions all deal with 
roughly 8-10,000 Crown Court cases per year678, but the Midlands has many fewer 
barristers. Given the high concentration of barristers in London and the South East, these 
figures broadly support the notion that there is less work available per barrister in this 
area than the Midlands, and that there are far more barristers working in London 
courtrooms. This view is supported by the interview data. Many interviewees speculated 
that London was far more competitive than the provinces, particularly at the junior end, 
and those in London seemed to be far more concerned about the quantity of work 
available. 
  
ii. Geographical area 
 
The HMCS regions comprise a similar number of Crown Court centres with 11 court 
centres in London, and 12 in the Midlands.679 However, the geographical size of the two 
court areas is dramatically different. The Midlands region is large, covering much of 
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 Ministry of Justice (2009) (n.665) Table 6.2. 
679
 HMCS London Crown Court centres: Blackfriars, The Central Criminal Court, Croydon, Harrow, Inner 
London, Isleworth, Kingston, Snaresbrook, Southwark, Wood Green and Woolwich. HMCS Midland 
Crown Court Centres: Birmingham, Derby (Combined Court), Hereford, Leicester, Lincoln, Northampton 
(Combined Court), Nottingham, Shrewsbury, Stafford (Combined Court), Stoke on Trent (Combined 
Court), Warwick and Worcester <http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk>  
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central England, with the two Crown Court centres furthest apart being approximately 
120 miles from one another.680 However, the London HMCS region is geographically 
confined with the two courts centres furthest apart being barely 20 miles from one 
another.681 The geographical isolation of some of the court centres in the Midlands area 
is exacerbated by poor rail and road links across country east to west and barristers in 
the Midlands are normally restricted on a day to day basis to two or three local courts 
within easy reach of chambers. According to the Bar Directory, chambers in the 
Midlands are either in Birmingham (8 criminal sets), Nottingham (4 criminal sets), 
Leicester (4 criminal sets) or Stoke-on-Trent (1 criminal set). Interviewees from the 
Midlands said that they generally attended Nottingham, Derby or Leicester Crown Court 
on a regular basis. This was unsurprising given that they were all from one of the two 
largest Nottingham chambers. Some explained that although they might take a brief for a 
case elsewhere, such occurrences were rare, with local solicitors instructing local 
counsel from the same or nearby city. 
 
London barristers, on the other hand, tend to congregate around the Inns of Court in the 
centre of the city. Solicitors from all over the London area who wish to instruct a 
barrister generally approach these chambers. Barristers practising in the London area can 
therefore be expected to go to any one of the 11 court centres. Most of the court centres 
can be reached by the Underground and all are readily accessible from a central London 
location. This means that a barrister working in London can easily move between court 
centres on a single day, conducting a PCMH in the morning and moving to another 
hearing in any one of the other court centres by the afternoon, or between days 
conducting back-to-back trials in different court centres. Within London, the listed 88 
chambers plus the other 15 chambers in the South East area, give a huge choice to 
solicitors looking to instruct an advocate in a case in any of those courts.  
 
It is not suggested that barristers are geographically confined to their local courts in all 
circumstances. Those who practice in Nottingham and Derby also mentioned Doncaster 
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 Hereford Crown Court and Lincoln Crown Court: measurements by Google Earth. 
681
 Kingston Crown Court and Snaresbrook Crown Court: measurements by Google Earth. 
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and Sheffield Crown Court as courts where they have conducted trials, as some 
barristers in London mentioned travelling out to the South Western and Midlands 
Circuits, as well as within the South Eastern Circuit to provincial courts. However, these 
were out of the ordinary occasions which did not constitute the majority of their case 
loads. It is accepted that the size of the criminal bar as estimated here are only very 
rough figures with barristers occasionally moving around the country and across circuit 
lines, however, the basic point relating to comparative sizes of the Bar and their regular 
court appearances remains.     
 
iii. Contact rate 
 
Relative to the Midlands, London solicitors have a far greater choice of barrister and 
barristers themselves can potentially move more frequently between courts according to 
their instructions. As shown, these conditions are created by two factors. Firstly, the 
number of barristers who may be conveniently instructed is far greater in London than 
the Midlands. Secondly, this larger number of barristers can access a much larger 
number of courts on a regular basis.  The net effect of geography and numbers of 
counsel is to vary the contact rate of barristers in cases as opponents, or within the 
environs of the courthouse generally, depending upon the region within which their 
chambers is based.  A barrister in Nottingham Crown Court is much more likely than a 
London barrister to have as his or her opponent a fellow member of chambers, someone 
that he or she has known from a previous case, or at least, someone that he or she has 
met in the robing room. Furthermore, he or she is much more likely to be in front of a 
judge who has previously tried cases in which they have appeared or who is or was a 
member of their chambers. This increased contact rate between barristers and judges is a 
potentially viable explanation for why the plea rate and cracked trial rates are different 
between London and the Midlands. This increase in contact rate has given greater 
weight to organisational drivers that may play a part of all barristers’ advice regardless 
of their location in the country. Through an analysis of the interview data this research 
will attempt to partially establish the nature of those organisational drivers that make 
guilty pleas and cracked trials more frequent in the Midlands and less frequent in 
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London. This research argues that the values of the barrister are not necessarily co-opted 
by the machinery of criminal justice to the detriment of the defendant, as Blumburg and 
Sanders and Young put forward, but that bargained pleas become easier within an 
environment where counsel know one another and already have a relationship prior to 
the case. As L1 commented: 
 
 I know some people who would say, if they were here, every case can be 
cracked. Every defendant can be cracked on something somewhere down the 
line, except the one in 1000 who is there on principle.  
 
That that point ‘down the line’ is less difficult to reach when both counsel have a close 
or previous relationship. This point is necessarily reached by barristers doing one 
another favours or helping out friends, rather barristers in close contact can understand 
how their opposite number approaches the case and can therefore enter into negotiations 
with knowledge of their opponent’s strengths and weakness. With greater information 
about their opponents’ abilities and the likelihood of more frank discussions, barristers 
are in a better position to negotiate successfully.  
 
c. The robing room 
 
During the course of the field work for this study, the researcher visited several robing 
rooms in various locations, including the Central Criminal Court, Kingston Crown 
Court, Leicester Crown Court and Nottingham Crown Court. As was noted at the time of 
the interviews, the atmosphere in the robing room between these courts was markedly 
different. Barristers, including those interviewed, regularly sat alone in the London 
Crown Court centres, failing to acknowledge anyone else who might enter or leave the 
room, and spent the entire interview period by themselves. In contrast, the robing rooms 
of the Midland court centres visited appeared far more sociable and amenable. Barristers 
regularly greeted one another by first name and mentioned recent social engagements or 
names of cases where they were in opposition to one another. Although superficial, these 
observations strongly suggested a level of familiarity in the Midlands court centres that 
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was absent from London. Again, this was unsurprising given that most of those in the 
robing room for a case on those days that the researcher was present seemed to be from 
either one of two larger Nottingham sets. As this experience was the same in 
Nottingham and Leicester there was nothing to suggest that these days were out of the 
ordinary or in any way exceptional. 
 
When organising the interviews for this study, the researcher was placed in contact with 
a senior member of a Midlands chambers. On meeting that member the researcher was 
introduced to several barristers at Leicester and Nottingham Crown Court who were 
recommended on the basis of being “sound” or “trustworthy”. In fact several barristers 
in the robing room were covertly pointed out as a barrister not to talk to. The idea of 
“out-siders” who did not play by the community rules was reinforced by the interviews 
themselves. As discussed below, barristers with an alternative approach were treated 
with suspicion. 
 
d. Evidence for court community and repeat players in the interviews  
 
The observation that different court practices existed in different areas of the country 
was common to many interviewees’ replies to questions relating to rates of guilty pleas. 
For the most part, the comments made about different circuits were unsolicited and came 
out of discussions about the interviewee’s practice in relation to plea bargaining. 
Barristers who practised in London frequently encountered a different atmosphere in 
provincial courts, noting that regular barristers were very friendly with one another, as 
well as the judiciary, as A2 commented: 
 
 …there is much more of a community feel. If you go to Sheffield Crown Court, 
it’s the same people everyday, going to the same court, and the judges are known 
to all the barristers very well, they all come from their chambers. In London there 
are maybe 20 courts. You go to different courts all the time, you’re not going to 
the same courts.   
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The report of A2 that in London ‘you go to different courts all the time’, strengthens the 
point made above regarding the contact rate in London as compared to the Midlands. As 
A2 understood, barristers in London simply cannot create the same kind of relationships 
as those in provincial courts because they lack continuous contact. E1’s experience of 
Nottingham Crown Court compared with her normal day-to-day work was very similar: 
 
 People in London, there isn’t such a community. I mean, people know each other 
but you can be in London, out of London, in different courts around London 
everyday of the week, every week of the year. So, you don’t see the same people 
every day. If you’re a barrister in Nottingham you go to Nottingham and you go 
to Derby, and that is it. And I’ve done cases in both towns, and there is a real 
tight knit group, particularly at Nottingham. 
 
That there were definable court communities was acknowledged by Midlands’ barristers, 
as well as those from London chambers. There is therefore a firm basis in the interview 
data for believing that the geographical isolation and grouping of courts described above 
does have a clear effect on the number of different barristers who are able to accept 
briefs at particular court centres. This in turn has a knock-on effect in terms of the 
community created there. London courts have a relatively high number of barristers, 
with a high turn over of individuals, through a larger number of court centres. This 
prevents communities and repeat players from forming, to the same extent as they might 
do in the Midlands where there are a relatively small number of barristers, with a low 
turn over, through one or two court centres.   
 
Barristers were then asked what impact the differences in court culture might be and 
have on the resolution of cases. Members of the London Bar said they felt like they were 
occasionally treated as an outsider by both opposing counsel and judges when they left 
the South Eastern Circuit. Some interviewees said they found that the regional bars and 
judges treated them with suspicion and that: 
 
 Some courts are parochial in their structure, in the way that the judges treat 
certain barristers. In the way that barristers treat you, you’re not from round here, 
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kind of attitude.682 
 
E1, who had experience of a trial in Nottingham, claimed that Midlands counsel refused 
to negotiate with her or take her view on the case into consideration.  
 
This lack of co-operation and mutual suspicion seemed to have created rather 
stereotypical and unsubstantiated myths surrounding each other’s ways of practising. 
London barristers accused the members of the Midlands Bar of cracking everything for 
fees, or other unscrupulous tactics such as listing themselves in two trials on the same 
day, and then cracking one case and running the other as a trial. None of the London 
barristers who related this account of double listing had experienced it directly and, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, the practice seemed to have limited possibilities and was 
described as undesirable by Midland barristers. However, the story had formidable 
currency as an accurate depiction of the Midlands Bar amongst some of those 
interviewed. In Nottingham, many of those interviewed put forward the idea of the 
‘alternative bar’ from London. These barristers were from ‘left-wing sets’ who tried to 
wring as much money from cases by taking every point possible against the prosecution 
case. L1 explained the typical member of the ‘alternative bar’ as: 
 
 L1: …the radical left wing, alternative bar. Many of them hail from London I’m 
afraid. That is why there is a gulf between us and London…  
 
 JB: So, you call them the alternative bar in that they are…? 
 
 L1: Dishonest. 
  
The archetype of the alternative bar advertised his or herself as willing to fight all cases 
and take all points possible. Such tactics might prove very popular with the defendant, 
but in the long run the defendant’s interests were harmed (perhaps by not taking a good 
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plea offer) and were motivated entirely by more money for the barrister. 
 
While there did seem to be limited, anecdotal evidence for these suspicions, other 
interviewees with direct experience of the local bar were far more circumspect. C1, a 
barrister at a London set gave an evaluation of the Midlands Bar which was more 
guarded in its explanation for why more cases cracked there: 
 
 …there’s a huge cultural difference between the practices outside London and 
inside London…they can’t be separated from plea. The system at work, the 
criminal justice system at work is far closer outside London than inside 
London…I think that’s certainly that people can have perhaps more open and 
frank discussions with people that they know well about the merits of cases. And 
I think traditionally used to be a way of getting through work in some areas 
perhaps. And I think just the style of advocacy in some parts of the country 
compared to London is far more collaborative.  
 
This reasoned approach shares much in common with how L1 and N2 explained their 
own work and how negotiations were conducted in the Midlands as compared with 
London. L1 described the Midlands court centres’ culture:  
 
 I think there’s a culture of trust up here which is far less common in London…I 
mean, we’ve got dodgy people up here, don’t get me wrong, but if you are dodgy 
up here you soon get seen for what you are. I mean, the community knows who 
you are and you will get marginalised by the community. You need to trust, for 
all this business of plea bargaining, Goodyear indications, early pleas. You need 
trust, you need fairness. 
 
That ‘culture of trust’ was used by L1 to explain the readiness with which he might 
come to an agreement with opposing counsel on how a case should be guided through 
the courts and eventually resolved. As was described in the theoretical model above, 
repeat players develop relationships of trust and information can be readily transferred 
between one another. Those from outside the community, or those who have shown 
themselves to be untrustworthy are quickly picked out and marginalised. N2 argued that 
there were clear advantages in having common approaches to cases: 
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 Many positive examples exist of two advocates who know each other and know 
how each other operate, thinking, talking, working professionally with 
professional pride to achieve a sensible compromise on the facts. It spares the 
system, the witnesses, all the nonsense or the panoply of a trial, if in that 
particular case it happens to be the best thing for the nonsense to be avoided and 
for there to be a resolution. That often happens. So maybe it is a bad thing but 
that happens. I’ve no doubt that that’s a bad thing that happens less in London, 
but that is a side-effect, not a side-effects, a symptom if you like, an unfortunate 
symptom of contesting more.  
 
What was perceived as a disadvantage, and regarded with suspicion by some London 
counsel, was seen as a real advantage by those interviewed from the Midlands Circuit. A 
barrister from off the circuit, N2 admitted, would not be dealt with in the same way, 
simply because he would not know how he or she approached cases: 
 
 Now, if that prosecution brief on the affray wasn’t with my chambers and was 
some out-of-towner that I’ve never met before, I might have tried it, discussed 
the idea of a basis, I might not have. But, I certainly wouldn’t have been able to 
go in with, armed with all the facts about my opponent and achieve what I 
achieved on this young man’s behalf. You know? 
 
It is difficult to know whether settling cases in this manner is detrimental to the 
defendant. On N2’s account, the free exchange of information about the true nature of 
the case against the defendant brings about a ‘sensible compromise on the facts.’ With a 
greater information exchange, cases that can be settled by way of a plea bargain are 
more likely to occur. However, a court community might have norms of settlement that 
work against the majority of defendants’ interests. Some London interviewees believed 
that regional solicitors regularly instructed London barristers where they wanted a trial 
and because London counsel were ‘more willing to fight cases.’683 This reinforces the 
idea that there is a court community that outsiders cannot readily break into, and it also 
suggests that these solicitors perceive Midlands’ barristers as settling cases too readily. 
S2 was also of the belief that local, Midlands barristers settled too easily, and he chose 
who he instructed extremely carefully. Why solicitors might want a case “to fight” is not 
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necessarily because it is in the best interests of the defendant, however. As established in 
the previous chapter, a long trial may be lucrative to a solicitor. Instructing London 
counsel would therefore be seen as improving the chances that negotiation will fail and a 
trial ensues.   
 
During the course of this research barristers were not observed advising nor were they 
observed in negotiation, therefore it is not possible to make an evaluation of this kind of 
collaboration between barristers. What does appear to be apparent on the limited basis of 
these interviews is that repeat players in Midland’s court rooms have created 
organisational drivers that create greater possibilities for settlement in cases. Further 
research would be required, including a scrutiny of case files and interviews with 
defendants before any conclusions about the operation of such drivers could be safely 
drawn.  
 
3. Other factors that may affect the guilty plea and cracked trial rates 
 
The explanation given here of the regional differences observed in the statistics is not 
intended to be a complete description. Other factors could have an impact on the guilty 
plea and cracked trial rates, however, they could not all be measured in the present 
research. Discussed briefly below are matters that were considered as potentially 
important in affecting why defendants in the Midlands are more likely to plead guilty 
and trials were more likely to crack. As will be seen some of these factors can be 
discounted, whilst others deserve further research. 
 
a. London deals with more serious offending? 
 
N1 suggested that London dealt with more serious offences and therefore the cracked 
trial rate there was likely to be lower: 
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I think the crack rate here is influenced by the fact that there is less serious crime 
and therefore it is cracking. The less serious the case the more likely it is to 
crack, quite frankly. I think input from judges and barristers is vastly overrated. I 
think it’s how serious a crime is. You are not in get someone pleading guilty to 
murder are you? And you’re not going to get someone pleading guilty to 
kidnapping. And there must just be a higher volume of serious crime in London 
and I would be interested to see the statistics, if you took it simply on serious 
crime. 
 
While N1 is correct in asserting that serious crime, such as rape and murder tend to have 
a lower plea rate684, the difference in the seriousness of offending between the circuits is 
minimal. The Judicial Statistics provide an overview of the types of offences dealt with 
by HMCS region, split into three classes of offences. In 2007, Class One offences, 
which include murder, rape, and kidnapping, account for 1.7% of all cases heard in 
London and 1.3% of all cases heard in the Midlands.685 Category 2 offences made up 
2.7% of all cases heard in London and 4.7% in the Midlands.686 Category 3, the least 
serious offences, including theft and many either-way offences, comprised 95.6% of 
cases heard in London and 94% of cases heard in the Midlands.687 According to these 
categories, the profile of the seriousness of offences is therefore very similar between 
the circuits. Although high profile cases may be heard in the Central Criminal Court, 
their number is very small when placed in the over context of criminal justice within 
each HMCS region and have very little impact on overall guilty plea and cracked trial 
rates.  
 
b. The acquittal rate in the Midlands is better 
 
Unfortunately, the Judicial Statistics for 2006, 2007 and 2008 do not list the acquittal 
rate for defendants by HMCS region. However, according to the 2005 statistics the 
acquittal rate in London (when a not guilty plea was entered to all offences charged) was 
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65.5%, whereas the acquittal rate in the Midlands was 68.4%.688 This might suggest that 
barristers in the Midlands are slightly better at identifying and diverting from trial those 
who should plead guilty, and may support the notion that suitable bargained pleas are 
more readily reached by Midland’s barristers within their court communities. The 
improved acquittal rate in the Midlands however is quite small and cannot account for 
the larger differences in the guilty plea and cracked trial rates alone. Furthermore, the 
acquittal rate may be accounted for by other factors, such as local jury attitudes, that 
were undetectable in the present research. 
 
c. Work load 
 
As noted above, the ability of any researcher to accurately estimate the size of the Bar is 
significantly impeded by a lack of reliable statistics on the number of barristers and 
advocates practising in the Crown Court. The general feeling from most of the barristers 
interviewed, and the rough estimations of the sizes of the local bar given here at 
paragraph 3)b.i, indicates that there is significantly greater competition for cases in 
London than in the Midlands. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that the financial 
incentives given to barristers were highly dependent on work load under the new AGFS. 
A busy barrister with many cases can make more money by cracking cases and running 
few trials. On the other hand, a barrister with few briefs will try to run cases as trials to 
ensure that they gain the greatest fee from the small number of cases that are available. 
Although the AGFS was only a recently enacted and cannot explain the historical 
difference, it is suggested that work load may have a significant impact on how cases are 
handled. Under the analysis provided in Chapter 6, it might be predicted that a higher 
work load, as that potentially found in the Midlands, would result in a great number of 
guilty pleas and cracked trials. In order to produce a definitive link, the typical work 
loads of barristers in both HMCS regions should be studied and the effect of cases per 
barrister quantified.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This data provides an indication that repeat players with court communities are 
established in the Midlands and that they assist with negotiation over plea, whereas in 
London, such communities are absent or weak in their effects on plea. This difference in 
local culture partially accounts for the differences in guilty plea and cracked trial rates 
between London and the Midlands as displayed in the Judicial Statistics. What cannot be 
said on the basis of this data is whether the presence of such communities are in the 
defendant’s interest or not. American studies that have examined the effects of repeat 
players on defendant outcomes have concluded that they have little impact on final 
sentence.689 A comparable study that examined the insider/outsider status of barristers 
and the effect on cases outcome would be useful in identifying whether or not the same 
conclusion can be drawn in the case of England and Wales. 
  
While information exchange is certainly improved in court communities, leading to 
better negotiations as per Scott and Stuntz, it is not possible to say what other values 
may be informing decision-making within each respective court culture. If barristers 
negotiated and advised on the basis of acquittal and conviction only, then the free 
exchange of information as displayed in the Midlands should be to the benefit of the 
defendant, who can evaluate their position on the basis of a realistic projection of trial 
and sentencing possibilities. The improved acquittal rate in the Midlands, subject to the 
caveats outlined above, might indicate that some defendants in the Midlands derive 
benefit from their representatives being repeat players. This however is unsubstantiated 
in the data and cannot account for the overall differences observed in the statistics. 
 
This chapter has not sought to argue that court communities account for all the 
differences in the guilty plea and cracked trial rates. As described, other significant 
factors may play a role. Rather, this chapter argues for a reassessment of the role of the 
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court community in barrister decision-making, how court communities might inform the 
content and timing of advice, and to what extent communities and repeat players may 
affect the pleas entered by defendants. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to provide a different perspective on the factors which determine 
a barrister’s advice on plea in the Crown Court. Beginning with the earlier literature, it 
has been argued that the present scholarship is too dated to act as an accurate description 
of the practices of the current Bar, and that the wealth of changes that have occurred in 
the past 20-30 years have created a very different environment for legal advice. In 
addition, the literature is missing vital empirical evidence on barristers’ own 
perspectives and does not reflect the current work environment of practising at the 
criminal bar. This research has sought to fill that lacuna by providing in-depth 
interviews with a sample of barristers and two solicitors. This research has discovered 
data that provides evidence which does not conform to current theories as to why guilty 
pleas are advised. 
 
Chapter 4 presents data that reveals that barristers themselves consider that they are fully 
committed to providing disinterested advice to the defendant which is based upon a 
proper consideration of evidence and sentence. This is not merely an unsubstantiated 
assertion by those interviewed. The interviewees, in describing their practices, were able 
to demonstrate detailed thought processes about how evidence is considered, how 
matters of sentence and the sentencing discount are discussed with the defendant, and 
the effect that those issues had on defendant decision-making. These interviewees 
revealed a carefully considered view about their role as an advisor. They were also 
openly critical of practices that they felt were improper. These findings are inconsistent 
with the description of an entrenched guilty plea culture, a court community that is 
deleterious to the defendant’s interests, or advice-giving which is driven primarily by the 
goal of maximising fees.  
 
This chapter also illustrated the danger of treating the Bar as a homogenous group. 
Amongst barristers, real differences of opinion about the appropriate way in which 
advice may be delivered appears to be present. The evidence for different advising styles 
supports Peter Tague’s findings and provides further issues about the appropriate role of 
the barristers in advising defendants. In particular, the data indicates that while some 
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barristers adopt a persuasive approach others adopt a facilitative approach which seeks 
to provide defendants with the necessary advice and information with which they can 
reach their own assessment of the costs and benefits of pleading. This thesis has argued 
in favour of a facilitative approach to preserve defendant autonomy and prevent the 
potential for their manipulation, while acknowledging the potential danger that some 
highly risk-averse factually innocent defendants might decide to plead guilty unless 
persuaded not to.  
 
In Chapter 5 it was suggested that plea bargains are often sought as a way of achieving 
an optimal outcome for the defendant. The interviewees were highly result focused, with 
a consequentialist view of criminal cases. The interviewees rejected the idea that plea 
bargains necessarily place unfair pressure on the accused, but rather argued that they 
provide a suitable plea that properly balances risk, as assessed by evidence, and 
outcome, as assessed by sentence. The current literature treats de facto innocent 
defendants as a discernable group, whereas in reality barristers, in predicting outcome, 
are only able to treat defendants according to the weight of the evidence. In England and 
Wales, the laws of evidence make it easier to assess pre-trial claims of evidence than it is 
in the United States by providing incentives to reveal defences at an early stage. In these 
respects, plea bargains are more likely to be based on an accurate assessment of the risk 
of conviction and sentence which the defendant faces. In many cases, the plea bargain 
may reduce the overall penalty faced by a de facto innocent defendant who is 
unfortunate enough to face a compelling prosecution case. Banning plea bargaining  
would probably increase the number of cases going through the courts and reduce the 
available resources that may be expended per trial. In this circumstance de facto 
innocent defendants who previously pleaded guilty to lesser offences might be convicted 
of more serious offences and face harsher penalties.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 considered overarching drivers that did not come out of the case at 
hand but were created by external factors. Incentives regarding fees clearly establish a 
causative link between fee and outcome, however, this link is not a direct relationship. In 
line with Peter Tague’s findings, the data suggests that barristers are typically unaware 
of the exact method by which fees for cases are calculated. This evidence suggests that 
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barristers’ clerks may be far more instrumental in the handling of cases than previously 
thought.  
 
Although there existed limited evidence in the data of fee manipulation by barristers, 
doing so overtly could be disastrous to the aspirations for a successful career. Instead, it 
was proposed that fees affect advice in areas of indeterminacy where the “best course of 
action” is difficult to determine. Here, a more financially remunerative course might be 
proposed more regularly, however, that course of action is perfectly valid and not 
necessarily detrimental to the interests of the defendant. By modelling the Advocates’ 
Graduated Fee Scheme it was determined that there is an incentive to encourage cracked 
trials provided that the barrister has sufficient work available. In certain chambers or, 
perhaps, regions of the country where fewer cases are available, trials are much more 
likely to occur. 
 
The findings of the research supported Peter Tague’s arguments as to the importance of 
the barristers’ relationship with their instructing solicitors in the plea decision. Although 
not determinative, Chapter 7 argued that the incentives affecting solicitors had a knock-
on effect on the incentives of barristers. Those who pressurised or manipulated 
defendants might find themselves rapidly out of work. These subsequent incentives are 
primarily financial. The new Litigators’ Graduated Fee Scheme creates a strong 
incentive for solicitors to continue to trial, particularly in long or complicated cases. 
That solicitors’ fees are now contingent on outcome is potentially highly significant in 
the future relationship between barristers and solicitors. Solicitors, unable to afford a last 
minute plea, may decline to instruct independent counsel, and take more and more work 
in-house as they seek to assert greater control over case outcomes. This might have a 
detrimental impact on the advice given to defendants as the mitigating effect of a split 
profession is removed. 
 
Finally this thesis proposed a partial explanation for the observed differences in the 
Judicial Statistics between London and Midlands HMCS regions for guilty plea and 
cracked trial rates. Using a model of repeat players and the reciprocal emergence of a 
court community, it was argued that an environment of increased trust and cooperation 
has emerged in the Midlands. This environment promotes negotiation as information is 
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more readily exchanged between counsel, and standard approaches to cases are 
formulated. This allows a ready resolution of cases through plea bargaining and suitable 
charging of cases. The interview data combined with calculations indicate that the 
courthouses of the Midlands are more isolated than their London counterparts. 
Combined with a reduction in competition for work, it was tentatively established that 
barristers in Midlands courtrooms have an increased contact rate, leading to the 
community effect described. On the basis of the data it was not possible to determine 
whether the court community postulated was inimical to the defendant’s interests, even 
though much of the data recognised that such communities did exist. Contrary to some 
of the literature, many incentives could act upon the way barristers behave in a way that 
might be beneficial to defendants. It was further proposed that case outcomes with 
repeat players of similar cases could be compared with those of one-off players from 
outside the circuit. This investigation might indicate whether and how repeat players 
affect outcomes for those they represent. 
 
This thesis does not argue that barristers are unaffected by factors that may lead to 
advice that is detrimental to the defendant. Instead the research has demonstrated is that 
the current literature overly simplifies the motivations of barristers, and risks obscuring 
the multitude of drivers that affect advice. Without seeking greater detail about what 
incentives influence legal advisors, policy which seeks to affect those incentives will be 
poorly informed. With a thorough, nuanced understanding of what motivates barristers, 
including matters that affect their assessment about the probability of conviction and 
sentence, why plea bargains are entered into, the fees incentives created, the impact of 
the relationship with solicitors, and court community factors, incentives can be adjusted 
so that the risks to defendants of inaccurate advice are minimised. Furthermore, costs 
within criminal justice can be more easily managed. As was revealed in Chapter 6 and 7, 
the current fee structure which provide incentives to solicitors to pursue a case to trial, 
may possibly create a break down in the use of independent counsel and an increase in 
trials. Whether or not an increase in trials is desirable in terms of the quality of justice, it 
will certainly undermine the aims of the government to save money on legal aid. Given 
that the barrister’s advice on plea is critical to the decision made by the defendant, which 
in turn is critical to the cost of a criminal case, a thorough understanding of the drivers 
behind advice is vital in formulating government policy. 
APPENDIX A Methodology 
 
1. Research objective 
 
The aim of the research is to identify the factors or drivers which may determine a 
barrister’s advice on plea. This objective was determined with reference to the relevant 
literature on plea negotiations and the conduct of barristers. Recently no published 
research, with the exception of Peter Tague, has spoken to barristers about how and why 
they advise defendants to plead.690 Tague’s research has suggested that a set of complex 
motives may determine a barrister’s advice and that the position of McConville et al 
does not attempt to explore barristers’ motivations, perhaps failing to appreciate the 
subtleties of how barristers formulate a proposed course of action to the defendant. The 
research objective is therefore not only to discover what determines a barrister’s advice 
on plea but to also evaluate the literature and to test the plausibility of the 
“selfish”/unprepared/financially motivated/guilty plea focused practitioner 
 
2. Method 
 
In identifying what determines a barrister’s advice on plea an appropriate method must 
be chosen. This research has determined that a qualitative approach is necessary- a 
research question with emphasis on decision-making processes is not readily answered 
through statistical or quantitative methods.691 What determines a barrister’s advice on 
plea is almost certainly brought about by complex social processes and cannot be 
measured through the analysis of the causal relationships between variables.692 On the 
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other hand qualitative research allows the use of methods which explore how and why 
people behave the way they do. Exploring the motives and purposes of people requires a 
careful choice of method. That choice depends on what the study wishes to discover.693 
The method must satisfy the requirements of validity and reliability.  
 
a. Using interviews 
 
i. Validity 
 
Validity is understood here to raise the question of whether the research actually does 
investigate that which it claims to investigate. Using interviews as the primary research 
tool is a well suited, valid method to tackle the research question. Although observation 
of social phenomena provides an understanding of how people behave, it does not allow 
for the understanding of motivation or experience. The research question requires an 
exploration of motivation and therefore would be partly hidden to someone who merely 
observed behaviour. As Patton says, ‘the purpose of interviewing is to find out what is in 
and on a person’s mind…, to access the perspective of the person being interviewed…, 
to find out from them things that we cannot directly observe.’694 Interviews allow an 
exploration of why people behave as they do and allows them to explain their own 
behaviour. The use of interviews to measure people’s attitudes and opinions is a 
widespread practice amongst social researchers.  
 
From the literature on plea negotiations and the numbers of defendants pleading guilty it 
is apparent that barristers regularly advise a plea of guilty, occasionally in ‘strong 
terms.’ Observational research as apposed to interviewing would not therefore 
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significantly assist in answering why barristers’ advice takes a particular form. A 
limitation of the current literature has been the propensity to observe the actions of 
barristers but not to explore the reasons behind them. Little of the central areas to be 
researched would be exposed by observation. The main interest of this research is not 
focused upon how barristers advise or their “lived experience” of advising clients, but 
rather why they come to the decisions that they do. Interviews are an excellent vehicle to 
explore purpose and decision-making. Interviews have the added advantage of allowing 
participants to reflect on their behaviour in a manner that they might not normally do. 
Interviews give a chance for participants to think about their own behaviour and to 
explain it. If the focus of the research is find out why barristers advise as they do rather 
than how, the best way of finding that data is to ask the barristers themselves.  
 
ii. Reliability 
 
Reliability is understood here to mean whether the data received is an accurate 
description of the real world. Interviewing is open to the traditional charges of relativism 
and an embedded subjectivity- that it would be impossible for the researcher to test the 
reliability of the barrister’s responses and whether what is said in interview bears at all 
upon the reality of the decision-making process on plea.695 Furthermore, the barrister 
herself may not understand her own true motives for how they make decisions or 
construct responses to fit with those that are those that are “expected”, “normal” or 
otherwise entirely located within themselves. This is further complicated by the 
researcher imposing his or her own biases on the data during interpretation and 
explanation.   
 
These are general criticisms of all qualitative research and are recognised here as a 
difficulty for both the design of this research and the interpretation of the data gathered. 
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Interviews in particular have been criticised as being ‘a trace of other things, not the 
thing- lived experience- itself’696, creating numerous levels of representation from the 
lived experience, to the telling to the researcher, to the final product of the research. 
While this view is not entirely accepted it is understood that drawing conclusions from 
qualitative research beyond the experience of the interviewee is a difficult process. At 
the same time it is possible to find realities in interviews. Interviews do yield useful 
information about people’s social worlds and are not completely meaningless beyond the 
context of the interview.697 Without embracing post-modernist interpretations of the 
construction of “realities”, this research proposes to accept the value of this criticism in 
that it ‘extends, complicates and challenges understanding, sensitising…practitioners to 
the complex dimensions of their work.’698 The apparent reliability of interviewing 
barristers about the way in which they reach their advice to defendants is therefore 
threatened and needs to be addressed. It is easy to envisage that barristers on interview 
will fall back to a “standard response”- the one taught to them on the Bar Vocational 
Course about the advice process, which may bear very little resemblance to what they do 
in practice. In recognising the inherent weaknesses in interview based research, it is the 
intention of this research to carefully navigate the potential pit-falls of overstating the 
reliability of the received data and to ameliorate its flaws through the use of other 
various methods.    
 
Interviewing alone may, therefore, be reproached on the basis that individual accounts of 
attitudes or thought process may not reflect the reality of what occurs when a barrister 
has a defendant in front of them and has a decision to make. This view, as explained, is 
not entirely accepted here, however it is agreed that the qualitative researcher must 
proceed carefully. A number of steps were taken in the present research to ameliorate the 
negative effects of using interviews.  
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Firstly, while the views of how barristers see themselves at work alone would be 
relevant and worthy of research, the reality of what occurs in the thought processes of 
the barrister when advising on plea is reflected interviews. That interviews can be used 
to gain viable data about lawyers’ “reality” is well established in the current literature, 
and several studies have used interviews with lawyers as part of data collection.699 
Barristers can give at least a partially accurate account of how they themselves think 
about the plea process. Barristers, as anyone, create and maintain meaningful worlds 
which they can communicate through language to the researcher.700 What is vital, 
however, is to achieve intersubjective depth and understanding based on trust, rapport 
and that the interviewer ‘have lived or experienced their material in some fashion.’701 
This was achieved in a number of ways. To prevent the barrister falling back on the 
“classic reply” of how they advise, the interview questions were designed to focus the 
interviewee on each of the elements that might impact on advice. These elements were 
drawn from the literature, the law, and the researcher’s experience of giving advice, and 
allowed an exploration of the complexity of the advice giving process beyond the 
“standard response”. The researcher also approached interviewees as a member of the 
Bar. As a non-practising barrister, being introduced as a member of the Bar and a lawyer 
(rather than as a sociologist, academic or student) engendered rapport between the 
researcher and the interview subject. The researcher has also studied criminal law and 
procedure in-depth and has some insight into the language used by lawyers to 
communicate ideas about their work from his experience of law in practice. The 
researcher was therefore able gain a rapport with the interviewee’s experience providing 
suitable follow-up questions or topics to their responses and interpreting the meaning to 
their answers as those given by a criminal practitioner.702  
                                                 
699
 For recent examples: C. Tata and F. Stephen, ‘“Swings and roundabouts": do changes to the structure 
of legal aid remuneration make a real difference to criminal case management and case outcomes?’ [2006] 
Crim LR 722; P. Tague, ‘Barristers' selfish incentives in counselling defendants over the choice of plea’ 
[2007] Crim LR 3; 
700
 Miller and Glassner (n.697) 126-127 
701
 Ibid. 132 citing P.H. Collins, Black Feminist Thought (Unwin Hyman, Boston 1990) 232. 
702
 For discussion of ways in which validity is enhanced: Arksey and Knight (n.695) at 52. 
 287
 
Secondly, to minimise the effects of the researcher’s own biases, the interviewees were 
asked open questions, rather than closed, directed questions which require only a “yes” 
or “no” answer. The researcher only became more specific with questioning once the 
interviewee had indicated a knowledge or preference for one particular form of answer. 
In this way “leading” the interviewees through the research questions was reduced to a 
minimum.  
 
Thirdly, the reliability of what barristers say about their own work can be checked by 
reference to whether their explanation satisfactorily explains high guilty plea rates. If the 
interviewees’ accounts are a realistic explanation of what occurs in practice it may be 
concluded that the accounts may at least be a partially reliable description. 
 
iii. Improving validity and reliability 
 
One view of qualitative research is that its validity can be improved through 
triangulation whereby the data is compared with other data for confirmation703 and 
completeness.704 Confirmation is defined as data which converges with the main 
research to support the conclusions drawn. Completeness is defined as data that 
supplements other research methods and adds dimensions to meaning and improves 
understanding.  
 
Triangulation techniques to improve completeness are the most appropriate as other 
forms of research method would not, and probably could not, confirm the data received 
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from interviewing barristers about their thought processes. Several methods presented 
themselves as potential ways to triangulate and help complete the data or at least allow a 
consideration of the data in context and depth.   
 
It was decided that at least two solicitors should be interviewed about the advising 
practices of barristers. Solicitors are uniquely placed to assess barristers whom they 
regular instruct and observe. The relationship of solicitor-barrister allows for a cross 
checking of what barristers do, and gives an informed third party perspective to interpret 
barrister behaviour. It was also theorised that, following Peter Tague’s research on 
barrister’s incentives, the subsequent incentives of solicitors relating to fees and 
treatment of defendants might have an effect on barrister advice.705 Two solicitors, S1 
and S2 were therefore interviewed. The interviews were digitally recorded and based on 
the responses given by barristers. S1 was interviewed after the 9th interview with a 
barrister, and S2 after the 20th interview with a barrister. The spacing allowed the 
researcher to put appropriately informed data to the solicitors for their responses.  
 
The data from this research was also compared with that of other qualitative and 
quantitative studies. As will be seen, the data was compared against quantitative studies, 
such as the judicial and criminal statistics, in the main thesis to test the accuracy and 
validity of what the interviews related. The results of the interviews were also checked 
against qualitative studies, including interviews with barristers that have previously been 
conducted.  
 
A final way of checking the validity and reliability of the data was done through 
theoretical triangulation. Here, the data in the main body of the thesis was compared 
against a diverse set of socio-legal theoretical explanations of lawyer behaviour given by 
other writers. This allowed the verification of whether the data provides a reasonable 
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explanation of ‘what is it that determines a barristers advice on plea’ according to 
accepted theories of lawyers, and how and why they give advice. 
 
3. Research design 
 
By recognising the methodological difficulties of interview based research, the interview 
field work was designed in order to address those problems or at least ameliorate their 
effects. From the beginning this research adopted a grounded theory approach.706 This 
type of methodology allowed the questions asked and the sample of participants to 
change to allow the development of the emerging theory based on the data collected. 
Beginning with existing or ‘grounded’ theories, these may be elaborated and modified as 
the income data is played against them.707  In essence, this type of theory ‘involves 
constantly searching, comparing and interrogating the first few transcripts to establish 
analytical categories that address the research questions, that are mindful of the research 
data, and which allow the greatest amount of data to be coded…’708 In grounded theory 
‘analysis is  interwoven with data collection, a process of finding, analysing and 
theorizing.’709  
  
The research design can therefore be summarised as follows: a grounded theory 
approach with theoretical sampling to conduct qualitative, semi-standardised interviews 
with practicing barristers who regularly represent defendants in the Crown Court of 
England and Wales.  
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a. Using semi-standardised interviews 
 
At the start of this research a good general idea about the variables to be measured was 
identified by the interviews. These variables have been drawn from the literature and 
sought to test the current position adopted by the literature on why barristers advise the 
way they do. This not only allowed this research to relate back to the current research in 
the area, but allowed penetration into the reality beyond the interview and the “standard 
response”.  
 
From these variables a set of standardised questions were drawn up, designed to explore 
the issues identified.710 A semi-standardised interview format was chosen, using a set of 
standardised questions followed up with scheduled and unscheduled probes to explore 
the interviewee’s responses. This method was selected so that each interviewee was 
asked about the same areas of interest while any further interesting points could be 
pursued to gain further information and allow the emerging theory to develop. A rigid 
set of questions would ignore unanticipated data and presume that all possible variables 
had been identified prior to the study. As Strauss and Corbin note, ‘some questions or 
foci with which you entered the interview…will get quickly dropped, or seem less 
salient, or at least get supplemented.’711 Because these initial questions had not come 
from data but rather other researchers’ perspectives, ‘they must be regarded as 
provisional and [potentially] discarded as data begin to come in.’712 The beginning 
format of questions therefore developed as interesting or unanticipated matters arose. 
That is not to say that the research changed tack on a whim, but rather was flexible 
enough to absorb new avenues for research and allow the collected data to guide the 
process. A flexible set of questions that allowed for variation supported the emerging 
theory method and gave extra reliability to the study. As the interviews progressed, for 
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example, it became more apparent that barristers did not have many concerns about civil 
liability arising as a result of their advice. As a consequence this question has less time 
devoted to it and other questions that had greater relevance were explored in more detail. 
The regional differences found were also pursued more vigorously as interviewees with 
“off-circuit” experience began to relate their observations of varying practices. 
Questions on the differences of the circuits were therefore added and barristers in later 
interviews who identified a difference were asked for reasons to account for this. 
 
4. Pilot  
 
These questions were piloted with 2 barristers to test whether they could be understood, 
whether they explored the relevant areas and whether they produced useful information. 
Basic matters such as the efficacy of the digital voice recorder were also tested as well 
as transcription. These interviews were conducted with personal contacts who could feel 
comfortable providing critical feedback on the interview process. 
 
The pilot interviews took place on Monday 10th December 2007. The interviews took 
place away from the interviewees’ chambers in a restaurant in the Temple. This location 
was chosen for its relative quiet. Both interviews were digitally recorded with the 
participants’ consent. The researcher also took some notes as they spoke, although most 
of the time was spent listening to their responses the researcher could participate 
properly in the interview process. To each interviewee the interview process was re-
explained and the ethical considerations of participating in the pilot.  
 
The first interview took exactly one hour, whilst the second around 54 minutes. The first 
barrister was exceedingly helpful despite her relative junior status. However, the second 
barrister was too junior to provide much beyond a basic sketch of a case moving through 
the Crown Court. The questions were, on the whole, well received and understood. P1 
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and P2 had some difficulty calculating the proportion of their practice that was in crime 
and what proportion was in prosecution and defending.  
 
The question: ‘how do you advise on plea?’ seemed to be difficult to answer for both 
these barristers. Both barristers left the impression that the advice ‘I think you should 
plead guilty’ was not a very good way of describing what they do. Both were keen to 
take instructions from the defendant and then together with the evidence in front of them 
make a recommendation to the defendant that was supported by reasons as disparate as 
how they thought the defendant would stand up to cross examination, the character of 
the prosecution witnesses and the strength of the evidence on the papers, and other 
matters going to a finding of guilt. This allowed them to make an assessment that could 
be presented to the defendant who then made the final decision. Both barristers were 
cautious not to be seen as supplanting the defendant’s decision with their own opinion 
about how the defendant should plead. The first barrister in particular was worried about 
being seen as anything other than ‘whiter than white’, and had some fear about ending 
up in the Court of Appeal giving evidence on the voluntariness of plea.  
 
Their advice on plea did not seem to be affected by matters such as the discount which 
do not go to guilt, however, both felt it their obligation to point out to the defendant the 
possible benefits of pleading guilty. On reflection it was decided that further questioning 
should have taken place as to whether either barrister felt that informing the defendant 
about the discount placed too much pressure on the accused or whether this was merely 
a professional responsibility that they were obliged to fulfil.   
 
Both barristers were aware of barristers who boasted of their fees on getting a guilty plea 
and P1 related a story of a defence barrister going down to the cells and asking ‘what’s 
all this not guilty shit?’ P1 believed that there was a culture amongst some barristers 
who were normally outside London and of a “type” who would certainly plead out cases 
in the interests of bravado and higher fees. P1 believed that these barristers were mostly 
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of an older age and worked in provincial courthouses where such behaviour was not 
frowned upon or was considered to be ‘just the way X does things.’ By contrast P1 felt 
that the highly competitive nature of the London bar made it more difficult for barristers 
to engage in fee focused work, at least overtly. P1 felt that the Carter Reforms would 
discourage barristers from taking this course as the financial incentive would be simply 
removed. Accounts of third party actions are difficult to verify, but it was noted that this 
barrister felt comfortable enough to expose behaviour she felt highly was unethical. 
 
a. Changes to the question schedule as a result of the pilots. 
 
As a result of the pilots it was necessary to change the understanding of how advice is 
given so that the process of giving advice was taken into account. This involved a 
presentation of the defendants’ options and overall assessment of the case rather than a 
blunt “I advise you to plead guilty/not guilty”. Asking: “In approximately what 
proportion of cases in which you are instructed to defend do you advise a plea?”713 was 
therefore a little artificial. Of course, the barristers questioned made recommendations 
on plea but this seemed to be more accurately put to the defendant as: “In my view the 
prosecution will present the evidence in this way, which, unless you have a satisfactory 
answer, will be highly unfavourable to you.” It was concluded that concentrating on the 
advice process rather than on how a particular factor impacts on a blunt guilty/not guilty 
conclusion would be more informative. It was determined that the questions should 
reflect how advice develops according to the various factors to try and get a sense of the 
complexities involved. It was therefore decided that the questions in this area should 
start with: “What process do you follow in advising a defendant- how do you begin?” 
This allowed the interviewee to talk though the process. This would be followed up with 
input from the researcher in the form of probes about how different elements impact 
upon the way the interviewees think. The pilot questions allowed this to a certain extent 
but were altered to allow the interviewees to lay out the process of advice giving rather 
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than replying to questions that look to the question of the final recommendation on plea. 
 
On listening to the interview it was apparent that charge bargain process should have 
been focused on in more detail. The interview questions were altered to ask a barrister 
how that process of bargain is initiated, carried out and presented to the defendant. This 
was obviously critical. If the bargain process is initiated after speaking with the 
defendant and an analysis of the “proper charge” on the papers, then the bargain might 
more realistically represent a charge that would be provable a trial. If the process is 
initiated by the prosecution and defence barrister, without an analysis of prosecution 
disclosure or an account from the defendant (who is presented with the deal) then the 
charge bargain would more closely resemble the description given by McConville et 
al.714  
 
The questions also benefited from a re-organisation into matters going to the actual 
determination of plea, as discussed above, and then further matters such as fees which 
although may impact on the content of advice, are external to the actual advice giving 
process itself. This avoided confusing the participants and improved the flow of the 
interview. The order was changed and categorised into: Preliminary questions; A) The 
advising process; B) Charge bargaining/relationship with the court; C) Fees/workload; 
D) The relationship between defendants and solicitors; and E) Ethics and professional 
liability.   
 
Reminders were also placed at the top of the question schedule as to important 
explanations that should be made to interviewees regarding ethics, and the general 
conduct of the interview. 
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b. Other matters arising from the pilots 
 
In a second short comment P1 mentioned that some barristers’ chambers were 
completely defence minded and therefore refused to represent the Crown in proceedings. 
These chambers, P1 pointed out, were far more likely to advise a defendant to plead not 
guilty and to go to trial. Arguably these chambers represent the antithesis to the guilty 
plea culture described by McConville et al’s research and had an impact on the selection 
of chambers when looking for barristers to interview. 
 
To improve the consistency of the interviews a number of scheduled probes as follow 
ups to the questions were inserted to ensure that the same kinds of areas with each 
interviewee were covered. It was concluded that the questions as drafted worked well 
and other than the changes noted above no radical rethink of the study was thought 
necessary. Both barristers involved said that they enjoyed the process of participating 
and were happy that they had decided to take part.  
 
5. Sampling 
 
a. Emerging theory sampling 
 
In common with the question design, the sampling technique proposed for this research 
was based upon a broad “emerging theory” methodology. This sampling technique is a 
type of theoretical sampling whereby the participants are chosen according to a 
developing theory which explains the data and drives selection as the study continues. 
Sampling proceeds purposefully and develops as the study does according to variables 
controlled by the needs of the theory.715 Following Sandelowski’s description, this study 
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began with a selected sample ‘according to preconceived, but reasonable initial set of 
criteria.’716 This initial sampling frame ‘permits the researcher to develop the conceptual 
lines that will ultimately drive theoretical sampling’717 as the emerging theory of the data 
becomes clear. As Glaser argues, researchers ‘begin by talking to the most 
knowledgeable people to get a line on relevancies and leads to track down more data and 
where and how to locate oneself for a rich supply of data’718 The researcher begins with 
a sample of where the phenomena occurs and then ‘collect more data to examine 
categories and their relationships and to assure that representativeness on the category 
exists. Simultaneous data collection and analysis are critical…The full range and 
variation in a category is sought to guide the emerging theory.’719 While the initial 
sample was controlled according to variables that were thought to be important, these 
variables did change as the study developed according to the inductive process involving 
the emerging theory from the data and the deductive process of the purposeful selection 
of samples to check out the emerging theory.720 This method was satisfactory in some 
respects, however it did pose some difficulties as described below.  
 
a. Sampling in action 
 
Interviewees were initially drawn according to demographic sampling techniques to 
cover a predetermined cross-section of the criminal bar. This sample should be 
““encultured informants”, individuals who know their culture well and take it as their 
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responsibility to explain it’721. Almost certainly barristers of any year of call know their 
culture and take it as their responsibility to explain it. The sample was specifically 
chosen to take in a number of what were thought to be initially significant, controllable 
variables. The following variations were identified as being significant for initial 
selection purposes: year of call (and therefore experience and type of work undertaken); 
size of chambers; gender722; proportion of work in prosecution and defence; and practice 
profile of chambers. These last two factors were thought be important for several 
reasons as the pilot found. Some chambers are known to be “defence sets” and therefore 
do no work for the CPS whatsoever. Barristers from these chambers possibly do not 
share exactly the same views as those from chambers where prosecution work is also 
conducted.  
 
A range of barristers and chambers that took in this range of traits were therefore 
contacted for interview. These traits were continually analysed and compared to guide 
the emerging theory. Barristers were selected using the Bar Directory published by 
Sweet and Maxwell and chambers’ own websites.723 Almost all chambers in England 
and Wales now have their own website which details the practice profile of the 
chambers and individual barristers. This allowed selection according to the variables 
identified, and the targeting of relevant individuals as the study progressed. After each 
interview was conducted, what was discussed was reflected upon and the data 
transcribed. Although the core questions and areas of interests remained the same with 
each interviewee, this allowed a process of continual theory development as data was 
revealed and gaps and weaknesses were discovered. Accordingly, although the first 
interviewees came from London sets, the data collected strongly suggested a divergence 
of practice between the South Eastern Circuit and the Midlands Circuit. In response, the 
sample was widened to take in five barristers at both Leicester and Nottingham Crown 
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Court centres, and the senior partner of a solicitor firm in Nottingham. These 
interviewees were not individually targeted by being identified beforehand, as the 
researcher was introduced to prospective participants in the robing rooms of both courts. 
During the time spent in the robing room of each court, the profiles of each barrister 
interviewed was ascertained beforehand from a contact in the court and checked against 
the overall profile of those already interviewed. Controlling this part of the sample in 
this way ensured that the five interviewed represented a mix of experience from less 
than 5 years call to QC.  
 
The process of theory development together with purposeful sampling did cause some 
difficulties as the response rate to requests for interview was generally muted. Despite 
an initial high rate of agreement from those contacted to participate- approximately 8 out 
of 10 of those first contacted for interviewed agreed to participate- this fell to very low 
rates towards the end of the study- around 1 in 20. This made it difficult to target gaps in 
the data with total precision. Accordingly the number of barristers interviewed with 5-10 
years experience is unrepresentative of the Bar itself as is the number of women.724 It is 
felt that this under representation does not have a large impact on the results of this 
research as the women interviewed and the interviewee with 5-10 years experience did 
not relate experiences that were particularly different from their male/more experienced 
colleagues.   
 
As with any research of this nature, those barristers who responded to the request for 
interview were volunteers and therefore were not necessarily representative or typical of 
the variables identified.725 In trying to ameliorate the effects of self-selection the sample 
of interviewees was continually reviewed to ensure that variable characteristics were 
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represented and that the data did not just concentrate on one type of criminal practice. 
The practice break down of the interviewees and their chambers is shown in Tables A-2 
and A-3.   
 
The number of participants in this research was 22 interviewees coming from 15 
different chambers, plus two solicitors who were senior partners in their respective 
firms. The original research design had planned to interview around 25 barristers, as this 
was felt to be a potential ‘saturation’ point for the data.726 Given that the last few 
interviews yielded little different data, the number of interviews undertaken was 
sufficient. The following tables presents a break down of the interviewees by number of 
years in practice, interviewees’ practice break down, interviewees’ chamber’s practice 
break down, geographical location and gender.727  
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 Table A-1 Years call of interviewees 
 
Years 
call 
     
 0-5 years 5-10 years 10-20 years 20-30 years 30 years + Total 
Number of 
interviewees 
2 1 13 
5 (including 
1 Queen’s 
Counsel and 
2 recorders) 
1(Queen’s 
Counsel) 22 
 
Table A-2 Practice break down of interviewees 
 
Practice 
break 
down 
     
 
100% 
defence 
75% 
defence/25% 
prosecution  
50/50% 
75% 
prosecution/ 
25% defence 
100% 
prosecution 
Total 
Number of 
interviewees 
8 3 4 5 2 22 
 
Table A-3 Practice break down of interviewees’ chambers 
 
Practice break 
down    
 
Criminal only 
practice sets  
Mixed common 
law sets 
Total 
 100% defence 
Mixed 
prosecution and 
defence 
  
Number of 
interviewees 
4 16 2 22 
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Table A-4 Interviewees’ circuit of main practice 
 
Circuit of main 
practice   
 South Eastern Midlands Total 
Number of interviewees 17 5 22 
 
Table A-5 Interviewees by gender 
 Gender   
 Male Female Total 
Number of interviewees 17 5 22 
 
The solicitors selected for interview were chosen on the basis of their experience of 
criminal justice in the Crown Court within the South Eastern and Midlands Circuits. 
Both were senior partners of well respected firms that have high ratings from reviewing 
agencies, such as the Legal 500 website.728 These solicitors were selected because of 
their extensive knowledge of criminal practice, legal aid and the local bar. Unlike the 
barristers interviewed, it was not felt that junior solicitors were necessarily beneficial to 
the study as they did not have the requisite experience to have formed a detailed view of 
barristers’ work, nor the understanding of running a criminal practice with respect to 
fees. Both these areas were felt to be important in asking the solicitors to give an opinion 
about how the Bar operates and how fees can affect advice. 
 
6. Approaching participants 
 
Before approaching potential participants directly, it was felt that the ethical conduct of 
                                                 
728
 The Legal 500, ‘a series of guides, reviews the strengths and strategies of law firms in over 90 
countries’ and includes firms dealing with crime: <http://www.legal500.com/>  
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the study required the approval of the Criminal Bar Association.729 The researcher 
therefore drafted a letter to the Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association at the time, 
Sally O’Neill QC. After a brief correspondence, Ms O’Neill agreed that the study was 
appropriate and that the researcher might approach members of the Bar for interview.  
 
In accordance with informed consent and paragraph 7 of the College’s guidelines on 
ethical research, each of the barristers interviewed was informed of the purpose of the 
study and the manner in which the data would be published and stored.730 No barrister is 
identified by name nor is any data that could identify them personally presented in the 
final thesis. A draft research methodology and question schedule was submitted to the 
Queen Mary College Research Ethics Committee which indicated approval for the 
research design and objectives on 21 November 2007.   
 
The interviewees in London were approached by email or letter which included the same 
text and topic guide outlining the general areas to be discussed in each interview.731 This 
letter explained the purpose of the study, drew participants attention to guarantees of 
anonymity and prior approval from the Criminal Bar Association.  As noted above, a 
good initial response rate dwindled so that few invitations were replied to. This is typical 
of any research looking for volunteers and the initial good response was probably an 
aberration of the study. After a positive response from the email or letter, the 
interviewee was contacted again by telephone or email to set up a convenient time and 
place for interview. Almost all those in London were interviewed in chambers or at 
court, with one preferring a local pub with a quiet saloon bar. The barristers in Leicester 
and Nottingham were interviewed at court after an initial contact with a senior member 
of chambers. This barrister was interviewed first, who then introduced the researcher to 
other barristers in the robing room. Those in the robing room were given a similar verbal 
                                                 
729
 The Criminal Bar Association is a part of the Bar Council of England and Wales and regulates the 
professional conduct of its members. 
730
 Council of Queen Mary, University of London Statement of Research Ethics Policy 
<http://www.qmul.ac.uk/research/ethics/>  
731
 The text of this letter and topic guide appears in Appendix C. 
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explanation of the interview as that contained within the letter and asked if they would 
like to participate. Although some of those approached declined on the basis of 
insufficient time, most of the barristers asked to participate agreed.  
 
The solicitors were approached differently. Both solicitors were identified beforehand as 
being particularly knowledgeable and were contacted through personal contacts of the 
researcher. After an initial introduction, correspondence via email arranged the time and 
date for interview. Both solicitors were interviewed at their respective offices. 
 
7. Conducting the interviews 
 
The 24 interviews (including the two interviews with solicitors) were conducted between 
January and May 2008. Each interview was digitally recorded and lasted between 35 
minutes and 1 hour and 20 minutes. After each interview the recording was transcribed 
by the researcher using voice recognition software. This allowed an ongoing analysis of 
the content of the interviews and gave the researcher a thorough knowledge of the 
content of each transcript. As is important with a grounded theory approach, the 
questions asked were reviewed after each interview, and salient, previously 
unrecognised issues (such as geography, and the differences between prosecution and 
defence pay) could be included in future interviews as scheduled probes. This also gave 
opportunity for the researcher to reflect on interview technique, including when matters 
should be probed more thoroughly and how interviewees could be set at their ease. It 
was apparent that interviewees appeared content to talk about the topics presented and 
were very willing to discuss all matters in detail and at length. Even potentially sensitive 
questions regarding pay were generally well received and no discernible change was 
detected in the style of answers given. The fluency of the interviews was improved by 
the researcher’s understanding of criminal law and procedure and prevented the 
difficulty of interviewees having to explain basic legal issues. This allowed interviewees 
to talk in depth about their expertise and professional experience. The interviews were, 
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overall, relaxed and the interviewees were very generous with their time. Nearly all of 
the interviewees commented on how much they had enjoyed the process and expressed 
interest in the results of the research. The positive attitude of the interviewees towards 
their interview experience reinforces the confidence that can be had in the reliability of 
the data- by gaining a relationship of trust and rapport with the interviewees the quality 
of the data was improved, as the participants were more open and frank about what they 
did in practice. The researcher endeavoured to reduce researcher led bias by avoiding 
any indication of approval for one view or another before or during the interviews.  
 
8. Data collection and coding 
 
The interviews were recorded digitally, stored on a computer and transcribed with voice 
recognition software. To ensure anonymity, each London interviewee was given an 
alphanumeric label to distinguish him or her from others. The letter given to each 
interview indicated the chambers from which the barrister came from, and the number 
indicated the individual barrister. Thus the first interview with a barrister from chambers 
“A” was labelled “A1”, the second “A2”, etc. The next interview participant from the 
second chambers was labelled “B1” and so on. The barristers interviewed in Leicester 
Crown Court were labelled “L1”, etc, for “Leicester” and the barristers interviewed in 
Nottingham Crown Court “N1”, etc, for “Nottingham”. Because these interviewees were 
selected to vary the data set, they were labelled slightly differently to ensure that they 
could be easily spotted in the final thesis as a “Midlands participant.” The two solicitors 
interviewed were labelled “S1” and “S2”. “JB” indicates the researcher. 
 
During the interviews the ‘triad of data collection, coding and analysis’732 was a 
continual process. As transcription was carried out early ideas about the data were 
constructed by annotating the text and a hand written log was kept that attempted to 
                                                 
732
 P.H. Becker, ‘Common Pitfalls in published grounded theory research’ (1993) 3 Qualitative Health 
Research 254, 256 
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explain the data and noted significant areas for development. As the interviews had been 
self-transcribed, the researcher was able to note nuances of tone of voice and context so 
that data was not misinterpreted.  
 
There is no right way to code and organise interview data, as there is no right way to 
organise data of any kind.733 According to Esterberg, qualitative data analysis is a 
creative process of making meaning rather than a method that reveals fixed, 
predetermined information.734 However, the researcher should endeavour to immerse 
themselves in the data in order understand it and identify patterned relationships within 
it.735 It was recognised that an open mind should be maintained throughout the coding 
process so that themes and categories ‘earned’ their way into the analysis.736 The 
interview data was subject to a two stage coding process.737 Without using pre-
established codes the transcribed data was analysed looking for developing themes and 
categories which were labelled on the transcript. These codes developed a commonality 
and a focus as the data became more familiar. Categories such as “pressure on the 
defendant”, “sentence as a factor”, “pay rates” were initially created which could then be 
developed into focused coding. In focused coding the data was examined, line by line, 
with the generated codes from open coding to group data together in single text 
computer files. These text files held together all the relevant data from all the 
interviewees on a particular identified theme with similar or contrasting responses noted. 
Alongside each sample of text yet further annotations were made with details of the data. 
The following is a typical example of annotated text in a text file entitled “Goodyear”: 
 
JB: Right, okay, okay. We’ve mentioned Goodyear. What do you consider to be 
the merits or difficulties of the case? And the operation of Goodyear? 
                                                 
733
 K. Esterberg, Qualitative methods in social research (McGraw-Hill, Boston 2002) 152. 
734
 Ibid. 
735
 K. Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory’ in S. Nagy Hesse-Biber and L. Leavy (eds) Approaches to Qualitative 
Research: A Reader on Theory and Practice (OUP, New York 2004) 497 
736
 Ibid. 
737
 Esterberg (n.733) 158. 
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L1: Of Goodyear? I think Goodyear is brilliant. I think Goodyear is brilliant. I 
think it’s high time in the system that judges were able to say, in appropriate 
cases, this is what you will get, or up to this if you have a trial, if you plead 
guilty. I think it’s high time we were able to do that. And I know there are lots of 
important safeguards within Goodyear and I note that there are many cases 
where a Goodyear is totally inappropriate, if it’s an IPP or if it’s a multi-hander, 
some going off for trial. And when I sit, I’ve been asked to give Goodyears. As 
an advocate I’ve asked for them repeatedly. And if somebody is on the cusp of 
going to prison or not a judge might say, “Mr [L1], I’m not ruling out custody 
but, nor am I my ruling out a non-custodial.” And you can read into the language 
you’re being given a hope of non-custodial without a guarantee of it. And the lay 
client can understand. No, I think that Goodyear is marvellous.  
Annotation: Positive opinion of Goodyear with reasoning of safeguards 
provided. Not always appropriate. 
 
In the text file “Goodyear” all the relevant responses were held with annotations 
alongside. 
 
The coded material fed into the emerging theory and allowed for the spotting of gaps in 
the data thus informing the sampling process as the interviews continued. Although extra 
questions were added as the research continued, the researcher was mindful not to lead 
interviewees in later interviews as to their responses. As the interviews drew to a close, 
these text files served as the basis of chapter construction for the main body of the thesis.  
 
To address the possibility of false coincidence of data, where a researcher may include a 
few well chosen quotes to support an otherwise unsubstantiated or contentious 
conclusion, the text was re-examined against other data that might contradict or 
complicate the issues identified.738 The grouping of data into text files helped this 
process as all data on single issues was placed together. This was assisted by employing 
the earlier discussed methods of triangulation used to improve reliability and validity of 
the data. 
                                                 
738
 Silverman (n.691) 176. 
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APPENDIX B Interview schedules 
 
Initial interview schedule 
 
Questions generated from areas of interest 
The questions have been numbered for easy of reference. 
Question schedule   
 
1. What is your year of call to the Bar? 
 
2. What proportion of your practice is in crime? 
 
3.  What proportion of your practice is in prosecuting/defending?  
 
4. In approximately what proportion of cases in which you are instructed to defend 
do you advise a plea? 
 
5. What proportion of those advised to plead guilty accepts your advice? 
 
6. Of those that fail to take your advice, how common is a not guilty verdict? 
 
7. Do you think the proportion of cases in which you advise a plea has increased 
over the years?  
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 I would like to explore factors which may influence your advice on plea. 
 
 
8. What is the primary consideration when advising a defendant on plea? 
 
9. How do you assess the probability of conviction? 
 
10. How do you weigh a defendant’s chances of conviction against the benefits of a 
guilty plea? 
 
11. Are there any particular rules of evidence that you feel are important in deciding 
what advice to give? 
 
12. Have any changes to, or the introduction of, evidentiary or procedural rules 
changed the advice you give to defendants? 
 
13. How have those changes effected your overall assessment of what advice is to be 
given?    
 
14. How do you feel about your current level of pay? 
 
15. What is your current work load in terms of number of court 
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appearances/trials/etc? 
 
16. Does your workload affect your advice on plea? 
 
17. Do you know the difference in the fee you would receive between a case 
resolved at the PCMH, as a cracked trial, or as a full trial? 
 
18. Do you know the formula used by the Legal Services Commission to calculate 
your fees? 
 
19. Does the fee structure work in such a way as to penalise legal advisors who have 
a high proportion of clients pleading not guilty? 
 
20. Have the Carter Reforms made a difference to how you advise? 
 
21. Are you aware of barristers who advise defendants according to their own 
financial interest? 
 
      21.(A) If yes, how do you think that the Carter Reforms will affect this kind of 
behaviour? 
 
22. Are you adequately prepared for most of your cases in the Crown Court?  
 
23. Does your level of preparedness affect your advice on plea?  
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24. Who do you consider you owe your primary duty to- the professional or the lay 
client? 
 
25. How strongly do you feel the necessity to follow the wishes of instructing 
solicitors on plea? 
 
26. Would you ever contradict an instructing solicitor? If yes, in what 
circumstances? 
 
27. Do you think it would be beneficial to you if you could get more guilty pleas 
from defendants? 
 
28. Would you ever advise a defendant to plea guilty even though you believed him 
or her to be innocent on the papers? If yes, in what circumstances? 
 
29. How do you feel about defending someone in a trial who had little chance of 
acquittal? 
 
30. When advising on plea, in what way do you interpret “in strong terms, if 
necessary?” 
 
31. When do you think it is appropriate to advise a defendant on the discount 
principle? 
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32. How important is the custody threshold in advising on plea? 
 
33. Would you advise a defendant to plead guilty to keep the case in the magistrates’ 
court? 
 
34. What do you consider to be the merits or difficulties of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Goodyear? 
 
35. In what circumstances would you seek a Goodyear indication from the judge? 
 
36. How regularly do judges remind you of the possibility of seeking a Goodyear 
indication? 
 
37. Do you ever worry about incurring civil liability or having professional action 
taken against you as a result of your advice? 
 
38. Have you ever considered the ethical implications of your advice? If so, how? 
 
39. In what circumstances would you approach the prosecutor or judge over charge 
or plea negotiations? 
 
40. How regularly do you approach the prosecutor or judge over charge or plea 
negotiations? 
 
 312
41. Do you feel you owe any duty to co-operate with the prosecutor or judge in 
getting a guilty plea? 
 
42. Does who the prosecutor is impact on your advice on plea? 
 
43. Does who the judge is impact on your advice on plea? 
 
44. Do you believe that defendants make a voluntary choice on plea? 
 
45. Why do you think that the guilty plea rate is so high in the Crown Court? 
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Final version of interview schedule739 
 
ASK FOR PERMISSION TO TAPE RECORD 
RE EXPLAIN PURPOSE OF STUDY AND THANK FOR PARTICIPATION 
INTERVIEWEE IS FREE TO END INTERVIEW AT ANY TIME OR MAY 
REFUSE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTION   
STUDY HAS BEEN APPROVED BY BAR COUNCIL AND QMREC 
 
 
Preliminary Questions 
 
1. What is your year of call to the Bar? 
 
2. What proportion of your practice is in crime? 
 
3.  What proportion of your practice is in prosecuting/defending?  
 
4. In approximately what proportion of cases in which you are instructed to defend 
do you advise a defendant that a guilty plea would be appropriate? 
 
5. What proportion of those advised to plead guilty accepts your advice? 
 
                                                 
739
 This is the ‘final version’ that was taken to the first interview with A1 however later versions included 
other probes relating to other matters such as geographical statistical differences and prosecution pay. 
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6. Of those that fail to take your advice, how common is a not guilty verdict? 
 
7. Do you think the proportion of cases in which you advise a plea has increased 
over the years?  
 
       I would like to explore factors which may influence your advice on plea. 
 
A) The advising process 
 
8. At what point are you normally asked to give advice on plea? 
 
9. What process do you follow in advising a defendant- how do you begin? 
 
   Standard process or does it depend on the defendant? 
 
  If I were a defendant what would you want to know from me? 
 
  Primary considerations when advising a defendant on plea. 
 
  Assessing the probability of conviction. 
 
10. Are there any particular rules of evidence that you feel are important in deciding 
what advice to give? 
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Explore changes to, or the introduction of, evidentiary or procedural rules 
such as bad character and hearsay. 
 
  Changes to overall assessment of what advice is to be given. 
 
11. How do you discuss with a defendant the chances of a conviction against the 
benefits of a guilty plea and the discount? 
 
12. When advising on plea, in what way do you interpret “in strong terms”? 
    
   See Turner [1970] 2 QB 321. 
 
  Suggest what other forms of conduct have been considered appropriate. 
 
13. When do you think it is appropriate to advise a defendant on the discount? 
 
Probe as to fairness/appropriateness in all circumstances/effect on 
defendant.  
 
14. How important is the custody threshold in advising on plea? 
 
15. Would you advise a defendant to plead guilty to keep the case in the magistrates’ 
court? 
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16. What do you consider to be the merits or difficulties of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Goodyear? 
 
17. In what circumstances would you seek a Goodyear indication from the judge? 
 
  Do judges remind of the possibility of seeking a Goodyear indication? 
 
18. Do you think that defendants can understand the processes to make a proper 
decision? 
 
Probe as to whether belief that defendants make a voluntary and informed 
choice on plea. 
 
B) Charge bargaining/relationship with the court 
 
19. Do you ever engage in negotiations over charge? 
 
  Probe as to regularity. 
 
20. In your experience how is the process of the charge bargain initiated? 
 
Probe as to process of the charge bargain; how is the process started?; 
who approaches who?; who is involved?; how is the defendant involved?; 
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how is the deal presented to the defendant?’ do they believe this exerts 
unfair pressure on the defendant. 
 
21. Do you feel you owe any duty to co-operate with the prosecutor or judge in 
getting a guilty plea? 
 
22. Does who the prosecutor is impact on your advice on plea? 
 
23. Does who the judge is impact on your advice on plea? 
 
C) Fees/work load 
 
24. How do you feel about your current level of pay? 
 
25. What is your current work load in terms of number of court 
appearances/trials/etc? 
 
26. Does your workload affect your advice on plea? 
 
27. Are you adequately prepared for most of your cases in the Crown Court?  
 
28. Does your level of preparedness affect your advice on plea?  
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29. Do you know the difference in the fee you would receive between a case 
resolved at the PCMH, as a cracked trial, or as a full trial? 
 
30. Do you know the formula used by the Legal Services Commission to calculate 
your fees? 
 
31. Does the fee structure work in such a way as to penalise legal advisors who have 
a high proportion of clients pleading not guilty? 
 
32. Have the Carter Reforms made a difference to how you advise? 
 
33. Are you aware of barristers who advise defendants according to their own 
financial interest? 
 
      33(A). If yes, how do you think that the Carter Reforms will affect this kind of 
behaviour? 
 
D) The relationship with defendants and solicitors 
 
34. Who do you consider you owe your primary duty to- the professional or the lay 
client? 
 
35. How strongly do you feel the necessity to follow the wishes of instructing 
solicitors on plea? 
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36. Would you ever contradict an instructing solicitor? If yes, in what 
circumstances? 
 
37. Do you think it would be beneficial to you if you could get more guilty pleas 
from defendants? 
 
38. Would you ever advise a defendant to plea guilty even though you believed him 
or her to be innocent on the papers? If yes, in what circumstances? 
 
39. How do you feel about defending someone in a trial who had little chance of 
acquittal? 
 
E) Ethics and professional liability 
 
40. Do you ever worry about incurring civil liability or having professional action 
taken against you as a result of your advice? 
 
41. Have you ever considered the ethical implications of your advice? If so, how? 
 
42. Why do you think that the guilty plea rate is so high in the Crown Court? 
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APPENDIX C Letter to Participants 
 
Dear [Barrister's Name] 
 
   I am a member of the Bar and a PhD candidate at Queen Mary College, University 
of London conducting doctoral research on criminal justice in England and Wales under 
the supervision of Professor David Ormerod and Professor Kate Malleson. As part of my 
work I will be gathering data on the working practices of barristers in the Crown Court. 
The Bar Council has given permission to approach you, and I am writing to ask if you 
would be willing to participate in an interview lasting approximately 45 minutes 
regarding the factors which affect the advice given to defendants in the Crown Court on 
plea.  The aims of the project and the sorts of areas which I would like to discuss with 
you are set out below in more detail in the research and topic guide. As you will see, the 
topic explores some interesting areas of your work and as a participant you would be 
making a vital contribution to the academic discussion of the role of barristers in the 
criminal justice process.  
          
    If you would be willing to be interviewed, please reply via my email address 
[researcher’s email]. I will then endeavour to arrange a suitable place and time for the 
interview at your earliest convenience.  
     
    Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like me to clarify anything about my 
research or the interview process. 
 
    Yours sincerely, 
 
    James Barry 
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Research and Topic Guide 
 
Your interview will form part of a doctoral thesis on barristers' working practices in the 
Crown Court of England and Wales. The research aims to look in detail at the various 
factors that make up a barrister's advice to defendants on plea and how recent changes to 
the law may have impacted upon the advice giving process. 
 
Your interview will be digitally recorded, last for approximately 45 minutes and cover a 
number of issues that are relevant to plea. You will be asked to discuss a number of 
areas including the influence of changes to evidentiary rules, the Court of Appeal's 
decision in Goodyear, the balance of professional and ethical duties, work load and fees, 
and the sentencing discount. The interview is expected to be wide ranging and you will 
be free to raise any points or issues that you feel should be discussed. It is hoped that 
you will find the experience interesting and provide you with an opportunity to speak 
frankly about your work. 
 
In the interest of maintaining the highest ethical and professional standards your 
interview will be conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct. The Bar Council 
has given permission to approach you and they are satisfied that the aims of the research 
and the methods used comply with the Code. In taking part in this research you will be 
interviewed anonymously and allocated a number only by way of identification. All the 
data held will be accessible only by James Barry and will not be passed to any third 
party. The research has been scrutinized and approved by the Queen Mary Research 
Ethics Committee. Copies of the ethical approval will be made available for you to 
inspect if you decide to participate.  
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